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Preface 
In 1972 the School of Business of the University of Kansas was privileged 
to present the first of what it was hoped would become a biennial series of 
symposia on matters of concern to practitioners and educators involved i n the 
field of auditing. The 1974 Arthur Andersen/University of Kansas Symposium 
on Audi t ing Problems bears testimony that the hoped-for emergence of such a 
series has become a reality. Important features of the first symposium were 
maintained in 1974: 
1. Limitation of the subject matter to technical and professional concerns 
related to the practice of auditing. The subdivision of auditing practice that is 
concerned with financial accounting standards was excluded i n recognition of 
the extensive attention already being devoted to that vital topic. 
2. Maximization of the interaction between practitioners and educators 
by having (with one exception) the designated discussant of each paper selected 
from the alternate sector of auditing, and by having the invited participants 
equally divided in terms of their primary concern with either auditing practice 
or auditing education. 
3. Preparation of all papers (but not the evening address) i n advance, with 
distribution to all participants, so that after brief comments by the preparer of 
the paper, more than an hour was available for the remarks of the designated 
discussant and the ensuing open discussion by the approximately fifty partici­
pants in attendance. 
4. Publication of the Proceedings of the symposium, but with no attempt 
to summarize the informal discussion except that both preparers and designated 
discussants had full opportunity to modify their papers and remarks as originally 
presented to reflect ideas that arose during the general discussion. 
The selection of topics for the invited papers for the 1972 symposium empha­
sized future directions of auditing i n terms of response to contemporary events, 
extensions of auditing practice and research, and development of standards in 
areas such as materiality and statistical sampling. The repeated references i n 
the 1972 discussions to the pervasive problems of auditor independence suggested 
the topic for the opening paper of the 1974 symposium: an historical analysis of 
the development of the concept and practice of auditor independence and con­
sideration of proposals for strengthening that vital element of auditing relation­
ships. The historical orientation of the opening papers of both the 1972 and 1974 
symposia reflects an intent that has emerged that these and subsequent papers 
covering aspects of the history and evolution of auditing w i l l eventually provide 
a comprehensive dissertation on the development and heritage of the auditing 
segment of the accounting discipline. 
Other papers i n the present volume examine various controversial questions, 
ranging from the "sample of one" and standards for confidence levels in sam­
pling, to an examination of the case for mandated independent audits of publicly 
held companies. A change of pace and an extension of the forward look of the 
1972 symposium is evident in the paper setting forth a decision theory model 
of the audit process. 
As was true for the 1972 symposium, I take full responsibility for the selec-
tion of topics for the invited papers, but the views expressed in the papers are 
those of the preparers, and, of course, not necessarily those of the organizations 
with which they are affiliated. For future auditing symposia, I wish to invite 
proposals for papers on topics consistent with the general theme of the symposia, 
and I urge those interested in preparing a paper for a future auditing symposium 
to contact me in that regard. 
The 1974 symposium and the printing of the Proceedings would not have 
been possible without the financial support of Arthur Andersen & Co. arranged 
by Robert A . Long, managing partner of the Kansas City office of the firm, 
alumnus of the University of Kansas, member of the Board of Advisers of the 
School of Business, and long-time personal confrere. 
H O W A R D F. S T E T T L E R 
July 1974 
University of Kansas 
Lawrence 
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Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development 
And some Proposals for Research 
R. Glen Berryman 
University of Minnesota 
A 1950 publication of the A I C P A , written primarily for readers of audit 
reports, stated "Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the founda­
tion of the public accounting profession." 1 More recently the same idea has 
been restated as follows: "Independence has always been a concept fundamental 
to the accounting profession, the cornerstone of its philosophical structure." 2 
Auditors and the users of audit reports then and now would strongly support 
the above assertion. Independence has been a developing concept, as evidenced 
by shifts in position as to what constitutes an independent status for the auditor. 
For example, "strong" rules on independence have been adopted only recently. 
The sections that follow review the historical development of auditor inde­
pendence and note the need for the presence of its various aspects i n connection 
with the attest function. Specific proposals for research are developed, with 
emphasis being placed on user perceptions of independence. 
English Backgrounds 
A n early concern for independence is noted in the English Companies 
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, Section 102, which stated: 
Where no other Qualification shall be prescribed by the special Act , 
every Auditor shall have at least One Share i n the undertaking; and 
he shall not hold any Office i n the Company, nor be in any other 
Manner interested i n its Concerns, except as a Shareholder. 
The requirement of shareholding, however, has not been retained i n Britain as 
an auditor qualification as evidenced by the Companies Act of 1862, which per­
mitted but did not require shareholding, and by subsequent Companies Acts. 
The provision against auditors serving as officers or employees of their auditees 
appears to have been maintained continually i n the British system. The English 
Companies Act of 1948 in Section 161 provided that no person who is " . . . an 
officer or servant of the company"; or is " . . . a partner of or i n the employment 
of an officer or servant of the company"; is qualified for appointment as auditor 
of such company. 
The relationship of the auditors to the shareholders was established i n the 
same 1845 English statute noted above. A t the first meeting of a company after 
passage of that 1845 statute, the auditors would be elected by the shareholders. 
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Further, Section 118 of that Act directed that the shareholders be provided with 
the report of the auditors. The Companies Act of 1900, Section 21, provided 
that i f an auditor was not appointed at the annual general meeting of the com­
pany, the Board of Trade would, on written application of any member of the 
company, appoint the auditor for the year and fix his remuneration. The Com-
panies Act of 1929, Section 134, provided that the auditors were entitled to 
attend any general meeting of the company at which any accounts that they 
had examined or had reported on were to be presented and, further, that they 
were entitled to make any statement or explanations which they wished to make. 
Continued concern with auditor independence is evidenced by the Companies 
Act of 1948. Section 160 of that Act provided that a special annual meeting 
notice would be required for either the appointment of an auditor other than a 
retiring auditor or nonappointment of the retiring auditor. 
Developments i n the U.S . to 1940 
In the United States, independent status for the auditor appears to have 
emerged slowly as a major concern. O f course, the profession itself d id not 
grow to major size and influence unti l much later than i n Great Britain. The 
American Association of Public Accountants, established i n 1887, d id not, i n its 
early years, formally recognize the need for independence in its constitution 
or bylaws. A n amendment to the bylaws adopted i n 1907 did recognize the 
desirability of avoiding incompatible or inconsistent occupations. Recognition 
of the importance of independence is noted by the following comment of an 
early practitioner: 
The position of the public accountant in respect to corporations and 
their management is always an independent one. Unl ike the attorney, 
he is not expected to make out a case. The character of the service he 
renders is impersonal. 3 
The American Institute of Accountants, formed in 1916, and its predecessor 
organization did not appear to have been actively concerned with independence 
unti l about 1930. A 1928 editorial i n The Journal of Accountancy demonstrated 
interest i n identifying improper relationships between auditors and their clients. 
The editor pointed out that an auditor should not be involved as a stockholder, 
bondholder, officer, or director of the organization he was serving as auditor. 
H e did recognize one exception, namely, a company could appoint an auditor 
as a director when it was being reorganized. The editor stated: 
The accountant should be so utterly divorced from financial or other 
participation i n the success or failure of an undertaking under audit 
that no one could ever point an accusing finger, however unjustly, and 
allege the possibility of bias.4 
A t the 1931 annual meeting of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, a proposal was introduced as follows: 
R E S O L V E D , that the maintenance of a dual relationship, as director or 
officer of a corporation, while acting as auditor of that corporation is 
against the best interests of the public and the profession and tends to 
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destroy that independence of action considered essential in the relation­
ship between client and auditor. 5 
This resolution was referred to the Committee on Professional Ethics, but was 
not acted upon by the Institute that year. 
The following year the Congress of the United States exhibited substantial 
interest i n financial representations supported by an independent review. The 
Federal Securities Act of 1933, Section 77aa, required that certain financial in­
formation filed with the Government be certified by an independent certified 
accountant or public accountant. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 
78(1), stated that balance sheets and income statements were to be certified by 
independent public accountants i f such is required by the rules and regulations 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. These are the first formal require­
ments mandating auditor independence. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, under authority granted it by 
the 1933 Act , adopted the following rule on July 6, 1933: 
The Commission w i l l not recognize any such certified accountant or 
public accountant as independent i f such accountant is not i n fact inde­
pendent. Unless the Commission otherwise directs, such accountant 
w i l l not be considered independent with respect to any person in whom 
he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or with whom he is con­
nected as an officer, agent, employee, promoter, underwriter, trustee, 
partner, director, or person performing similar function. 6 
In 1934, the American Institute of Accountants' Council adopted and the annual 
meeting approved the following resolution: 
R E S O L V E D , that no member or associate shall certify the financial 
statements of any enterprise financed i n whole or i n part by the public 
distribution of securities i f he is himself the actual or beneficial owner 
of a substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed 
to acquire such an interest.7 
The S E C rule prohibited any interest, direct or indirect, in any person with 
respect to whom the accountant is alleging independence, while the A I A position 
focused on "substantial financial interest," and omitted any reference to em­
ployment. 
In 1936, The Securities and Exchange Commission did amend its rule with 
respect to independence and adopted the Institute's position prohibiting any 
substantial interest.8 Shortly after this, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
i n Accounting Series Release #2, dated May 6, 1937, discussed briefly the inde­
pendence of an accountant as follows: 
In response to such requests, the Commission has taken the position 
that an accountant cannot be deemed to be independent if he is, or has 
been during the period under review, an officer or director of the regis­
trant or i f he holds an interest i n the registrant that is significant with 
respect to its total capital or his own personal fortune. 
The Release continued: 
In a recent case involving a firm of public accountants, one member 
of which owned stock in a corporation contemplating registration, the 
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Commission refused to hold that the firm could be considered inde­
pendent for the purpose of certifying the financial statements of such 
corporation and based its refusal upon the fact that the value of such 
holdings was substantial and constituted more than 1 percent of the 
partner's personal fortune. 
In the decade of the 1930's, both the Federal government and the public 
accounting profession adopted the view that auditors should be independent of 
their clients. The S E C exerted leadership i n determining what constituted inde­
pendence, as evidenced by its issuance of A S R #2. Emphasis was placed on 
financial interest and on employment by the client of the auditor i n capacities 
other than that of auditor. 
Independence: 1940-1955 
In 1940, the Institute adopted the following rule on independence as part 
of its Code of Professional Ethics: 
A member or associate shall not express his opinion on financial state­
ments of any enterprise financed i n whole or in part by public distribu­
tion of securities, if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a 
substantial financial interest i n the enterprise or if he is committed to 
acquire such an interest; nor shall a member or an associate express his 
opinion on financial statements which are used as a basis of credit, 
if he is himself the actual or beneficial owner of a substantial interest 
in the enterprise or if he is committed to acquire such interest, unless he 
discloses his financial interest i n his report. 9 
This adoption is noteworthy because (1) the financial independence rule first 
became part of the Code of Professional Ethics and (2) when financials are 
used for credit purposes, approval was apparently given for an auditor's holding 
of a substantial financial interest i f he disclosed such holding. 
In 1942, an amplification of the rule on financial independence was adopted— 
" . . . i f he owns or is committed to acquire a financial interest in the enterprise 
which is substantial either i n relation to its capital or to his own personal 
fortune . . . " 1 0 This action brought the Institute i n line wi th the SEC's 1937 
action i n ASR #2 as to investment, but not wi th respect to other employment 
arrangements. 
The S E C i n Accounting Series Release #22, of March 14, 1941, reported an 
opinion of its Chief Accountant, W i l l i a m W . Werntz, as follows: 
When an accountant and his client, directly or through an affiliate, have 
entered into an agreement of indemnity which seeks to assure to the 
accountant immunity from liability for his own negligent acts, whether 
of omission or commission, it is my opinion that one of the major 
stimuli to objective and unbiased consideration of the problems encoun­
tered in a particular engagement is removed or greatly weakened. Such 
condition must frequently induce a departure from the standards of 
objectivity and impartiality which the concept of independence implies. 
That same release also cited, wi th approval, the Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S E C 
364, (1936) decision which held that the certification of a balance sheet prepared 
by an employee of the auditor who was also serving as an unsalaried but principal 
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financial accounting officer of the registrant and who was also a shareholder 
of the registrant was not a certification by an independent accountant. 
The S E C i n Accounting Series Release #37, dated November 7, 1942, indi­
cated that i n determining independence, consideration would be given to the 
propriety of the relationships and practices involved i n all services performed 
for the company by such accountant. Accounting Series Release #47, dated 
January 25, 1944, reported several situations i n which non-independence was 
found, including the following: 
1. Both an accountant and a business associate made loans to the regis­
trant. Further, a son of the accountant was an officer of the regis­
trant. 
2. The accountant advanced funds to the registrant for financing a 
new department. 
3. The registrant was unable to pay the accountant's fee and the regis­
trant pledged shares of its own stock to assure that such fee would 
be paid. In addition, it had given the accountant an option to 
purchase the pledged security at market price at the option date. 
4. The accountant was the treasurer and a shareholder of a company 
which sold some of a registrant's products. 
5. The son of a partner was serving as assistant treasurer and chief 
accountant of a registrant. The son resided with his father. 
6. The accountant audited cash reports prepared by the client's staff, 
entered them i n a summary record, posted such data to the general 
ledger and made adjusting journal entries each month. 
The above list provides additional evidence that the S E C wanted to maximize 
the likelihood of an objective review by prohibiting a significant financial interest 
or a close personal relationship with the client. 
The American Institute of Accountants through its Committee on Audi t ing 
Procedure produced a special report i n 1947 entitled Tentative Statement of 
Auditing Standards; Their Generally Accepted Significance and Scope. The 
second general standard stated, " I n all matters relating to the assignment, an 
independence i n mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors." 
Independence in fact is emphasized i n this document, as discussed on p. 17— 
Independence i n the last analysis bespeaks an honest disinterest on the 
part of the auditor i n the formulation and expression of his opinion, 
which means unbiased judgment and objective consideration of facts as 
determinants of that opinion. It implies not the attitude of a prosecutor, 
but a judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation on his part for 
a fair presentation of facts which he owes not only to the management 
and the owners of a business (generally, in these days, the holder of 
equity securities i n a corporation) but also to the creditors of a busi­
ness, and to those who may otherwise have a right to rely ( in part, at 
least) upon the auditor's report, as i n the case of prospective owners 
or creditors. 
This position was subsequently affirmed i n the 1954 publication Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards. 
In 1950 the S E C revised its rule on independence by deleting the word 
"substantial" from the phrase "any substantial interest." Thus, the S E C went 
5 
back to its 1933 position in which there was a prohibition against the accountant 
having any direct financial interest in his client. The Institute in January, 1962, 
some twelve years after the above stated S E C rule revision, moved to prohibit 
the direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest i n an enterprise 
under audit by the member. 1 1 D u r i n g the interim (1950-1962) a double standard 
as to investment in the client company prevailed—no direct financial interest for 
S E C work and no substantial direct financial interest for other engagements. 
The double standard also existed wi th respect to employment—no employment 
of the types listed i n A S R #2 was permitted for S E C work. The Institute was 
silent on the matter of other employment of the auditor by the client company. 
The concept of independence was being developed and articulated in the 
1940-1955 period. Specific rules were adopted to require independence. Though 
independence in fact was emphasized, the illustrations publicized by the S E C 
could be interpreted to suggest that the appearance of independence was a major 
factor in its evaluations of the independence of accountants. Prohibition of an 
auditor's holding of a financial interest i n a client was being established. 
Independence: 1956-1973 
The membership of the A I C P A in January 1962 adopted the following rule 
on independence as part of its Code of Professional Ethics. A R T I C L E 1: Rela-
tions with Clients and Public. 
1.01 Neither a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a partner, 
shall express an opinion on financial statements of any enterprise unless 
he and his firm are i n fact independent with respect to such enterprise. 
Independence is not susceptible of precise definition, but is an expression 
of the professional integrity of the individual. A member or associate, 
before expressing his opinion on financial statements, has the responsi­
bility of assessing his relationships wi th an enterprise to determine 
whether, i n the circumstances, he might expect his opinion to be con­
sidered independent, objective and unbiased by one who had knowledge 
of all the facts. 
A member or associate w i l l be considered not independent, for example, 
with respect to any enterprise if he, or one of his partners, (a) during 
the period of his professional engagement or at the time of expressing 
his opinion, had, or was committed to acquire, any direct financial in­
terest or material indirect financial interest i n the enterprise, or (b) 
during the period of his professional engagement, at the time of ex­
pressing his opinion or during the period covered by the financial state­
ments, was connected wi th the enterprise as a promoter, underwriter, 
voting trustee, director, officer or key employee. In cases where a 
member or associate ceases to be the independent accountant for an 
enterprise and is subquently called upon to re-express a previously 
expressed opinion on financial statements, the phrase, "at the time of 
expressing his opinion" refers only to the time at which the member 
or associate first expressed his opinion on the financial statements i n 
question. The word "director" is not intended to apply to a connection 
in such a capacity with a charitable, religious, civic or other similar 
type of nonprofit organization when the duties performed in such a 
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capacity are such as to make it clear that the member or associate can 
express an independent opinion on the financial statements. The 
example cited i n this paragraph, of circumstances under which a mem­
ber or associate w i l l be considered not independent, is not intended to 
be all inclusive. 
This rule moved the A I C P A closer to the S E C position i n that it prohibited 
direct financial interest in the client and for the first time prohibited specific 
employment relationships, such as director or officer of a client, during the period 
of the professional engagement. Independence i n fact was emphasized i n the 
first paragraph of this rule, while independence in appearance was specified i n 
the second paragraph. 
Effective March 1, 1973, the membership of the A I C P A adopted new rules 
of conduct that included the following: 
R U L E 1 0 1 — I N D E P E N D E N C E . A member or a firm of which he is a 
partner or shareholder shall not express an opinion on financial state­
ments of an enterprise unless he and his firm are independent with 
respect to such enterprise. Independence w i l l be considered to be im­
paired if, for example: 
A . D u r i n g the period of his professional engagement, or at the time 
of expressing his opinion, he or his firm: 
1. H a d or was committed to acquire any direct or material indirect 
financial interest in the enterprise; or 
2. H a d any joint closely held business investment with the enter­
prise or any officer, director, or principal stockholder thereof which 
was material i n relation to his or his firm's net worth; or 
3. H a d any loan to or from the enterprise or any officer, director 
or principal stockholder thereof. This latter proscription does not 
apply to the following loans from a financial institution when made 
under normal lending procedures, terms and requirements: 
(a) Loans obtained by a member of his firm which are not 
material i n relation to the net worth of such borrower. 
(b) Home mortgages. 
(c) Other secured loans, except loans guaranteed by a member's 
firm which are otherwise unsecured. 
B. Dur ing the period covered by the financial statements, during the 
period of the professional engagement or at the time of expressing an 
opinion, he or his firm 
1. Was connected wi th the enterprise as a promoter, underwiter 
or voting trustee, a director or officer or i n any capacity equivalent 
to that of a member of management or of an employee; or 
2. Was a trustee of any trust or executor or administrator of any 
estate if such trust or estate had a direct or material indirect financial 
interest i n the enterprise; or was a trustee for any pension or profit 
sharing trust of the enterprise. 
The above examples are not intended to be all-inclusive. 1 2 
R U L E 1 0 2 — I N T E G R I T Y A N D O B J E C T I V I T Y . A member shall not 
knowingly misrepresent facts, and when engaged i n the practice of 
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public accounting, including the rendering of tax and management 
advisory services, shall not subordinate his judgment to others. In tax 
practice, a member may resolve doubt i n favor of his client as long as 
there is reasonable support for his position. 1 3 
The need for the appearance of independence is not stated as it was i n the 
previous Rule 1.01 (. . . he might expect his opinion to be considered inde­
pendent, objective and unbiased by one who had knowledge of all the facts.) but 
the listing of the prohibitions and the indication of specific situations which are 
acceptable strongly urges continued interest i n the appearance of independence. 
It is also interesting to note that some of the previous "Interpretations of Rules 
of Conduct of the A I C P A Division of Professional Ethics" were incorporated i n 
the new Restatement publication. Interpretation "101-3—Accounting Services" 
emphasizes independence in appearance by suggesting that the auditor consider 
whether he is " . . . lacking in independence i n the eyes of a reasonable ob­
server." 1 4 It is also noteworthy that the 1973 Restatement includes Rule 202 
which incorporates expressly generally accepted auditing standards. Those stand­
ards include the general standard requiring an "independence in mental attitude," 
which is independence in fact. 
Statement on Auditing Standards #1, dated November, 1972, issued by the 
Committee on Audit ing Procedure of the A I C P A , included i n paragraph 220.03 
the following statement. " T o be independent the auditor must be intellectually 
honest; to be recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation 
to or interest i n the client, its management, or its owners." Thus, continued 
emphasis on independence i n fact as well as the appearance of independence is 
maintained i n this document. 
The S E C continued to push the development of rules related to independence, 
as evidenced by its issuing of Accounting Series Release #81, December 11, 1958, 
and Accounting Series Release #97, May 21, 1963. In A S R #81, 54 situations 
were reviewed, 34 of which noted the accountants as "not independent," 19 of 
which noted the accountants "have not been held to be not independent" and 
one in which accountants would be independent as to one entity and not inde­
pendent as to another entity. The S E C i n A S R #97 found that a C P A i n 
practice was not independent where he was one of three stockholders and an 
officer and co-manager of a finance company which made loans to customers and 
employees of a client who was a registered broker-dealer. 
The SEC's primary pronouncement on independence is Rule 2-01 (b) of 
Regulation S-X. That rule, enforced today, states: 
The Commission w i l l not recognize any certified public accountant or 
public accountant as independent who is not i n fact independent. For 
example, an accountant w i l l be considered not independent with respect 
to any person or any of its parents, its subsidiaries, or any other affili­
ates, (1) i n which, during the period of his professional engagement 
to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date 
of his report, he or his firm or a member thereof had, or is committed 
to acquire, any direct financial interest or any material indirect financial 
interest; or (2) wi th which , during the period of his professional en­
gagement to examine the financial statements being reported on, at the 
date of his report or during the period being covered by the financial 
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statements, he or his f irm or a member thereof was connected as a 
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee, 
except that a firm w i l l not be deemed not independent i n regard to a 
particular person i f a former officer or employee of such person is em­
ployed by the firm and such individual has completely disassociated 
himself from the person and its affiliates and does not participate i n 
auditing financial statements of the person or its affiliates covering any 
period of his employment by the person. For the purposes of Rule 2-01, 
the term "member" means all partners in the firm and all professional 
employees participating i n the audit or located in an office of the firm 
participating in a significant portion of the audit . 1 5 
It is interesting to note that the S E C rule does not include a distinction between 
independence i n fact and the appearance of independence. 
Accounting Series Release #123, March 23, 1972, endorsed the establishment 
of standing audit committees composed of outside directors as a means of pro­
viding "protection to investors who rely upon such financial statements." Ac-
counting Series Release #126, July 5, 1972, provided some guidelines for 
accountants for determining existence or lack thereof of independence. It stated, 
"The concept of independence, as it relates to the accountant, is fundamental to 
this purpose because it implies an objective analysis of the situation by a dis­
interested third party." Examples were provided of situations in which the 
independence of accountants could be challenged. W i t h respect to management 
service activities, the Release states . . . 
The basic consideration is whether, to a third party, the client appears 
to be totally dependent upon the accountant's skill and judgment i n its 
financial operations or to be reliant only to the extent of the customary 
type of consultation of advice. 
As to E D P and bookkeeping services, the Release states . . . 
Systems design is a proper function of the qualified public accountant. 
Computer programming is an aspect of systems design and does not con­
stitute a bookkeeping service . . . where source data is provided by 
the client and the accountant's work is limited to processing and produc­
tion of listings and reports, independence w i l l be adversely affected if the 
listings and reports become part of the basic accounting records on 
which, at least in part, the accountant would base his opinion. 
As to unpaid fees the Release indicated, 
When the fees for an audit or other professional service remain unpaid 
over an extended period of time and become material i n relation to the 
current audit fee, it may raise questions concerning the accountant's 
independence because he appears to have a financial interest i n the 
client . . . normally the fees for the prior year's audit should be paid 
prior to the commencement of the current engagement. 
As to business relationships with clients, the Release suggested that joint business 
ventures with clients, limited partnership agreements, investments i n supplier 
or customer companies, rental of blocks of computer time to a client (except in 
emergency or temporary situations) would adversely affect independence. 
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Accounting Series Release #144, of May 23, 1973, considered the inde­
pendence of a large firm of public accountants and alleged that they were not 
independent because partners or employees of accountant's branch office during 
the time when they were working on the audit of a client, received payments 
from the general partners of the client company totaling about $17,000, " i n the 
guise of profits from participation in the purchase and sale of "hot issues'." 
Dur ing the 1956-1973 period, emphasis centered on refining the rules for 
determination of the existence of independence. The S E C tended to lead the 
way i n establishing guidelines, though substantial efforts were made by the 
A I C P A to clarify the meaning of its ethics and its concept of independence. The 
appearance of independence was considered critical, though the profession and 
the S E C remained as "judges" of independence. The A I C P A adopted the S E C 
position on avoidance of any direct financial interest i n a client. 
Aspects of Independence 
The purpose of the auditor's representation as to his independence is to 
develop i n users' minds a high level of confidence i n his reports. If that con­
fidence with respect to his technical skills and his independence is not present, 
then the value of the audit report is diminished greatly. 
The concept of independence implies freedom from control and domination 
by another party. It implies impartiality and the absence of bias in the gathering 
of evidence, interpretation of evidence and opinion formulation. The auditor 
as an independent party must be wi l l ing and be i n a strong position to insist 
on that course of action which his professional judgment urges is the appropriate 
one i n the circumstances. 
Independence has a "time" component—it must exist for some min imum 
period of time for each audit situation. A n independent state of mind must exist 
from the time an audit contract comes into existence unti l the report is rend­
ered and subsequent responses interpreting such report have been given. It 
seems to be generally agreed that an independent attitude must be maintained 
from the time that an engagement is undertaken until a l l audit work, including 
reporting, is completed. 
Independence has a "party" component—the auditor must not be under 
the influence of the client or other party at interest. Aspects of this are reflected 
by the question raised by a C P A , quoted i n a Forbes article, "Since auditors are 
selected and paid by management, are they truly independent?" 1 6 This raises 
a series of issues, including: (1) W h o should select the auditor? (2) W h o should 
make the decision to change auditors? (3) W h o should pay the audit fee? and 
(4) W i t h respect to what parties should the auditor be independent? 
Independence has a "what" component. Carey has stated: 
Independence has three meanings to the certified public accountant. 
First, i n the sense of not being subordinate, it means honesty, integrity, 
objectivity and responsibility. Second, i n the narrower sense i n which 
it is used in connection with auditing and expression of opinions on 
financial statements, independence means avoidance of any relationship 
which would be likely, even subconsciously, to impair the C P A ' s ob­
jectivity as auditor. T h i r d , it means avoidance of relationships which 
to a reasonable observer would suggest a conflict of interest. 1 7 
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Mautz and Sharaf suggest, "Three phases of independence are important to 
independent auditing. First is the independence of approach and attitude . . . 
The second phase . . . freedom from bias and prejudice, . . . The third phase 
. . . to separate the two divisions (auditing and other services) of public ac­
counting . . . " 1 8 Questions could be asked such as (1) H o w important is the 
appearance of independence? (2) Can independence i n fact be measured? and 
(3) What relationships should be avoided? 
Independence has a "How shall it be maintained?" component. This raises 
questions such as (1) W h o shall judge whether it has or has not been main­
tained? (2) What procedures should be adopted to provide assurance to users 
that independence has been maintained? and (3) What operational tests shall 
be applied by reviewers to detect a lack of independence? 
Selection, Payment and Change of Auditors 
The user group for audit service now includes at least management, credi­
tors, the current shareholders, prospective shareholders, employees, and govern­
mental units. External users i n general have a strong desire for the auditor to 
take an impartial and unbiased approach to his work. 
The auditor's role can be likened to that of a judge, who listens to the 
charges or petitions, hears the arguments, evaluates the evidence presented and 
its bearing on the issues, considers the legal rules that are applicable, reasons to 
a conclusion and renders an opinion indicating his findings and their underlying 
rationale. But audit practice differs somewhat. The auditor collects his own 
evidence rather than rely on the two or more parties i n the case to each collect 
evidence and present it i n an adversary proceeding. Also, no cross examination 
is provided for i n auditing. O n the other hand, the public accountant must be 
aware of the underlying rules, must reason to a conclusion and must render 
an opinion as does the judge. 
W h o should select the auditor? The parties i n a legal action do not make 
the final determination as to what judge w i l l hear the case nor what jurors w i l l 
be called. W o u l d the user's view of auditor independence be strengthened by 
having auditors appointed by a governmental authority (e.g., an equivalent to 
the English Board of Trade)? Some companies have audit committees com­
posed of outside directors. Does this arrangement, as far as it is related to 
selection of auditors and communications with the auditors, increase perceived 
independence? 
W h o should pay the auditor? A judge receives his "fee" i n the form of 
salary from the state, whereas the auditor receives his fee from his client and 
the auditor has some control over the size of the fee. Is this arrangement on 
audit fees one that should be continued or do the users perceive this arrangement 
as one which impairs the auditor's independence? 
O n what basis should public accounting firms accept new clients? A t the 
present time, each f irm adopts its own criteria for acceptance of new engage­
ments. Consideration could be given to the question of whether independence 
with respect to any existing client would be affected adversely by the acceptance 
of a new client. 
W h e n should auditors be changed? What internal or external changes i n 
relationships might have an effect on independence? What relationships between 
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auditor and client could impact independence? For example, would the hir ing 
by the client of several audit staff members have a negative impact? W h o should 
be responsible for detecting such changes and then urging and or making a change 
i n auditor? 
A number of questions have been asked above, and no answers appear to be 
readily available. Research could well be undertaken to ascertain user and 
auditor views on each of the above, including their implications for the be­
havior of the auditor under varying sets of circumstances. 
What Constitutes Independence? 
Independence i n appearance has received attention i n the literature. It 
involves the perception of the auditor's independence by parties interested i n 
audit reports. F r o m the standpoint of the external user, every judgment made 
by the auditor has an independence aspect. Such judgments include but are not 
limited to his search for clientele, staff hir ing, assignment of staff to the engage­
ment, approach to his audit investigation, evaluation of evidence, and develop­
ment of his opinions. If any judgment appears to involve compromise, even 
though of apparent minor import, subordination may be alleged and perceived 
independence may be questioned. For example, the decision to omit a con­
firmation of a specified receivable or auditor acquiescence to the change i n the 
wording of a footnote could give rise to a feeling by a user that the auditor's 
judgment was subordinated. 
H o w can auditors be assured that users have a high level of confidence i n 
their independence? The perception of the user must certainly be taken into 
account. H o w do we measure the reader's perception of independence? Perhaps 
some measuring instrument 1 9 could be developed such that the profession as a 
whole could monitor user pulse. Deterioration of the level of perceived inde­
pendence could then be attacked by the profession i n a variety of ways, such as 
proscriptions as to activities felt by the user to be impinging on independence 
and education of the users as to the "real " state of auditor independence. Dif­
ferent users and different groups of users may have different concepts of what 
constitute independence and "how m u c h " independence is essential. The dif­
ferences or even conflicts i n view points could present difficulties as well as 
could attempts to develop recommendations for actions to raise the level of 
perceived independence. 
There has been little emphasis placed on the determination of what attri­
butes create independence i n fact. Independence i n fact seems to require absolute 
intellectual honesty and the absence of obligation to any potential user. 
Professor Barrett has indicated that " . . . the audit profession's ethical 
notion of apparent independence can be operationally defined as a sociological 
role construct, and . . . its conception of real independence can be operationally 
defined as a personality construct." 2 0 H e suggests that: 
Professional Audit Independence contains two constructs. Interpersonal 
Independence describes functional situations which promote or dys­
functional situations which impair the profession's auditor image as per­
ceived by reasonable observers . . . Intrapersonal Independence is the 
second order factor containing three operational content variables. It is 
assumed that male individuals—who are field analytical rather than 
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global field types, who evidence a low social approval need rather than 
being approval motivated and who prefer to describe themselves i n 
terms of independent rather than intermediate or dependent personality 
typologies—tend to possess a high degree of intrapersonal independence 
as characterized by their behavior i n test and non-test situations. 2 1 
Professor Barrett goes on to indicate that, i n his opinion, on the basis of ex­
ploratory studies, interpersonal and intrapersonal independence can both be 
determined by means of empirical testing. Additional research i n this area, 
largely untouched to date, seems warranted. 
What relationships should be avoided? A t a recent bank's annual meeting, 
a minority shareholder sharply criticized a $1,600,000 loan by the bank to the 
company's auditors on the ground that such was a "conflict of interest and 
jeopardized the independent status of the auditor." 2 2 Many public accounting 
firms are strongly interested i n "sell ing" management services. Might not the 
user of an audit report suspect a tradeoff between the accounting firm and its 
client on the basis that the audit might be reduced i n scope or a disclosure 
requirement changed i f the particular management service was "purchased"? 
As related earlier, the S E C has indicated i n various releases situations where 
independence is questioned N o comprehensive research appears to have been 
undertaken on this question. A substantial pay-off should be obtainable from 
a comprehensive research project covering satisfactory and unsatisfactory rela­
tionships, particularly if user views are taken into account i n the project. 
Maintenance of Independence 
What party or parties should assess the presence or absence of independence? 
T o date, the public accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission have been the formulators of the rules regarding independence and also 
the enforcers of such rules. The view of the S E C can be presumed to reflect 
their perception of the needs of the security investors for auditor independence. 
However, it appears that a major thrust of the S E C work and of the A I C P A 
documents is providing for the appearance of independence. If such appearance 
of independence is the prime focus, why should not al l external parties or their 
representatives have a voice i n formation and enforcement of the rules on inde­
pendence? Would not such position provide a "watch-dog" and aid greatly 
i n maintenance of confidence by users i n auditors' reports? 
In developing confidence i n the minds of the users of financials, should we 
institute a review of the audit report and its underlying documentation? In 
the judicial system a judge's opinion is appealable to successively higher levels, 
up to the Supreme Court of the U .S . W e do not have an equivalent procedure 
for appeal of an auditor opinion, nor for a subsequent investigation of it by 
another professional. Might not the adoption of a procedure for auditing the 
auditor enhance user confidence levels i n the effective independence of the 
auditor? Research into the opinion of users and auditor reactions to such a 
required review would be helpful i n anticipating the effect of such a requirement. 
Operational tests of independence must await a determination of those 
attributes which contribute to independence and those that detract from it. If 
those attributes can be determined, the profession and the users of its services, 
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or the parties designated to assess the existence of independence, can proceed to 
formulate operational tests or guides to ascertain the existence of a satisfactory 
state of independence. 
Summary 
Independence has, i n varying degrees, been a concern of auditors and the 
users of audit reports since the early days of the profession i n England and the 
United States. In the U.S., development of the concept of independence has 
been pushed by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a representative of 
one set of users. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has, 
through various publications, articulated concepts of independence and has 
adopted independence as a mandatory qualification for the auditor. It is sug­
gested that the need for independence is related exclusively to the attest function 
and that unless the user perceives independence to exist, the attest function has 
extremely limited value. Various relationships between (1) auditor and client 
and (2) auditor and external parties can have impacts on perceived independence 
and independence i n fact. 
Research needs to be undertaken with respect to user perceptions of inde­
pendence; the relationships which they feel impair independence as well as 
those which promote independence. Research could be undertaken on a joint 
basis by representatives of the profession and representatives of various user 
groups. This arrangement should promote soundness of research design, im­
partiality i n evidence gathering, summarization and interpretation, and accepta­
bility of the research reports. The research projects could focus on many ques­
tions, such as (1) W h o should appoint and remove the auditors? (2) What 
relationships between client and auditor are likely to impede the exercise of 
impartial, unbiased judgments? (3) W h o should pay for audit services ren­
dered? (4) Should reviews of auditor work, including audit independence, be 
undertaken? and (5) What instruments best measure independence? 
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Discussant's Response to 
Auditor Independence: Its Historical Development 
And some Proposals for Research 
LeRoy E. Kist 
Ernst & Ernst 
Glen Berryman's paper conveys to me a very clear impression of the thought­
ful sifting of voluminous source material to present a comprehensive yet concise 
account of the evolution of the independence concept. By contrasting the 
actions of the A I C P A with the actions of Congress and the Securities Exchange 
Commission and with the English background, he has brought the reader up 
to date so that he can at least begin to understand and appreciate the problem 
of independence and to consider the possible need for further research. 
In his book The CPA Plans for the Future John Carey stated, " F r o m the 
beginning, independent auditors have recognized that they would be useless to 
society unless they were fair and objective i n their attestations to financial 
data . . . The assumption that auditors must be independent was taken for 
granted." Independence i n an abstract sense may have been taken for granted 
but certainly a precise definition of independence and the specifics of its imple­
mentation could not be taken for granted. Development of the independence 
concept obviously didn't come easy and I am inclined to believe that there was, 
i n part, some effort by the American Institute to accommodate a dual standard 
that would permit the practitioner's occasional financial interest, or other close 
relationships, i n his closely-held client. W e have come a long way from the 
tainted independence of the twenties, and with the adoption of the revised 
Code of Professional Ethics as of March 1, 1973, I hope that we do not have 
too much further to go. 
Questions for Further Research 
Glen has asked five basic questions which, he proposes, should be subjected 
to further research. The questions relate to the following principal issues: 
1. Appointment and discharge of auditors. 
2. Relationships between client and auditor that are likely to impede 
the exercise of impartial, unbiased judgments. 
3. Payment for audit services rendered. 
4. Reviews of auditor work, including audit independence. 
5. Measurement of independence i n fact. 
In addition, he has asked questions which, i f answered, could help in improving 
the appearance of independence which, we must acknowledge, is of some con-
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sequence. In my discussion, I w i l l try to comment on these issues and hopefully 
to expose another viewpoint for your consideration. 
In commenting upon the selection, change, and payment of auditors, the 
author has drawn an analogy between the work of the independent accountant 
and that of a judge i n a judicial proceeding. Because of the similarities of the 
activities of the two, he has suggested the possibility of having auditors appointed 
by a governmental authority, paying them from public funds, and requiring 
their change when the regulatory agency perceives any diminution of inde­
pendence. 
I agree that the similarities exist; however, there are also dissimilarities and 
other factors to be considered. I question that a true analogy exists i n that, 
unlike the judge, the auditor must be prepared to defend his judgments i f ques­
tioned by the users of his reports and, i f found to be i n error, to take the con­
sequences of his work. The role of an auditor should not be considered as 
one of resolving differences between antagonists (his client on one side and 
stockholders, creditors, etc., on the other) but one of searching for the right 
answers to complex business problems and then reporting them in a manner 
that is fair to all concerned. 
Appointment and Discharge of Auditors 
As noted in Glen's paper, the selection process is normally undertaken by 
management with the concurrence of the Board of Directors. In addition, a 
number of companies have adopted the practice of asking the stockholders to 
ratify the selection. I am not aware of any general criticism of that process; 
however, questions have been raised about the freedom of management to dis­
charge its auditors, probably i n some cases for being too independent. In this 
latter regard, the S E C has been helpful i n a recent modification of F o r m 8-K, 
which requires the reporting of various current events. Item 12 of that form 
requests a registrant to report the engagement of a new auditor and also to 
furnish a separate letter stating whether in the 18 months preceding the engage­
ment there were any disagreements with the former accountant on any matter 
of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing 
procedures, which disagreements, i f not resolved to the satisfaction of the former 
accountant, would have caused h i m to make reference i n connection with his 
opinion to the subject matter of the disagreement. The former auditor is re­
quested to furnish a letter stating whether he agrees with the statements con­
tained i n the letter of the registrant. This requirement should have a deterring 
effect upon registrants who may hope to find a more compliant auditor in 
connection with the change. There is some problem, of course, i n deciding 
whether a bona fide disagreement existed or whether there was merely a differ­
ence of opinion which was eventually resolved i n the manner requested by the 
auditor. Is a table-pounding session needed before it can be said that a true 
disagreement existed? This is a matter requiring careful consideration by the 
deposed auditor and, hopefully, some concern by the newly appointed auditor. 
I understand that consideration currently is being given to requiring the 
report to be filed at the time of the discharge of the former auditor, rather than 
upon the engagement of the new auditor. This change should improve the 
value of the report, but I believe that other changes could be made to improve 
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it even more. For example, consideration might be given to requiring the regis­
trant to report any intention to discharge its present auditor several months 
before doing so. A panel including representatives of the accounting profession, 
as wel l as the S E C , could review the facts and circumstances and decide whether 
the divorce should be granted. A s it now stands, the discharged auditor may get 
some satisfaction from knowing that his former client and the successor auditor 
w i l l be watched carefully, but that knowledge would do little to strengthen his 
independent attitude i n the first place. Research i n this direction should be 
productive. 
Relationships between Client and Auditor that Are Likely to 
Impede the Exercise of Impartial, Unbiased Judgments 
In this matter, the pronouncements of the S E C and the interpretations 
of the A I C P A have been very useful and do much to clarify specific situations 
encountered i n practice. Interpretations for the most part have been under­
standable and progressive. I w i l l not attempt to comment upon any particular 
interpretation included i n the numerous Accounting Series Releases issued by 
the S E C , other than to note that when the S E C took a d im view of unpaid 
fees i n A S R #126, many accountants must have been made much happier. 
What is probably needed i n this area is to classify and analyze the various in­
terpretations of the S E C and of the A I C P A i n an attempt to derive from them 
the fundamental features i n a more abstract form. 
Payment for Audit Services 
A s mentioned previously, Glen has suggested the possibility of paying 
the auditor from public funds. Because of the wide disparity in the extent of 
services required and the absence of a universal need, this does not seem to be 
a practical solution. Fees conceivably can affect the independence of the auditor 
as much or more than if he were to have a direct financial interest i n his client. 
Nevertheless, this aspect appears to be more detrimental to perceived inde­
pendence than to independence i n fact, provided, of course, that other controls 
and conditions are effective. 
Reviews of Auditor Work including Audit Independence 
Recently the A I C P A , i n part upon the urging of the Securities Exchange 
Commission, undertook to develop a program of quality control. The program, 
which has been accepted by the Board of Directors of the Institute, calls for 
the independent review of an accounting firm's performance, looking at the 
adequacy of the procedures being followed, and later assessing the degree of 
compliance of the firm with its own procedures. This is something like the 
review, evaluation, and test of compliance of a system of internal control. In 
addition to its other features, the review would be concerned w i t h client selection 
and retention, and independence. W h e n this program is operative, the account­
ing profession should have another strong and worthwhile tool to police its 
membership and to maintain a satisfactory level of independence. 
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Measurement of Independence i n Fact 
Independence is a very complex issue. For those who have not been involved 
i n an audit, it might seem quite easy to hold a client at arm's length and subject 
its financial statements to a dispassionate, microscopic review. In actual practice, 
however, we realize that an auditor must maintain a close relationship with 
his client i n order to understand its operations and to obtain appropriate infor­
mation essential to the formation of his opinion. Possibly for this reason I 
would not be very receptive to a suggestion that persons outside the profession 
should evaluate our performance and independence. In this respect, I strongly 
believe that the profession should be self-policing. 
In the discussion of what constitutes independence, the author appears to 
be concerned about the appearance of independence. It seems to me that i f we 
are concerned primarily wi th independence in fact, the appearance of inde­
pendence w i l l largely take care of itself. Is an active P R program necessary 
for the accounting profession, or w i l l doing a good job observing all of the 
present rules of conduct be sufficient? It may be useful to obtain the views of 
users, but the ultimate conclusion as to what does and what does not constitute 
independence should be generated from within the profession itself. 
Additional Suggestions 
Many here may have heard of the so-called "auditor of record" concept, 
which is receiving active consideration by the S E C . This concept would require 
the auditor to become more closely associated with his client throughout the year 
and would require h i m to assume some, as yet unspecified, degree of responsi­
bility for the adequacy of interim financial reporting. The auditor w i l l become 
more deeply involved i n the day-to-day decisions regarding accounting matters, 
which he w i l l then be expected to audit and report on at a later date. This 
association raises a question as to whether the auditor's independence w i l l be 
adversely affected. It seems to me that research should be undertaken in this 
matter. 
The personal characteristics or traits of honesty and integrity are critical 
to independence, and men and women entering the accounting profession should 
possess, and be well aware of the need for, those characteristics in abundance. 
It has been said that everyone's character is almost completely established during 
his childhood; however, an awareness of the demands of the public accounting 
profession i n this regard becomes implanted at a much later date. It seems to 
me that educators could provide a real service to the public if they were to 
discuss and ponder over these considerations with their accounting students 
as an integral part of the academic program. 
When I was a young man I clerked i n a drugstore for several years. A t 
that time I noticed a motto appearing on the label of a large pharmaceutical 
company that impressed me a great deal, and I have never forgotten it. It 
said, "The priceless ingredient of every product is the honor and integrity of its 
maker." This also should be true for every audit engagement. If we were 
assured of the quality of these ingredients, there would be no need to be con­
cerned over independence. 
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The New AICPA Audit Commission— 
Will the Real Questions Please Stand Up? 
Stephen D. Harlan, Jr. 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
The A I C P A ' s Board of Directors has recently authorized the appointment 
of a Commission to make a full-scale study of the functions and responsibilities 
of independent auditors. It is my understanding that the Commission w i l l consist 
of seven members, with four members coming from outside the C P A ranks and 
three from within. The Commission members are yet to be appointed, but I 
understand the chairman w i l l be from outside the auditing profession. Basically, 
I believe the establishment of such a Commission is a very positive step that 
can lead to vast improvements i n the world of auditing—IF. If the right issues 
are addressed and the right questions asked. 
D u r i n g the past fifteen years, as we all know, the auditing profession has 
come under severe attack. This is particularly true today with increasing pres­
sures from the regulatory bodies, the courts, and society as a whole. The volume 
of suits filed against auditors has gone up dramatically i n the past few years. 
Also, the grounds for these suits appear to be widening, as indicated by the fact 
that criminal indictments are being sought and returned against auditors. It 
seems as though every day is a new day with a different set of ground rules 
and the auditor is caught somewhere i n the middle. 
If this is true, then can the mere establishment of a Commission to study 
auditing be effective? In order to address that question, let us examine the 
Commission's potential charge as it might be gleaned from the questions con­
tained in the March 11, 1974 issue of The CPA: 
1. What responsibility should an auditor have for detecting fraud? 
2. Should auditors monitor all financial information released to the 
public and, i f so, what should be the extent of their responsibilities? 
3. Should the auditor's standard report, particularly the phrase "presents 
fairly," be changed to express better the responsibilities of auditors? 
4. What mechanisms should be adopted to strengthen the functions of 
auditors? 
5. Is the mechanism for developing auditing standards adequate? 
6. What should the profession do to reduce the risks of misunderstand­
ing about its role? 
In reading these questions, I get the feeling we are continuing to take the 
same old approach that we have in the past. The questions appear to be ad­
dressed primarily to segments of our activities and do not deal with the broader 
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issues of auditing. Unless the Commission interprets its charge broadly i n light 
of recent and anticipated changes in our society and our economy, I hold little 
hope for its success. What are these so called broad fundamental issues? 
Some Premises 
Certain assumptions defining the environment of auditing are necessary 
i n order to properly address ourselves to the issues. 
Audi t ing Exists i n a Dynamic Environment Almost every aspect of the 
audit is subject to change. A t one end of the spectrum, information processing 
technology has given rise to new auditing techniques. A t the other end, society's 
values are changing—our performance and utility are measured by a constantly 
changing yardstick. 
Information Technology. One of the most noticeable areas of change relates 
to information processing technology. Changes implemented by clients have 
necessitated adaptation of many traditional auditing tools. This same technology 
has permitted the profession to introduce more sophisticated and more effective 
tools. 
The processing activities being carried out by clients have changed. Com­
munications and terminal technology have led to extensive remote access to 
machine-sensible data. This , i n turn, has had some tendency to reduce the 
volume of documents that are available for verification. Sti l l further, the develop­
ment of integrated systems with operations research models imbedded into the 
normal flow of data processing has resulted in having transactions initiated and 
then processed within the same computer system. Without dwelling excessively 
on this point, it suffices to say that it has been necessary to adapt auditing pro­
cedures to meet the changing situation. 
In a very real sense, the auditing firm is a business that must itself take 
advantage of changing technology to improve both the cost and effectiveness 
of its operations; it has been necessary to use computers to apply tools such as 
statistical sampling and model building that are needed to meet our professional 
obligations. 
Some of the advances in the information processing area have the potential 
for making subtle, but significant changes i n auditing objectives. The develop­
ment and implementation of large-scale data bases has raised increasing concern 
regarding security and privacy issues. W i l l the auditor, who is already charged 
with an objective review of a company's data processing system, eventually be 
held responsible for attesting to the performance of controls i n this area? 
As another possibility, assume that a company's financial statements are 
disseminated by having investors use remote terminals to access reports main­
tained i n the data bank of an information utility. W i l l this movement have an 
impact on the auditor's liability exposure by altering the definition of the fore­
seeable class of users? W i l l the flexible retrieval capabilities of such systems force 
the auditor to offer the equivalent of piecemeal reports, since users can access 
any parts of the statements that are relevant to their decisions? W i l l the auditor's 
opinion have to be broadened to encompass interim reports, since reports main­
tained on such a system w i l l certainly be updated during the year? 
Social Attitudes. In the same sense that it was possible to say that the 
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changes i n information processing technology are altering the operating en­
vironment, it is equally clear that there have been changes i n social attitudes. 
Directly and indirectly, more attention is being focused on managerial actions. 
W i l l (should?) we eventually take a position regarding the effect of manage­
ment's actions on resource allocation, on the utilization of energy resources, or on 
minority groups as a potential source of employees? 
Changes i n social attitudes are particularly important for the auditing 
profession. The scope of our liability is ill-defined. In this age of consumerism, 
it is all too common for limits to be imposed after the fact by courts that are 
reacting to legal actions. This point is of crucial importance. Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure makes it easy to institute class actions. The 
class actions, in turn, increase the magnitude of our exposure and tend sometimes 
to shift the focus of interest away from the party allegedly wronged and to the 
plaintiff's attorney as the individual who has the largest readily identifiable 
financial interest i n the action. 
In summary, then, the auditor is operating within an ever-changing environ­
ment—one that is creating both new opportunities and new pressures. 
Uti l i ty Is i n the Eyes of the Beholder 
There is no rationale for auditing services unless they serve some definable 
objective. In a market-oriented economy, this means that the absence of such 
utility w i l l certainly result i n an unwillingness to incur the cost of the services. 
In the quasi-regulated position of auditing, the lack of utility results i n either 
a reluctance to mandate the performance of services or the establishment of addi­
tional regulatory pressures to align the services provided with the identified 
needs. 
The most important observation following from this premise is that the 
auditor has only limited control over the nature of the attest function. Uti l i ty 
is determined, not by the auditor, but by the market for his services. This is a 
complicated situation, because the attitudes of the market place are constantly 
changing. N o t only are the values changing, but the use of the regulatory 
agencies and courts to force further changes and realign economic distributions 
compounds the problem. 
A System Is Needed to L i n k the Auditor to H i s Varied Audience 
Operating within the environment specified above, it is clear that commu­
nication between the auditor and his audience should not be left to after-
the-fact determinations by the courts and the regulatory agencies. The current 
situation leaves something to be desired. 
A n argument can be made that the profession is talking to itself when we 
talk about not having any responsibility for detecting fraud. The same is true 
with regard to our attempts to define the class of intended financial statement 
users as being either informed or naive (or both simultaneously). 
Leaving the resolution of these issues solely to the regulatory bodies may 
not be useful. In the past, regulatory attempts have often proven to be hap­
hazard efforts to resolve short-run issues. For example, the S E C has recently 
the profession must rest upon. 
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issued a pronouncement requiring the disclosure of inventory profits. Whi le well 
intended, the requirement fails to give adequate recognition to the broader issues 
associated with reporting the effects of price level changes. Regulatory agency 
rulings rarely reflect the k ind of unified, internally consistent, perspective that 
In summary, then, the auditing environment can be characterized by: 
1. A need to operate in a constantly changing environment. 
2. A utility structure that is influenced by its audience. 
3. A need for communication between the auditor and the market for 
his services. 
General Parameters of a Useful Framework 
It is necessary to examine the framework of auditing before we can make 
sensible recommendations regarding crucial issues influencing the profession. 
There should be general agreement that the major product of the auditing 
profession is attestation, i.e., offering a professional opinion regarding actions 
taken by others. 
Attestation. Systems theory tells us that the effective functioning of a system 
requires that each of its elements must function i n accordance with predetermined 
performance standards. Also, each element must have available information on 
the conditions existing i n any other elements on which it depends, i.e., there 
must be reliable communication. 
Attestation enters into this process i n two ways. First, it is a convenient 
tool for use i n a very large system where it is not possible for each element to 
individually verify the functioning of the elements upon which it depends. In 
this context, it can be argued that to justify reliance, it is more efficient for an 
independent attestor to review various elements and offer judgments regarding 
their functioning, than to have each element verify each other element's per­
formance. A n d second, one should not overlook the behavioral impact of 
attestation on a system that has a goal and knows that its actions are being 
examined. This is the well documented behavioral impact of auditing—the fact 
that people w i l l alter their behavior because they know that they are being 
watched. 
Attestation is thus a two-pronged tool for controlling a system. It provides 
information regarding the activities that are taking place i n a given segment of 
the system. A t the same time, it alters the actions of some system elements i n 
order to keep them aligned with a set of assumed goals. 
Parties of Benefit. If you are wi l l ing to grant the framework presented 
above, then it becomes clear that we can get our feet back on the ground and 
identify two specific groups that can and do benefit from our attestation services: 
1. Users of Information. This class includes credit grantors, investors 
and regulatory agencies. In a less direct sense, it includes the voting 
populace, who by their electoral capabilities, can influence the regu­
latory environment. The class also includes decision makers i n a 
large organization who are located a distance away and therefore 
unable to conduct their own verifications. 
2. Managers. Reference is being made here to the behavioral impact 
of the attestation process. The class of managers is potentially very 
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large. The owners of large corporations are certainly included, 
since they use this process as one of several tools for keeping manage­
ment aligned with stockholder objectives. The regulatory agencies 
fall into this same broad category. A n d finally, the management 
of the business uses this same approach on a much smaller scale. 
Attestation and the Auditor 
If one is to make sense out of the current situation, one must take the state­
ments regarding attestation i n general and relate them to the current situation. 
There are several questions of critical importance. What is the relationship 
between the profession and the various governmental agencies? What is the 
scope of the profession? 
Governmental Relationship. A very careful balancing act must take place 
i n terms of the relationship between the auditing firm and the governmental 
agency. The agency mandating auditing services should certainly be one that is 
influential, i.e., one that can associate serious penalties with failure to satisfy 
existing standards. A t the same time, the requirement for attestation services 
must be framed i n a manner that does not take away flexibility i n meeting the 
needs of the market place. There is, of course, a middle ground that attempts 
to balance the needs of the regulatory agency with those of the auditing profes­
sion and society. 
Identification of the auditing profession with a particular governmental 
agency is a two-edged sword. For historical reasons, the profession has become 
identified with financial representations. This , i n turn, led to its association with 
the S E C . Whi le the power of the S E C gives the profession much of the power 
that it currently has, it also creates problems. There is the constant threat of the 
S E C "take-over." There is also an identification with the financial community 
that makes it hard for us to address other attestation-related needs to society. 
Scope. There is conceptually no l imit to the scope of attestation activities. 
A t the same time very practical limits do exist. A s a practical matter, the value 
of the attestation services must be validated i n the market place by the willingness 
of society to pay for the services. Hence, there is a definite need to recognize 
two factors—the expertise that is actually possessed by the attestor and the extent 
to which society is wi l l ing to grant h i m this expertise. 
The close relationship with societal attitudes is at the heart of many of 
our problems. Audi t ing has been traditionally associated with financial repre­
sentations. Firms i n the field have thus sought to employ staff members who 
have a financial orientation, just as these financially trained people have sought 
out the firms. Financial identification is further reinforced by the involvement 
of the profession with the S E C . There is thus a definite l imit to the profession's 
ability to define its own scope (at least i n the short run) . This point is the basis 
for some of our present difficulties. O n the one hand, society sometimes attributes 
expertise to us, even i f we deny that we possess it. This is the case wi th regard 
to the detection of fraud. O n the other hand, it limits our ability to alter the 
scope of practice, since the value of the services provided depends on both the 
expertise that we actually possess and on the expertise that society is wi l l ing 
to grant us. 
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Toward a Dynamic Future 
The present situation is far from satisfactory. As members of a recognized 
profession, we cannot sit back with any real degree of self-satisfaction. 
There is a definite need for two types of research and development activities 
on an on-going basis. It goes without saying that there must be a continual 
up-grading of current services. Hence, there must be research to maintain the 
status quo i n the face of changing technology and to improve the things that 
we are now doing. 
It is absolutely essential that there be an on-going program looking into 
new areas of attestation. There are two reasons for this need. First, like any 
business, the auditing firm must be able to adapt to changing needs and to 
introduce new services for which there is a demand. The fact that the value 
of auditors' services is at least partially determined by society is a point that 
cannot be overlooked. If there is no research to develop skills with which we 
can be identified, it is highly unlikely that society w i l l give us credit for these 
skills (and what's more, dangerous if they do give us such credit). 
It may sound heretical, but as a practical matter, the profession does and 
should pay attention to the marketing of its services. Classical lore has it that 
the market beats a path to the better mousetrap, but that is not a safe enough 
base upon which to build the profession. It is necessary to give explicit attention 
to the development of a well organized marketing mechanism for the profession 
that not only makes the market aware of our expertise, but also of the limits 
associated wi th our services. 
The Real Questions 
In my preceding remarks emphasis has been placed on financial representa­
tions, because this has been the traditional area of our expertise. Our legitimacy 
has been derived from both the market place and the securities laws, and this 
has further acted to define the nature of our image i n the eyes of our audiences. 
However, the current situation is quite critical. Legal suits are mounting 
together with the magnitude of the damages being claimed. Respected publi­
cations are questioning the way i n which we are handling our affairs. There 
is reason to believe that auditing lacks respectability within the academic insti­
tutions—our primary education and research arm. H o w many schools would 
offer auditing courses i n the absence of the C P A exam and state licensing 
requirements? H o w many doctoral students are looking to auditing as an area 
for specialization and research? 
Commissions are appointed infrequently, with an expectation that they w i l l 
have a significant impact. Hence, due care should be addressed to the charge 
of such a group. Appropriate objectives of this Commission should be to identify 
the issues facing the profession, the options available, alternative courses of 
action, and a structure for achieving an orderly resolution of the issues. 
The questions that should be addressed should focus on the fundamental 
issues that are impacting the profession at the present, and those that have the 
potential for impact i n the future. A m ong those issues are: 
1. What is the role of the auditor in society? O u r environment is 
formed by our expertise, by the legal structure surrounding our 
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actions, and by the attitudes of those who (potentially) use our 
services. T o whom are we responsible? What are the attitudes 
towards the profession? What are our perceived strengths and weak­
nesses? What factors do our audiences focus upon when forming 
their opinions of us? 
2. To what extent do we have the ability to influence our role in the 
future? As stated above, this role depends upon both our expertise 
and audience perception of our expertise. The apparent gap between 
our self-image and the users' views of us is at the heart of many of 
our current problems. Is it possible for us to establish a structure 
that w i l l help to keep this image discrepancy within some acceptable 
bounds? H o w can we do this? 
3. Who are the users of our services? The present structure assumes 
that particular users of our services (the relatively sophisticated 
creditors and investors) are dominant. This assumption is the basis 
of some present difficulties. Consideration must also be given to 
potential investors and creditors, as well as to management and the 
general public. 
4. What are the decision making needs of the users? The Trueblood 
Committee studied the objectives of financial statements, and the 
committee findings are now being considered by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. Other user-related questions include 
the need to attest to forecasts and related underlying assumptions, 
adequacy of internal control, and management effectiveness. 
5. What should the structure be to control quality and auditing stand-
ards? T o what extent can the profession operate i n a self-contained 
manner? W h o should establish auditing standards? W h o should 
monitor auditing quality? H o w can auditing be kept current, or 
w i l l we need another Commission in a few years? 
6. Should there be changes in the relationship between the auditor and 
the firm being audited? A t the present time, the auditing f irm is 
retained by a firm i n order to offer an opinion regarding its financial 
representations. The auditing firm is presumably independent. It 
also presumably has a large degree of influence on the choice between 
alternative techniques. However, there are many who question 
this independence. There is no easy solution to the problem. Whi le 
I am not proposing this solution, it is useful to recognize that i n 
England, once the firm has chosen an auditor, it is very difficult 
for it to make a change. The system appears to work. 
These are not all of the questions requiring answers and there may be some 
debate regarding the inclusion of one or two. Nevertheless, I believe they do 
focus on the fundamental issues that face the profession. 
This is a most unique moment i n the history of our profession. W e have 
asked "outsiders" to help us identify the problems and develop solutions. W e 
should view this Commission as an opportunity to objectively study our entire 
role and responsibility to society. Let's all hope that the real questions—and 
answers—eventually stand up. 
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Discussant's Response to 
The New AICPA Audit Commission— 
Will the Real Questions Please Stand Up? 
Jack C. Robertson 
University of Texas at Aust in 
One finds no argument with M r . Harlan's belief that establishment of the 
A I C P A Audi t Commission can be a positive step toward improvement i n the 
world of auditing. However, as he implies, it is not merely the appointment 
that represents progress but rather the ultimate product of the Commission that 
finally must be perceived as relevant and meaningful. In order to attain these 
latter qualities not only must relevant and meaningful (i.e., real) questions and 
issues be raised, but they must be resolved to the satisfaction of the "worlds" 
that exist outside the world of auditing. 
Other Worlds 
Some view auditing as a very small sub-world i n society and others view 
it as a universal, pervasive and larger world i n its own right. Typical expres­
sions of the various worlds, which auditing is both in and of, are couched i n 
terms of the societal segments that are interested i n financial communications. 
In order not to belabor this old and familiar concern, let me just draw a 
picture i n words: Visualize a series of concentric circles that represent various 
societal spheres of interest. In the inner circle lies accountancy, and i n suc­
cessively larger outer circles management, present stockholders, all other present 
investors, other economic interests (e.g., labor, competitors, suppliers), potential 
future investors, and other social-political interests (e.g., regulators, ecologists). 
In my mind's eye, auditing is the set of spokes that connects these other worlds 
to accountancy, for better or for worse. 
I wish to make two points based on the foregoing preamble: First, auditing 
is inextricably bound to accountancy i n current thought, thus it is oftentimes 
difficult to distinguish an accounting question from an auditing question. (More 
on this point later.) Second, the length of the imaginary spokes is important to 
auditors i n the context of specifying auditors' role(s) i n society. A closely allied 
corollary question i n this regard is: " W h o is the auditor's client?" 
I submit that the definition of "client" is more than a mere exercise i n 
semantics. The definition lies at the heart of auditors' acceptance of professional 
responsibility, and the issue constitutes the premier real question for the new 
audit commission. The A I C P A Code of Ethics defines client as the person(s) 
or entity which retains an auditor for professional services. I perceive this 
definition as deficient because it does not fully recognize the social-political 
concerns of other worlds with whom an auditor has a social contract to fulfill . 
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M r . Harlan has recognized this issue forthrightly i n his own first question 
for the commission, and I am in full agreement with h i m . H e has augmented 
his first question with his last one, raising the issue of the relationship between 
the auditor and the auditee. These two real questions are parts of the same 
issue, but they have been somewhat slighted i n the reported charge to the 
Commission. 
The A r t of Raising Questions 
Relevant and meaningful decision outputs cannot be attained unless the real 
questions are first identified. This assertion is a truism long recognized i n a 
technical sense by practicing auditors as a matter of decision theory (viz., rele­
vant evidence cannot be obtained unless first the relevant assertion, explicit or 
implicit, has been recognized and formulated as a decision problem). In the 
context of the charge to the Commission, questions are real only to the extent 
that they are relevant and meaningful to the "other worlds." This does not 
preclude their being relevant and meaningful to auditors alone, but i f they are 
limited to technical issues, then the other worlds w i l l be disinterested and w i l l 
perceive the Commission's product as self-serving. 
The essence of the art of raising questions about auditing, thus, is the art 
of making them meaningful to non-auditors. The other worlds, i n my opinion, 
are interested i n meta-conceptual questions and the philosophical impact of re­
sponses to them. Competing with this line of approach is the auditor's need to 
pose operational questions which can be resolved i n a manner amenable to 
"making things work . " As an expedient, the Commission charge could cloak 
the operational questions i n a mantle of philosophy, but it has not been done 
i n this manner. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the Commission charge contains operational 
questions that correspond i n part with Steve Harlan's first and last question 
points. In order to be quite specific, I suggest that the following portions of the 
charge are consistent wi th real questions of auditor role and auditor-auditee 
relationships. 
1. What responsibility should an auditor have for detecting fraud? 
2. Should auditors monitor all financial information released to the 
public and, if so, what should be the extent of their responsibilities? 
3. Should the auditor's standard report, particularly the phrase "presents 
fairly," be changed to express better the responsibilities of auditors? 
In my perception of the social mil ieu, each of these questions w i l l have to 
be answered i n such a manner as to expand the responsibilities presently accepted 
by auditors to match the expectations of the social circles that lie beyond man­
agement. The other worlds w i l l apparently perceive anything less as a recalci­
trant and self-serving ploy to avoid professional responsibilities. Society, as we 
know it today, expects more not less from independent auditors. Resistance to 
this force would be futile and self-defeating. 
In a like manner I believe that the Commission charge recognizes two other 
of M r . Harlan's real questions: his second and fifth ones concerning auditors' 
ability to influence their future role and the structure to control quality and 
auditing standards. As before, the Commission charge is phrased in operational 
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terms rather than the conceptual language used by Harlan. Specifically, the 
Commission's questions are these: 
1. What mechanisms should be adopted to strengthen the functions 
of auditors? 
2. Is the mechanism for developing auditing standards adequate? 
3. What should the profession do to reduce the risks of misunderstand­
ing about its role? 
However, this set of questions does not provide much comfort and succor. 
The last one contains the seed of self-serving limitation of responsibility. It 
smacks of the context of bringing social expectations down to the level of current 
auditor acceptability in order to reduce the incidence of lawsuits. A neutral 
expression of the same concern would allow the possibility that auditors would 
raise their functions to the level of social expectations, and this possibility is 
implicit i n Harlan's phrasing of the issues. 
In order to summarize on the art of raising questions at this point, let me 
observe first that four of the issues that Steve Harlan poses and the questions 
charged to the Commission appear to be closer i n spirit than is suggested by h i m . 
There still exists the gulf between the meta-conceptual concerns of the other 
worlds and the operational concerns of professional auditors, and the issue of 
"who is the client" is apparently to be neglected by the Commission. If forced 
to a choice, I would find more relevance and meaning in M r . Harlan's presenta­
tion because it is more conceptual and more cognizant of the real issues. 
A Troublesome Dichotomy 
The art of auditing is uniquely characterized by investigatory problems of 
recognizing economic assertions and obtaining evidence related to them. These 
facets are essentially private concerns of the auditor, becoming public concerns 
only when an audit report is the center of a dispute (as i n a lawsuit). The on­
going public facet of auditing lies i n the auditor's duty to match assertions and 
evidence to criteria and i n the communication of his findings to users. A t this 
latter stage auditing becomes inextricably bound to accountancy and bound to 
the public interest. 
Although I would personally be relieved of many troublesome problems i f 
I, as auditor, could slay the accountancy dragon by declaring the independence 
of auditors, nevertheless, I fear that I would have only toppled a straw man, 
and may wel l have succeeded only i n creating more problems rather than fewer. 
Yet this philosophical independence from accountancy appears to be important 
to members of the other worlds. The manifestation arises i n argumentation over 
the phrase "presents fair ly" and i n discussions of reports on controls, forecasts, 
interim statements and other matters that have largely been given only passing 
attention i n official accounting theory. 
M r . Har lan has fearlessly thrust these accounting questions on the new 
Audi t Commission. Apparently, as a practicing auditor, he does not share my 
academic proclivity to keep accounting and auditing questions neatly separated. 
Upon reflection I confess that I too am convinced that it is incumbent on auditors 
to identify the users and their information needs, thus identifying the appropriate 
content of audit communications. T o undertake such a task would indeed repre-
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sent a break with the past and would in fact be a new approach; it would take 
audit practice out of its own ivory tower and marry it to the other worlds that 
it purports to serve. 
One must recognize, however, that acceptance of these real questions (the 
third and fourth ones presented by Harlan) could easily lead auditors to many 
of the same issues currently being addressed by the S E C . W e need not be 
reminded that accountants and auditors are presently resisting many S E C 
decisions. Nevertheless, to proceed as M r . Harlan suggests might result i n the 
identification of classes of users (justifying differential disclosure or multiple 
special statements in place of general financial statements). The Commission 
might find sufficient demand for attestation to interim statements, forecasts, and 
other matters currently favored more heavily by non-auditor worlds. As a corol­
lary issue, the Commission could support the efficacy of quality control organiza­
tions that would "audit the auditors." In brief, the new Audi t Commission 
could emerge as a private-enterprise S E C . 
Herein lie two possibilities: (1) Rejection of the Commission and resistance 
of the same type that characterizes current relations wi th the S E C , or (2) Happy 
acceptance of the Commission as the means of recovering responsibilities that 
were slipping away into other-world hands. The latter alternative would require 
action responsive to the meta-conceptual concerns of non-auditors, and i n all 
likelihood would transform the world of auditing. 
In Closing 
Among points that I have thus far neglected is the important matter of 
expertise—that which auditors admit to having and that which others presume 
they have. I agree that non-auditors may be wi l l ing to presume that auditors 
have greater abilities than the auditors themselves w i l l admit. This incongruence 
creates a very real barrier to satisfying the meta-conceptual questions. A "market­
i n g " approach may ameliorate the problem, but it must not degenerate into a 
defense of the status quo which is so often characterized as "education of the 
public." Auditors should be pleased rather than frightened that the other 
worlds w i l l grant such recognition of professionalism, and we should begin to 
accept the societal recognition lest it melt away. 
As a summary, I find an appeal in Harlan's real questions for the new 
Audi t Commission to accept the kind of meta-conceptual questions that other 
worlds wish to raise. I find too that the operational questions charged to the 
Commission are technical transformations of some of the real concerns, and I 
believe that full credit has not been given where it is due. Yet other important 
issues remain, and i f they are not raised, I anticipate with Har lan that we may 
need another Commission i n a few years. 
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Controlling Audit Quality: 
A Responsibility of the Profession? 
Andrew P. Marincovich 
Andrew P . Marincovich & Co. ; President, National Association 
of State Boards of Accountancy 
When the chairman asked me to deal with the subject "Controll ing Audi t 
Quality: A Responsibility of the Profession" he did not indicate the printed 
program title would end wi th a question mark. It would take a brave man to 
answer the broad question of responsibility of the profession i n the negative, 
but it may be constructive to inquire whether the programs of the profession— 
either i n being or under study—are adequate to discharge this responsibility. 
The subject of controlling audit quality involves three inter-related questions: 
" W h e n , " " H o w , " and " B y W h o m . " It seems clear that optimum audit quality 
requires control measures at each stage of the game, i.e., i n the educational 
preparation, in the examination and accreditation process, and i n actual pro­
fessional practice. The questions of " H o w " and " B y W h o m " are more complex, 
and we shall attempt to explore some possibilities. 
Initial Controls 
State laws have established educational requirements for entrance into the 
profession—usually a baccalaureate degree with a certain minimum concentration 
in accounting and related subjects. 
In a 1970 California study, Professor A l a n R. Cerf made certain comparisons 
between the legal profession and the accounting profession i n which he men­
tioned the importance of the law school and the standard of legal education for 
admission to the bar. H e posed the following questions: 
The C P A has made significant strides i n developing examinations 
for admission to the profession. But has he given sufficient attention 
to the preceding education? Particularly has he related the educational 
requirements to the entire functions of the C P A ? 1 
In May of 1969 the A I C P A council adopted the recommendations of the 
Beamer Committee. A m o n g the recommendations of the committee were a five 
year program of professional preparation and elimination of the experience 
requirement of state boards. T w o years after the report, i n a presentation at 
N A S B A ' s annual meeting, M r . Beamer reported that i n eleven states, under 
varying conditions and amounts of education, it was possible for a candidate 
to receive the C P A certificate without meeting an experience requirement. 
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A joint A I C P A - N A S B A Committee on Professional Recognition and Regu­
lation concluded i n 1973 that, "the accounting profession can attain full profes­
sional stature only through establishment of professional schools. In support 
of this position, we point out that other learned professions, which the accounting 
profession often seeks to emulate, have professional schools with close ties to 
the practicing portion of the profession."2 
The question of academic professional preparation continues to have the 
attention of the profession's leaders. Their judgment as to the proper course 
to be selected in the light of realistic future needs w i l l be an important factor 
i n fostering high standards of audit quality. The National Association of State 
Boards of Accountancy ( N A S B A ) can act as a catalyst in the consideration of 
these matters by State boards and can promote a reasonable consistency of ap­
proach among jurisdictions. 
Critical to the performance of a profession as a whole is the quality of the 
personnel who gain entrance to that profession. Education, demonstration of 
competence by examination, and character are the basic ingredients for a suc­
cessful candidate. It has been suggested that character checks on those entering 
the profession may be an important step i n strengthening the standards of the 
accounting profession. By whom should such checks be made? The State Boards 
are the focal point. Their investigation of applicants may not be as searching 
as it should be. The routine inspection of a few letters of reference hardly 
insures the desired standards of integrity, dedication, professionalism, etc. Should 
not the inquiry into the character of a candidate be at least as searching as that 
given i n connection with a security clearance, a mortgage application, or mem­
bership in a social club? This may be an area where N A S B A can provide a 
suggested approach, or possibly assist in actual screening of candidates as a 
service to State Boards. 
W e might also inquire whether educational institutions, particularly the 
professional schools of the future, should not be more selective in admitting 
students to the study of accounting with a view to entering the profession. One 
prominent educator has suggested that such a selection process might be more 
effective i n raising standards than mandatory continuing education after entrance 
into the profession. Professional schools of law, medicine and the ministry have 
long utilized techniques for "weeding out" those deemed to be unfitted for 
professional careers by reasons of temperament or character. 
Administered by individual state boards, all states and territorial jurisdic­
tions, fifty-four in all , utilize the same national examination and national advisory 
grading service provided by the A I C P A . This is a major achievement and 
certainly is a unifying force i n the accounting profession. Careful attention is 
paid to the preparation and security of examination questions by the A I C P A . 
N A S B A has developed and distributed among state boards a procedural manual 
for state boards to help guarantee, as much as possible, uniform conditions for 
the C P A candidate. N A S B A also collaborates with the A I C P A Board of Ex­
aminers in a continuing evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
examination. 
So much for the initial controls which have some relation to achieving a 
satisfactory level of audit quality. H o w can we insure these levels of quality 
i n actual professional practice and whose responsibility should it be? 
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Subsequent Controls: Mandatory Continuing Education, a Need? 
U n t i l recently, once a candidate received his certificate the only requirement 
to retain his certificate and license to practice was to pay his annual or biannual 
fees. 
W i t h i n the past few years, the concept of a structured continuing education 
requirement (either mandatory or voluntary) has come to the fore as an im­
portant means of insuring a higher standard of audit quality. Mandatory con­
tinuing education was recommended i n a report of the Beamer Committee of 
the A I C P A . The recommendation was approved by the Council of the A I C P A . 
A t last count twelve states had adopted mandatory continuing education statutes 
and regulations and at least fifteen others were i n the process of doing so. 
W i t h certain exceptions, al l licensees i n continuing education states w i l l be 
required to provide evidence to their respective state boards that they have 
complied with the regulations. These programs are directed to individual com­
petence, however, and do not deal directly with the mechanisms for controlling 
audit quality from a firm point of view. 
Another Way 
Is there another way to approach the problem—namely, some k ind of 
quality review directed to the end-product: the auditor's report (plus the 
organizational structure which produces it)? 
In the 1960's a Practice Review Program was initiated by the A I C P A for 
review of published corporate reports and with subsequent correspondence wi th 
the accountant i f a report was determined to be deficient. State Societies were 
encouraged to supplement the A I C P A program. W i l l i a m C . Bruschi, Institute 
Vice-President, reported in a paper at the T h i r d Annual Symposium for Ac­
counting Educators that " . . . unfortunately i n many states, the state society 
program has languished because of an absence of reports for the committee to 
work o n . " D u r i n g eight years of service on the Board of Accountancy i n my 
own state I was not aware of any case where a substandard report was referred 
to the Board for disciplinary action by the Practice Review Committee of the 
State Society. I hasten to add that it is understood by me that the program was 
intended to be educational and not disciplinary; however, particularly i n cases 
of flagrant substandard reports, I wonder why it should be so limited. H o w 
can we get more grist for the mill? In California various state agencies require 
filings of financial reports for various reasons such as the Department of Finance 
for school district audits, State Controllers Office for municipal reports and the 
Department of Health for health care provider reports to name a few. Staff 
investigators from the California Board would routinely review such filings 
for deficient reports. Because of lack of personnel i n recent years the volume 
of reports reviewed has been limited. The agencies themselves occasionally 
submit apparent substandard reports to the Board. Should State Boards initiate 
a vigorous program for the review of such reports? Except for listed companies, 
public agencies and governmental agencies, a vast majority of audited and un­
audited financial reports prepared for third party use by C P A s are not potentially 
subject to peer review. Should they be? If so, with what agency should they be 
filed and by whom should they be reviewed? W o u l d legislation be required 
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or only an administrative agency ruling? What about the confidentiality of 
information where non-public companies are concerned? W o u l d the added 
"red tape" and potential lack of confidentiality discourage use of the inde­
pendent audit i n the " smal l " or "closely held" corporate situation? W o u l d 
credibility be enhanced sufficiently to provide encouragement for peer reviews? 
These are not easy questions. W e can point out that in some countries 
of the world, financial statements of all businesses must be filed with an ap­
propriate agency, thus opening the door for a review of audit quality on a broad 
basis—assuming the requisite authority and capability. 
An Independent Audit of the Auditors 
The "hot question," at the moment, seems to be the independent perfor­
mance audit (quality control review) of the auditor. This concept deals with 
the firm's controls more than with individual competence. The C P A would 
be the first to point out that the independent audit of publicly held companies 
is a cornerstone of the capital market i n the United States. Should he not be 
receptive, therefore, to an audit (quality review) of his own firm? 
In an address at the annual meeting of the Institute i n 1972 W i l l i a m J. 
Casey, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission suggested that 
the profession is " . . . very much i n partnership with the S E C . This partner­
ship was formed by the congressional decision made almost 40 years ago to 
refrain from any effort to establish a Federal corps of auditors to verify corporate 
reports but rather to rely on the independent audits made by independent ac­
countants."3 H i s comments may have been prophetic of certain more recent 
developments. 
The Quality Review program of the Institute began in 1971 on an experi­
mental basis and was fully operational in 1973. The program came to the 
attention of the Chief Accountant of the S E C , John Burton, who requested 
that a program be developed for reviewing the quality control standards of 
firms considered by the S E C to be i n need of such a review. The agency has 
the necessary authority to perform such reviews but prefers not to do so. The 
intent of the program would be to provide the S E C an alternative to or supple­
ment to " . . . other types of sanctions which might be imposed under Rule 
2(e) as a means of providing assurance to the public and the Commission that 
adequate standards have been established and implemented. It is felt that prac­
ticing firms w i l l be benefited by such a program with consequent benefits to 
the public which the profession serves."4 
H o w w i l l the program work? The A I C P A w i l l designate a panel of quali­
fied reviewers. The S E C w i l l select a Review Team manager who w i l l then 
appoint other members of the team from the panel. The work of the review 
team would be done under Court Order which would provide a cloak of con­
fidentiality to the review procedure. Whereas the A I C P A ' s review program for 
local and regional firms focuses upon audit procedures and reports, the thrust 
of the program developed with agreement of the S E C is upon the reviewed 
firm's quality control procedures. A t least two firms are presently scheduled 
for review. The A I C P A Special Committee on Quality Control in a report 
outlining a tentative program for an inspection of quality control standards 
states: 
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A n inspection conducted by practicing Professionals under A I C P A 
auspices, is preferable to one conducted by persons who may not suf­
ficiently understand auditing practice, whether they be members of the 
staff of the S E C or other persons selected by the S E C . 
It should be pointed out that this type of examination is a new 
exercise i n many respects. U n t i l the first examination is conducted, a 
pattern of conduct by the examiners and by the S E C is not fully dis­
cernible. 5 
Professor Cerf i n his 1970 study suggests: 
The publicity for a profession associated with malpractice suits 
tends to damage the public confidence i n the profession. It would take 
a great deal of study to determine how the C P A s could perform autop­
sies on the work of their fellow practitioners. However, this may be a 
better solution to maintenance of discipline than revocation of licenses 
or expulsion from the professional societies.6 
Except for the voluntary Quality Review program of the Institute which 
is just getting under way and has achieved limited coverage, other programs 
seem to accentuate the negative (disciplinary aspects of control). The Institute 
and some state societies are considering an abridged version of the voluntary 
program, i.e., a one-man-day review for smaller firms. Unresolved questions 
include: 
W h o would pay for such reviews? 
W o u l d they be coordinated or supervised by State Boards? 
Would they be really adequate or only cosmetic? 
Would they be educational or would they include sanctions? 
It may be helpful to return to M r . Casey's 1972 address to the Institute in 
which he said: 
It seems to me that an important profession-wide requirement for 
the accounting profession is the establishment of an improved profes­
sional quality control system. Membership i n the national professional 
organization of accountants should represent more than a license and 
paying dues. It should represent more even than agreement to a code 
of ethics, as vital and necessary as that is. 
It might be that a more formal mandatory self-policing system 
should be established so that every professional practice is reviewed 
periodically by other professionals. In the self-regulation of the securi­
ties industry, a comprehensive annual inspection is called for. The 
situation is not exactly analogous, and such a comprehensive inspection 
may not be necessary on an annual basis i n your work. However, i f 
your organization is to be a truly responsible self-regulatory body, some 
self-policing effort seems called for. 7 
Other Steps 
In the meantime, other steps must be taken to improve the regulatory 
control procedures affecting the profession. 
Underscoring this need is a recent Wisconsin court decision which declared 
unconstitutional Wisconsin statutes that gave the State Medical Examining 
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Board the power to investigate and discipline doctors for unprofessional conduct. 
State boards of accountancy may very well be required to get out of the business 
of acting as the investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. If, however, state 
boards of accountancy are permitted to continue i n those roles, should it be the 
responsibility of the profession to develop and present cases of substandard 
professional performance to state boards when the educative process fails or has 
been shunned? Is such cooperation and assistance to regulatory boards and 
commissions a legitimate part of self-regulatory procedures? Is it a national 
outgrowth of the Institute's present efforts to integrate its procedures with the 
state societies? 
Conclusion 
It seems clear that the problem of controlling audit quality is so complex 
that it w i l l require a cooperative effort on the part of practitioners, professional 
organizations, government agencies, and regulatory boards. N o small part of 
the problem lies in the heterogeneous nature of the profession. Measures which 
are designed to insure a level of competence in individual C P A s may have little 
effect when related to the quality control "apparatus" of a medium- or large-
size f irm. Measures which might give comfort as to quality control wi thin a 
firm might rest on "quick-sand" if a basic level of competence of individual 
licensees is not looked after. It may well be that a multi-pronged approach is 
required which would include: 
1. A continuing education program for the individual licensee. 
2. A n effective investigatory procedure, possibly the peer review, as a 
prophylaxis for the "cause celebres," the flagrant cases. 
3. A n availability of talent which can be programmed for voluntary 
reviews under the auspices of professional organizations. 
4. A testing program by State Boards, under statutory authority, of 
the quality control apparatus of firms. 
It is encouraging to note that these questions and others are being actively 
considered i n a number of forums. The C P A must have high standards and 
the public must have confidence that he is what he says he is. Wal ly Olson 
suggests: 
It is crucial to our credibility that we carry on a vigorous program 
of self-discipline. Such a program must not only be effective but must 
be perceived to be effective by the public at large. 8 
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Discussant's Response to 
Controlling Audit Quality: 
A Responsibility of the Profession? 
Gordon L. Murray 
Haskins & Sells 
While I have done a lot of speaking over the years, I have never participated 
in a meeting with this particular format. I assume that my comments are to be 
directed toward stimulating discussion during the period that w i l l follow. In 
the interest of stimulating such discussion and to preserve my own integrity, my 
comments on this question w i l l be strictly as I see it. 
I have studied Andy Marincovich's paper and it appears to me that the 
following points emerge: 
• The title is "Controll ing Audi t Quality: A Responsibiltiy of the Pro­
fession?" wi th a question mark. T o me the question mark is the most significant 
item i n that tide. 
• Andy's paper says " . . . it may be constructive to inquire whether the 
programs of the profession—either i n being or under study—are adequate to 
discharge this responsibility." This statement appears to assume that the answer 
to the question is that controlling audit quality is a responsibility of the pro­
fession. Is that really so? 
• Reference is made to the Beamer Committee on the matter of continuing 
education requirement. Whi le M r . Beamer was a partner of mine before his 
retirement, it does not necessarily follow that I agree with h i m on continuing 
education. However, I also don't presume to be an expert i n this particular area. 
Therefore, I w i l l dispose of the continuing education matter by simply saying 
that what I have seen adopted so far is a very feeble, and perhaps unnecessary 
effort. I also have a bias that formal education for a practitioner has very definite 
limitations and that essentially a person's continuing education is what he does 
i n connection with researching to find solutions to particular problems occurring 
in day-to-day practice. T o show how far I am probably away from current 
thinking on this subject, my own firm now has a continuing education program 
that is required for all persons through the age of 50. The best part of this 
program, to me, is that I am now 56 and therefore I am not going to be involved. 
• The paper suggests that " . . . character checks on those entering the 
profession may be an important step i n strengthening the standards of the 
accounting profession." M y own experience has included work for two B i g 8 
accounting firms, three industrial firms as the chief financial officer, and a major 
firm of management consultants, all of which have involved extensive executive 
recruiting activities. I can only say that I believe there are very real limitations 
to what can be accomplished through any attempt to conduct "checks of char-
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acter." In one instance a person that I was evaluating had all of the evident 
credentials for a particular position but subsequently turned out to be homosexual. 
N o one is going to tell you in a character check that a person has that problem, 
nor is anyone going to tell you that a person is an alcoholic. Therefore, I con­
clude, based upon experience, that there are important limitations in any effort 
to elicit character representations. 
• Andy refers to the Practice Review Program as "another way." T o me, 
practice review, however conducted, is not necessarily "another way" of getting 
at the quality problem, as this and other possible programs are not mutually 
exclusive or inclusive. Rather, one must consider the whole matter. 
• In speaking of an independent audit of the auditors, the paper cites 
M r . Casey, the former Chairman of the S E C , as suggesting that the profession 
is very much in partnership wi th the S E C . This poses a vital question of to 
what extent the profession wishes to become part of the enforcement machinery 
of the S E C and therefore a quasi-arm of the Government, as contrasted with 
the independent practice of public accountancy. This, I suggest, is a very vital 
matter for everyone i n the profession to assess although some already say that 
we have been functioning i n an enforcement role as an agent of the Government 
for some many years. 
T o all of these suggestions that the profession has the responsibility for the 
enforcement of performance—for continuing education—for some more stringent 
entrance requirement to the profession—it is very easy to respond with a "yes" 
answer. It is at first blush obvious that no responsible person within the pro­
fession could be against such actions. However, when one introspectively ex­
amines what is involved i n accomplishing such objectives, one might well be 
concerned with the realities involved. 
Reviews of Quality Performance 
I have already commented to the extent I wish on the matters of continuing 
education and character checks and would now like to turn to the area I know 
most about—that of reviews of the quality of performance of accounting firms, 
however structured. 
For some years the A I C P A has had a committee to conduct quality control 
reviews of accounting firms. This has been generally directed toward providing 
smaller practitioners with an opportunity to have their procedures and practice 
reviewed by others i n the profession. However, this program has been quite 
limited—consisting of a review of only 2 or 3 days, of selected engagements, and 
conducted on a voluntary basis. 
It was not until the S E C proposed that quality control reviews of major 
firms be required as a consequence of proceedings under Rule 2(e) of the rules 
of practice of the S E C that this matter really heated up. Subsequent to the con­
siderations of the A I C P A to assess how the profession might accommodate the 
wishes of the S E C , a program was developed for the A I C P A to structure a 
voluntary quality review program which would be extended to multi-office firms. 
As you know, I have been chairman of the committee to consider the SEC's 
request for accommodation with respect to reviews required under Rule 2(e). 
The charge to our committee was to consider the SEC's request and to negotiate 
the best accommodation that could be achieved so that the Board of Directors 
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could reach a conclusion as to whether the A I C P A would participate in the 
SEC's program or not. The result of our committee effort was the "Tentative 
Program for an Inspection of the Quality Control Standards and Procedures of 
an Accounting F i r m Pursuant to 2(e) of the S E C Rules of Practice." This 
program outlines the ground rules for conducting such an examination and was 
adopted by the Board of Directors with the understanding that the A I C P A 
would participate i n the examination of the first firm so charged under rule 
2(e) and would also cooperate i n what we call the "front end" of the next 
two or three firms to be so charged. 
Essentially, the proposed program provides that the A I C P A assemble a 
panel of persons from firms engaged i n S E C practice; the S E C w i l l select a 
chairman of a review team; the chairman w i l l assemble, from the list, a team 
of reviewers; the reviewers w i l l assess the quality standards and practices of the 
defendant firm; and subsequently—some 15 months later—will conduct a review 
to determine that firm's compliance. This is a very abbreviated statement of the 
plan. 
This program is in the process of application at the moment with respect 
to Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath and is also to be applied to Touche 
Ross & Co. I also understand that two other members of the B i g 8 are i n the 
process of negotiating a similar deal. O f course, you realize that this program 
was proposed by the S E C as an alternative to a suspension from practice before 
the S E C which could be disastrous for any firm if the suspension was for any 
significant period of time. I should say that throughout all our deliberations, 
our committee never had any reason to question the sincerity of S E C staff motives 
i n advocating this program. 
Our committee "backed into" a recommendation that the A I C P A should 
accommodate the S E C i n the first of such reviews, recognizing the onerous 
alternatives, and also recognizing that a major firm had already made a com­
mitment to accept this treatment. 
Legal and Other Problems 
N o w you should realize that there are very many difficult, unique legal 
questions involved i n this type of exercise. I don't intend to attempt to identify 
or discuss al l these legal questions except to point out that they involve matters 
of confidentiality, matters of discovery i n litigation involving any of the clients 
of a given firm, the legal position of those serving as quality control reviewers, 
the legal problems of the A I C P A , etc. The S E C staff has been largely disinter­
ested i n our legal problems associated wi th the program, and has expressed the 
attitude that we should forget our legal problems and get on with the job. In 
our committe's final report to the Board of Directors i n January 1974, we ex­
pressed a number of serious reservations regarding this program. Among these 
reservations were: 
• The S E C provides, i n the L K H & H case, that a quality control review 
is to be conducted by persons selected from a panel put up by the A I C P A , or 
by accountants selected by the S E C from the total population of accountants, or 
by the staff of the S E C . Our committee concluded that a peer review by persons 
practicing i n the accounting profession and selected by the A I C P A was by far 
the preferable approach. 
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• The S E C provides that a quality assurance review may result from: 
— A Court Order and Consent Decree as provided in the L K H & H 
case, 
— B y a negotiated settlement of a 2(e) proceeding with a given 
firm without benefit of a court order and consent decree, which is the 
Touche Ross situation, or 
—Simply by the S E C advising a given firm that while they do not 
intend at the moment to initiate a 2(e) proceeding, their view of the 
quality of performance of that firm would suggest that they volun­
tarily submit themselves to such a review. 
Y o u should recognize that the legal problems involved i n these three types 
of reviews are most significant and any review without the benefit of participa­
tion of the Court leaves the reviewed firm and other parties i n a significantly 
vulnerable legal situation. 
• Our committee was quite concerned with the fact that the profession 
has never established generally accepted quality control standards of practice. 
This is a most complex subject considering the differences i n type and size of 
practice among accounting firms and makes it quite difficult to establish uni­
versally applicable generalizations. The Audi t ing Standards Executive Com­
mittee of the Institute has this item on their agenda, but based upon past experi­
ence with Institute projects I would not expect to see any final product very 
soon. In the L K H & H case the consent decree includes by reference a statement 
of the quality control organization, procedures, and methods that they agree to 
apply. I must say that I have read this document and it prescribes about all the 
apparatus anyone could visualize. The tentative program negotiated by our 
committee with the S E C prescribes that i n the future cases the review team w i l l 
inspect the firm coincident wi th the 2(e) action to develop the prescribed 
quality practices applicable i n that firm's situation and then return some 15 
months later to inspect for compliance. W e had considerable concern with the 
S E C prescribing quality control procedures from the standpoint that each suc­
cessive case could add layer on layer of quality control procedures that could 
constitute a body of precedent that could prove to be unreasonable and could 
be applied against any given firm i n a matter of litigation. W e suggested that 
qualified practitioners are the ones that should prescribe quality control practices 
and remedies. 
• Our committee had a fundamental concern whether the proposed pro­
gram would i n fact accomplish the objective of improving the quality control 
performance of a given firm. W e concluded that i n the first instance, quality 
of performance depends on a firm establishing a conscientious policy of high 
standards—a professional rather than a commercial attitude toward its practice. 
In the last analysis, quality of performance is attributable to the competence of 
a staff accountant and his supervision i n performing all aspects of an audit and 
whether such competence, i f it existed, was conscientiously applied. Therefore 
a program such as that proposed, consisting of a post-review of working papers, 
reports, etc., has inherent limitations i n assessing the fundamentals of a firm's 
quality of performance. 
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Problems and Limitations of Review Programs 
What I am trying to convey is the feeling of our committee that a post-
review of performance may be more of a facade than an exercise of substance. 
In fact, during our committee's deliberations we adopted the code name "chicken 
soup." (For those of you who have not come from Brooklyn, chicken soup 
refers to a Jewish mother's practice of preparing chicken soup whenever a 
member of the family is i l l—not because chicken soup is going to do any good, 
but at least she is doing something, and it is not going to do the patient any 
harm.) 
Many aspects of the audit process are essentially predictive and therefore 
judgmental i n nature. Our committee concluded that an analysis of the causes 
of audit or reporting failure would disclose that such failures are generally a 
matter of the judgments applied during the process rather than procedural 
matters, and a quality control program per se would have limited effect i n curing 
the causes of poor results. 
W e concluded that good control procedures do not necessarily insure good 
audits and good auditors may function effectively i n an environment with poor 
quality controls. 
The Committee's Views on Quality Control Review 
W e were quite positive in our contention that a quality control review of 
selected audits i n a given organization should be to establish whether there is 
confidence that the firm is applying the procedures it agreed to apply, rather 
than to second-guess the actions of the reviewed firm i n a given instance; also, 
the environment of the review is one where the applicable rules and standards 
are i n a constant state of flux. In other words, we were not disposed to offer 
the S E C a service wherein the reviewers would be expected to second-guess 
audit results and report them to the S E C . 
D u r i n g the early discussion with the S E C our committee proposed that a 
more regular procedure for quality control reviews would be for the S E C to 
select a firm of C P A s to review the practices of the defendant firm on the basis 
of a regular professional engagement between firms for that purpose. O u r com­
mittee continues to believe that the firm-to-firm approach has distinct advantages 
i n providing a professional level relationship wherein reviewers would have 
access to the resources of their firm as i n any other engagement; participants 
would function under the usual protection of their firms regarding legal liability 
and other matters; and the organizational and administrative problems associated 
with such an exercise would be minimized. Firms have greater strength as 
professional performers than do individual practitioners. Separating reviewers 
from their firms for purposes of these special reviews, weakens rather than 
strengthens the effort. However, the firm-to-firm approach was not acceptable 
to the S E C and I suspect that attitude reflected a desire to strengthen their public 
relations posture. 
As a practical matter, the use of a panel of practitioners from various firms 
put up by the A I C P A represents an inherent problem wherein, i n due course, 
panel members w i l l come from firms that have previously been subject to quality 
reviews. I believe it is realistic to recognize that i n today's environment all of 
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the major firms with a substantive S E C practice w i l l i n due course get " h i t " 
with a quality control review. 
W e recognize that today every relationship in our society is suspect of a 
conflict of interest. However, we would like to think that not everyone's motives 
are so suspect that the more normal and professional approach of a firm-to-firm 
review should not be acceptable. 
There was considerable discussion with the S E C concerning the responsibili­
ties of the reviewers, should they encounter what appeared to be errors i n a 
particular engagement inspected during the course of a review. We proposed 
that the reviewer's responsibility would be to report such apparent errors to the 
firm under review and that they should have the responsibility to assess their 
course of action regarding disclosure to the S E C as they would i n the event 
they themselves discovered an error. This approach was not acceptable to the 
S E C and the tentative program provides that such errors, should they be material 
with respect to adequate disclosure to the investigating public, must be reported 
to the S E C by the reviewers. This is but one aspect of the larger problem of 
whether the A I C P A quality review program is to become a part of the S E C 
enforcement apparatus or not. 
There was also discussion and negotiation about whether the reviewers 
would be asked to select and pursue engagements of a firm that were of particu­
lar interest to the S E C . W e hope that our understanding is that the review of 
any particular engagement is a matter of selection by the reviewers and their 
purpose is to review the engagement to assess the application of a firm's quality 
control procedures rather than to second-guess the appropriateness of the ac­
counting and reporting resulting from a given audit. 
Confidentiality and Legal Problems 
O u r early discussions with the S E C and with A I C P A legal counsel were 
concerned with matters of confidentiality and the legal position of the various 
parties involved. A s the discussions progressed, the legal protections applicable 
i n this program became more and more vague and less and less protective— 
but then we are i n an unexplored area, so I can understand why the legal 
questions are so much i n doubt. Y o u can be sure that once this type of inspec­
tion process is initiated a standard question in any legal action involving C P A 
firms w i l l be whether a given firm has been subject to a quality review and there 
w i l l be an attempt to disclose the reviewers' report and their working papers 
even though the particular case at hand involves a particular client rather than 
the overall practices of a firm. The S E C has said that the working papers and 
reports resulting from a quality review can never be destroyed without their 
permission and that they would be disposed to disclose this material to any 
litigant who has, i n their judgment, a legitimate interest i n the performance 
of the firm. This has got to be a new adventure, which added to all of the legal 
action currently going on involving accounting firms must cause some of us to 
pause. Our committee believes that this quality control exercise could certainly 
not be expected to lessen the legal actions against accountants but only add grist 
to the m i l l . In my view, the severe penalties associated wi th any firm's failure 
to perform effectively are already so onerous that no additional motivations are 
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required to encourage firms of accountants to give priority attention to the 
quality of their performance. 
Conclusion 
So this is where we stand at the moment. The Board of Directors has 
authorized the A I C P A to put up a panel of reviewers to conduct the first review 
of L K H & H and to do the front end of the next 2 or 3 cases. A panel has been 
established, and one of my partners has been selected as the chairman of the 
first review team. What the motivation for this selection was, I do not know, 
but I would like to think that my partner was selected because our firm is not 
now high on the list of those to be reviewed. In any event, the first review w i l l 
be conducted, and the Board of Directors has reserved the right to reassess this 
whole exercise i n the light of the experience gained on the Laventhol matter. 
I should also add that our committee was asked to consider the formulation 
of a voluntary review program of multi-office firms sponsored by the A I C P A . 
For many of the reasons already noted, our committee rejected this proposal out-
of-hand. Subsequently, a new committee was appointed under the chairmanship 
of T o m Holton of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., which has now developed a 
voluntary program which is under consideration by the Board of Directors. 
Whether or not such a voluntary program w i l l fly remains to be seen. I really 
don't know how much "chicken soup" the Institute should be brewing on the 
quality control matter, but if anyone thinks that a voluntary program established 
by the A I C P A is going to blunt the thrust of the SEC's interest i n demonstrating 
that they are performing the regulatory role, I believe they are "whistl ing Dix ie . " 
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4 
Relationship of Auditing Standards 
To Detection of Fraud 
George R. Catlett 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
The accounting profession is facing a wide diversity of difficult challenges. 
One of the current problems facing C P A s i n public practice is how to achieve a 
proper understanding on the part of the public and others of 1) the relation­
ship of auditing standards to the detection of fraud, and 2) the responsibilities 
of auditors for the detection of fraud. 
Nature of Fraud 
Dishonesty and deceit have always been present to some degree not only 
i n the business community but i n all walks of life. However, fraud i n business 
enterprises has been increasing i n recent years. Whi le most managements and 
employees are honest, there are enough material cases of dishonesty to cause 
concern among independent auditors. 
Fifteen years ago, most accounting firms had only an occasional fraud case, 
and many of those were not of any great significance. Today, with fraud cases 
becoming more common, and with investigations by governmental agencies and 
resulting litigation exploding i n all directions, this disturbing trend is becoming 
a major factor in the operation of accounting firms. Some of the reasons for 
this situation are interesting, but time limitations do not permit us to discuss 
that topic. 
What constitutes fraud is not always clear. In cases of bankruptcies and 
failures, fraud is sometimes alleged when what really may have occurred was 
bad management decisions and/or adverse business conditions, with a resulting 
loss of money by investors and creditors. The tendency to allege " fraud" under 
these circumstances frequently seems to be irresistible. In any event, what is 
referred to as " f raud" i n some cases may not actually be " fraud." 
Legal liability of independent auditors for alleged negligence and other 
deficiencies i n their work has many ramifications. M r . A . A . Sommer, Jr., now 
a Commissioner of the S E C , discussed this area at the Symposium here i n 1972. 
The number of court cases involving the question of whether and under what 
circumstances an auditor may have legal liability is still somewhat limited; but 
more such cases w i l l probably go to trial i n the next few years, and the guide­
lines may become clearer than they are at the present time. 
Many different kinds and magnitudes of fraud exist, with some not affecting 
the financial statements at all or only i n a minor way, while others have a 
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material effect on the financial statements. Some examples of the various types 
of fraud are: 
1. Misappropriation of assets. 
2. Overstatement of assets or understatement of liabilities to present 
more favorable financial position and/or results of operations. 
3. Siphoning off of assets through transactions wi th affiliated entities 
or i n other ways. 
4. "Kickbacks" and other irregular transactions between officers or 
employees of an enterprise and outside parties. 
5. Lack of disclosure of significant information. 
Fraud i n a business entity may be covered up in many ways, but major 
cases usually include collusion among officers and/or employees, or collusion 
with outside persons. The cover-up may involve false accounting entries or mis­
leading information, forgeries, unrecorded transactions, or other such means. 
Responsibilities of Management 
Management has the primary responsiblity for the use and safeguarding 
of corporate assets and the incurrence of liabilities of the business enterprise on 
behalf of the stockholders. A n additional responsibility runs to creditors and 
other parties and agencies wi th a legitimate interest in the enterprise. 
The responsibilities of the board of directors in monitoring the management 
are becoming of increasing concern to many directors, particularly the outside 
directors. Even though the directors, as representatives of the stockholders, 
review or approve management actions in various ways, the responsibilities of 
directors for various kinds of management fraud are still somewhat undefined 
from a legal standpoint. 
One of the important functions of management is the establishment of an 
adequate accounting system along with appropriate administrative and internal 
accounting controls and the necessary internal auditing. The resulting financial 
statements are the direct representations of management, setting forth the finan­
cial position and results of operations of the enterprise along with the necessary 
disclosures for interpretation of the financial statements. 
Primary reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed 
on an adequate system of internal control because such a system is in constant 
operation and covers a great many periods and transactions when the inde­
pendent auditor is not present. It is not feasible for the auditor to check these 
transactions later in any detail. Management should realize that a good system 
of internal control can be circumvented by collusion among employees or by 
collusion between one or more employees and persons outside the enterprise. 
This possibility must be considered by management, and internal auditing is an 
additional safeguard. 
When collusion to circumvent the accounting system is directed by man­
agement, an additional and complicating dimension is added to the problem 
of deciding when and how an auditor might detect fraud, assuming that gen­
erally accepted auditing standards have been followed. 
Managements involved in some fraud cases have been held legally responsi­
ble from a civi l and/or criminal standpoint. However, the number of cases is 
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disturbing i n which the independent auditor appears to be the main "target" i n 
governmental investigations and class action suits rather than the individuals 
who perpetrated the fraud. 
Present Auditing Standards 
What effect, i f any, should recent fraud cases and the resulting governmental 
investigations and litigation have on auditing standards? Are the present stand­
ards satisfactory? Have we learned as much as we should have from our 
experiences? Have the fraud situations gone undetected by auditors because of 
ineffective work or inadequate auditing standards; or has the cause been 
fraudulent concealment by management or other actions not detectable by nor­
mally appropriate auditing procedures? The answers to these and many other 
related questions are not self-evident. 
The auditor should constantly exercise his professional judgment i n deciding 
whether it is reasonable to assume that he has all the pertinent facts and what 
auditing standards and procedures are necessary in attempting to obtain the 
facts. Audi t ing cannot be done entirely by rules and forms. 
The greater use of electronic computers and all sorts of sophisticated equip­
ment for accounting and related purposes also represents new challenges i n 
developing audit techniques. Some of the basic concepts of auditing may be 
changed. However, the standards of auditing should not be thwarted by 
equipment. People, not machines, commit fraud. 
The A I C P A has a special committee reviewing the Equity Funding case 
to determine whether in the light of that case consideration should be given by 
the A I C P A to possible changes i n any auditing standards and procedures. The 
report of that committee has not been issued. 
The most authoritative statement by the A I C P A of the independent audi­
tor's responsibility for the detection of fraud is set forth in Statement on Audi t ing 
Standards N o . 1 (paragraphs 110.05-110.08), and this is quoted in Appendix A . 
Chapter 6, "Due Audi t Care," from The Philosophy of Auditing by Mautz 
and Sharaf, contains this statement: "Independent auditors should accept re­
sponsibility for the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities which the 
exercise of due audit care by a prudent practitioner would normally uncover." 
A summary of some of the views expressed i n that chapter is quoted i n A p ­
pendix B. 
The membership of the A I C P A adopted ten standards that are referred to 
as "generally accepted auditing standards," and these are classified as general 
standards, standards of field work, and standards of reporting. These standards 
contain such requirements as technical training and proficiency, independence, 
due professional care, adequate planning, proper study and evaluation of internal 
control, and sufficient competent evidential matter. Careful distinction should 
be drawn between these "auditing standards" and the "auditing procedures" to 
be selected and executed in accordance with the standards. 
A l l of the items referred to above are wel l written and pertinent to the 
subject under discussion. W h e n we relate what is said i n those documents to 
the situation i n which the accounting profession finds itself today, it is evident 
that controversial questions and misunderstandings exist. 
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Internal Control 
Internal control, for many reasons, has become an increasingly important 
factor in the conduct of audits. The A I C P A second standard of field work 
states: "There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal 
control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant 
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted." 
The evolution in auditing over many years i n the direction of greater reliance 
on internal controls and the use of test-checking in reviewing those controls is 
not just a theoretical or philosophical development. This trend is the result of 
practical necessity. W i t h the large business enterprises that now exist, detailed 
auditing to any significant extent is not economically feasible. 
When there are millions of transactions i n a single enterprise i n a year, an 
auditor must rely on test-checks for much of his work. Therefore, the effective­
ness of the accounting system and internal controls and the integrity of manage­
ment are crucial to the auditor. 
Most of the significant fraud cases publicized i n the financial press are the 
result of a breakdown i n internal control as a result of management direction, 
collusion of officers and/or employees, deterioration of internal control from 
neglect, or a combination of these and similar factors. 
The auditor's evaluation of internal control is an important phase of an 
audit engagement. Management has a responsibility to its shareholders to see 
that adequate internal control exists. A n absence of adequate control raises a 
serious question; one to which professional judgment must be applied as to 
whether the auditor can compensate by expanding the scope of his work or 
should withdraw from the engagement. 
Representations by Clients 
Representations by management and employees take many forms in the 
conduct of an audit. If an auditor is precluded from relying on such representa­
tions and should be required to assume that al l of them are wrong until he can 
prove them correct, an audit would have to be viewed from a vastly different 
perspective. A n auditor certainly does not accept all information and data 
given to h im by a client without question. O n the other hand, when an auditor 
is given misinformation or information is withheld without his knowledge, 
there are limits to the steps he should be expected to take to find something he 
does not know exists. If each audit is to be approached with the viewpoint that 
the client is dishonest until proven otherwise, not only would an entirely new 
approach be needed but also the auditor may well be placed i n an untenable 
position. 
The credibility and integrity of management are an important factor for 
an auditor to assess in the conduct of his work. If the auditor finds that a man­
agement does not have sufficient integrity to rely on its representations, he is 
running a serious risk that frequently cannot adequately be dealt with by an 
extension or expansion of the audit procedures. O n the other hand, an auditor 
may assume that integrity exists and then find to his dismay that his trust and 
confidence i n this regard were misplaced. 
Auditors do have responsibilities i n the conduct of an audit, but these 
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responsibilities do not include infallibility or clairvoyance. Management should 
be held responsible for misrepresentations and withholding of material matters 
from the auditor. A n auditor should not be held responsible when he follows 
customary auditing procedures, those procedures do not disclose the deception, 
and no apparent reason exists to expand the customary audit procedures. 
What are Some of the Pertinent Questions? 
A few pertinent questions regarding auditing standards and procedures 
as they relate to the detection of fraud are set forth below i n order to serve as a 
basis for discussion. 
The first question is: Should an unqualified auditor's opinion be construed 
to constitute a representation that there is no undetected fraud having a material 
effect on the financial statements? 
A second and somewhat related question is: Should an auditor be held to 
be a "guarantor" of the financial statements or of the fairness with which they 
are presented insofar as fraud is concerned? Put another way, should the auditor 
be held to have a joint responsibility with the management for the financial 
statements i n this regard? 
The third question is: Can fraud become so extensive or massive that the 
answers to the first two questions are different? 
A fourth question, especially i f the first two are answered affirmatively, is: 
Are any basic changes needed in current auditing standards and procedures? 
A fifth question is: Should auditors rate clients as to quality and take only 
the better ones? If so, what are the criteria for this purpose? 
A further question is: Should legislation be passed establishing greater 
responsibility on the part of everyone not to intentially mislead auditors? 
I w i l l not try as a part of my formal remarks to answer these questions in 
detail, but I w i l l make a few comments on them. 
Hindsight is a wonderful faculty. There is no area in which hindsight is 
more readily applied than to undetected fraud after such fraud is later discovered. 
It inevitably seems to appear obvious that the fraud should have been detected. 
The circumstances at the time are most difficult to recreate and comprehend, and 
little effort is really made to do so. Second-guessing becomes prevalent, and 
the less experience or knowledge one has about auditing, the more certain one 
becomes of the righteousness of his condemnation. Subsequently judging the 
effectiveness of a professional person in doing his work under the stress and 
strain and actual conditions at the time should not be taken lightly. 
Auditors should not be presumed to have represented or guaranteed that 
no undetected fraud exists or to have guaranteed that the financial statements 
are a fair presentation of the financial position and results of operations. Those 
who suggest that the auditor has a joint, and presumably equal, responsibility 
with management for the financial statements do not i n my view understand 
the relative roles of management and the auditor. There is no more justification 
for an auditor to be a guarantor than there would be for a lawyer to guarantee 
that he w i l l w i n a lawsuit or a doctor to guarantee that an operation w i l l be 
successful. A lawyer does not have a joint responsibility for a client's morals, 
and a doctor does not have a joint responsibility for a patient's health habits. 
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Insofar as the extent or massiveness of a fraud is concerned, about all to be 
said about this is that the larger the fraud the more likely it is to be detected 
by the auditor i n following proper audit procedures. However, counter forces 
to detection may be the extent of the collusion inside and outside of the enter­
prise, the existence of expert forgery, or other sophisticated deterrents to detection. 
Generally accepted auditing standards and procedures should be constantly 
reevaluated i n the light of improved knowledge and current developments. This 
should be done by the accounting profession and by accounting firms. A s an 
example, some of our past ideas i n this regard may be changed by computers. 
Some improvements can undoubtedly be made i n auditing techniques and pro­
cedures, but I see no particular evidence that any revolutionary change is needed 
in the standards. 
Our free-enterprise system w i l l be hampered and the tradition of opportunity 
for all w i l l be affected, i f the accounting firms decide only to perform audit 
services for "safe" clients. A relatively new enterprise wi th a first-time registra­
tion statement is frequently of greater risk for an auditor than an established 
business. The new enterprise is more likely to result i n failure or disillusioned 
investors. However, the public interest may not best be served if auditors are 
forced to avoid such risks. The auditor should be able to perform a professional 
service for these entitles i n a proper manner without being subjected to the 
threat of a lawsuit whenever one of them fails. 
As to whether legislation is desirable with respect to putting greater penalties 
on misleading the duly appointed auditors of a company, many factors are 
involved. I would not advocate such legislation at this time, but something 
needs to be done to protect the auditor, who all too frequently is left "holding 
the bag" as a result of management misconduct. 
Auditors are well aware that fraud can occur. They are also concerned 
about the possibility of fraud being so material as to have a significant effect 
on the financial statements upon which they are reporting. O n the other hand, 
the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming 
responsibilities or accepting a role that cannot be successfully fulfilled. 
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Appendix A 
Extract from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (1973) 
110 Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor 
Detection of Fraud 
.05 In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware 
of the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated 
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresenta­
tion by management, or both. The auditor recognizes that fraud, if sufficiently 
material, may affect his opinion on the financial statements, and his examina­
tion, made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, gives con­
sideration to this possibility. However, the ordinary examination directed to the 
expression of an opinion on financial statements is not primarily or specifically 
designed, and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar 
irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the 
discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is usually more closely 
associated with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination 
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. The responsibility of the inde­
pendent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to 
clients and others) arises only when such failure clearly results from failure to 
comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
.06 Reliance for the prevention and detection of fraud should be placed 
principally upon an adequate accounting system with appropriate internal con­
trol. The well-established practice of the independent auditor of evaluating the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the system of internal control by testing the 
accounting records and related data and by relying on such evaluation for the 
selection and t iming of his other auditing procedures has generally proved 
sufficient for making an adequate examination. If an objective of an independent 
auditor's examination were the discovery of all fraud, he would have to extend 
his work to a point where its cost would be prohibitive. Even then he could 
not give assurance that all types of fraud had been detected, or that none existed, 
because items such as unrecorded transactions, forgeries, and collusive fraud 
would not necessarily be uncovered. Acordingly, it is generally recognized that 
good internal control and fidelity bonds provide protection more economically 
and effectively. In the case of fidelity bonds, protection is afforded not only by 
the indemnification for discovered defalcations but also by the possible deterrent 
effect upon employees; the presence of fidelity bonds, however, should not affect 
the scope of the auditor's examination. 
.07 When an independent auditor's examination leading to an opinion on 
financial statements discloses specific circumstances that make h i m suspect that 
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fraud may exist, he should decide whether the fraud, if i n fact it should exist, 
might be of such magnitude as to affect his opinion on the financial statements. 
If the independent auditor believes that fraud so material as to affect his opinion 
may have occurred, he should reach an understanding with the proper repre­
sentatives of the client as to whether the auditor or the client, subject to the 
auditor's review, is to make the investigation necessary to determine whether 
fraud has i n fact occurred, and, i f so, the amount thereof. If, on the other hand, 
the independent auditor concludes that any such fraud could not be so material 
as to affect his opinion, he should refer the matter to the proper representatives 
of the client with the recommendation that it be pursued to a conclusion. For 
example, frauds involving " lapping" accounts receivable collections, or frauds 
involving overstatements of inventory, could be material, while those involving 
peculations from a small imprest fund would normally be of little significance 
because the operation and size of the fund tend to establish a limitation. 
.08 The subsequent discovery that fraud existed during the period covered 
by the independent auditor's examination does not of itself indicate negligence 
on his part. H e is not an insurer or guarantor; i f his examination was made with 
due professional ski l l and care i n accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards, he has fulfilled all of the obligations implicit i n his undertaking. 
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Appendix B 
Extract from R. K. Mautz and Hussein A . Sharaf, 
The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association, 1961 
Chapter 6—Due Audit Care, pp. 139-140 
Summary. In this chapter we have tried to establish a concept of due audit 
care as the basis for judging the responsibility of independent auditors i n the 
performance of their professional duties. This concept is based on an assumed 
prudent practitioner and the knowledge, skil l , caution, and responsiveness that 
could be expected from h i m under the circumstances at issue. The usefulness 
of such a concept seems clear. If it can be developed, it w i l l give to all concerned 
with the subject a more explicit statement than is now available i n the literature. 
The difficulty of formulating such a concept is closely related to the problem 
of irregularity detection. There are some irregularities which should be discovered 
in any standard examination; the obligation of discovering certain other irregu­
larities would be so onerous a burden as to be unbearable. Between these ex­
tremes are perhaps innumerable cases varying from one extreme to the other. 
We are unable to find i n the characteristics of irregularities themselves any 
significant clues which permit a precise statement of audit responsibility for 
detection. This leads us naturally and inevitably to consideration of the legal 
doctrine of a prudent man and its application to auditing. 
It must be recognized that a concept of due audit care, founded on the 
legal concept of a prudent man acting reasonably with average knowledge and 
average judgment i n the specific circumstances, cannot give us objective advance 
answers to the question of responsibility i n any given case. W e feel it does give 
a useful criterion to the auditor himself and to those who must judge the quality 
of his work, a criterion which w i l l increase i n usefulness as experience sharpens 
and strengthens the concept itself. 
W e also believe that a statement indicating the extent of responsibility 
accepted can be formulated i n a manner that w i l l make its usefulness apparent, 
both to practitioners i n their daily affairs and to the profession as an indication 
of acceptance of its just and fair responsibilities. L ike development of the concept 
of due audit care, this may take some time, but it is a worthy endeavor and w i l l 
repay the effort. As a beginning, we suggest the following summary. It w i l l be 
apparent to the careful reader that its component ideas have been borrowed from 
a variety of sources. 
Independent auditors should accept responsibility for the discovery and 
disclosure of those irregularities which the exercise of due audit care by a 
prudent practitioner would normally uncover. A prudent practitioner is assumed 
to have a knowledge of the philosophy and practice of auditing, to have the 
degree of training, experience, and skill common to the average independent 
auditor, to have the ability to recognize indications or irregularities, and to keep 
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abreast of developments in the perpetration and detection of irregularities. Due 
audit care requires the auditor to acquaint himself with the company under 
examination, its method of operation and any significant practices peculiar to it 
or the industry of which it is a part, to review the method of internal control 
operating i n the company under examination by inquiry and such other methods 
as are desirable, to obtain any knowledge readily available which is pertinent 
to the accounting and financial problems of the company under examination, 
to be responsive to unusual events and unfamiliar circumstances, to persist unti l 
he has eliminated from his own mind any reasonable doubts he may have about 
the existence of material irregularities, and to exercise caution in instructing his 
assistants and reviewing their work. 
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Discussant's Response to 
Relationship of Auditing Standards 
To Detection of Fraud 
John J. Willingham 
University of Houston 
I believe it fair to begin by summarizing George Catlett's paper as an 
affirmation of the conventional wisdom of the accounting profession. Adherence 
to the standards of a profession must always be seen by responsible citizens as 
admirable, and therefore criticism is difficult. In this regard, I w i l l not present 
esoteric criticism that sometimes characterizes the remarks of teachers i n situa­
tions such as this, nor w i l l I dwell at length on selected statements i n the paper. 
However, i f you w i l l indulge me, I wish to respond to one statement because 
it sets a tone for the paper and for the conventional wisdom of the profession 
which I would like to see changed. Under the heading "Representations by 
Clients," the following statement can be found: "[Auditors ' ] . . . responsibili­
ties do not include infallibility or clairvoyance." 
"Responsibilities" of CPAs 
In this statement, as well as in many other parts of the paper, either ex­
plicitly or implicitly, Catlett suggests that the detection of fraud could become 
a "responsibility" and an onerous one at that. Presently it is reasonably clear, 
at least to accounting practitioners and students, that detection of fraud is not 
an objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements. However, should 
this objective be undertaken by C P A s , it would not necessarily constitute a new 
"responsibility." Should such an objective be assumed, it seems likely that it 
would result from a demand for service either directly from clients or indirectly 
from clients through a governmental or other agency charged to represent the 
public. Further, I might add, that assumption of such a "responsibility" should 
carry with it appropriate remuneration. 
I am suggesting that the services or functions of a profession evolve over 
time and the nature of these services is dictated largely by customers who 
demand services and are wi l l ing to pay for them. Finally, I am also suggesting 
that the accounting profession should feel flattered and privileged to be asked 
to extend its services to a desirous public. This is, of course, a simplification of 
the rather complex problem of attesting to the material absence of fraud i n the 
operations of an entity. T o clarify my position, however, I would like to take 
up several specific topics included i n the subject paper and attempt to relate 
them to this potential extension of the attest function. 
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Nature of Fraud 
The paper outlines the nature of fraud i n a manner that should be satisfy­
ing to most accountants. Examples of various types of fraud are listed and even 
these examples appear to be inclusive of the vast majority of frauds that are 
perpetrated. However, the paper dwells at length on cases of fraud which are 
concealed through collusion and tends to ignore defalcation and embezzlement 
by individuals. Catlett states that " . . . major cases usually include collusion 
among officers and/or employees, or collusion with outside persons." C P A 
firms certainly should be able to support a statement such as this one. I cannot, 
but I do know that there are many individuals now i n prison who were convicted 
of embezzlement and who did not collude wi th anyone. Many of you probably 
w i l l remember the study of defalcators published over 20 years ago i n The 
Journal of Accountancy. The study by Donald Cressey centered on convicted 
defalcators incarcerated at Illinois State Prison at Joliet. Cressey's purpose was 
to determine the causes of defalcations. H e generalized about the process of 
defalcation i n the following way: 
Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive 
of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-sharable; (2) 
have the knowledge or awareness that this problem can be secretly 
resolved by violation of the position of financial trust; and (3) are able 
to apply to their own conduct in that situation a verbalization which 
enables them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons 
with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or 
property. Unless there is movement through this sequence, a trusted 
person does not become a violator. 1 
This study along with other studies by students of D r . Cressey have indi­
cated that some types of fraud do not include collusion. If an auditor were to 
attest to the material absence of fraud, he should consider this type of fraud 
as well as such misrepresentations by management as over- or under-statement 
of assets and liabilities and irregular and/or deceitful transactions. Presently, 
auditors have an excellent opportunity to uncover an individual defalcation 
through the review and evaluation of internal control. A l l pronouncements on 
the nature of internal control emphasize division of duties and responsibilities 
in a manner that prevents errors and defalcations unless collusion exists. If most 
perpetrators (at least those who are caught and convicted) have nonsharable 
problems and perpetrate embezzlements wi th no collusive help, the auditor 
should be able to discern weaknesses i n the control system which could allow 
for the existence of such fraud with the use of current internal control evalua­
tion standards and procedures. 
Audit Objectives 
Apparently, some frauds involve collusive arrangements, but some do not. 
It would seem that all should be included i n any definition of fraud if a stance 
is taken on the subject of attesting to the material absence of fraud. However, 
a more important consideration to this discussion concerns objectives of audits. 
Historically, these objectives have changed. Brown suggests that the detection 
of fraud was recognized as a major audit objective until at least 1940.2 H e 
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also indicates that beginning around the turn of the century fairness began to 
overshadow detection of fraud as a stated audit objective, and that detection 
of fraud seemed to disappear as a stated audit objective around 1940 due largely 
to the effect on the profession of the McKesson & Robbins case. Perhaps the 
discussion of the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud has not yet 
diminished because it was a stated audit objective for over 400 years and was 
removed as an objective by the profession rather than by a change i n demand 
of clients of accounting firms. A solicitous consuming public could reinstate it. 
If this were to happen, the terms might be more advantageous for C P A s than 
they were during the period previous to the McKesson & Robbins case. 
The detection of fraud as an audit objective might resurface as a part of the 
ordinary examination of financial statements or as a special examination of 
financial statements. Recently there has been much more interest i n attestation 
of representations other than those which appear i n historical financial state­
ments. Forecasts and interim financial statements are two possible extensions 
of the attest function that are of current interest to the profession. 
Whether the potential extension of the auditor's opinion is forecasts, interim 
financial statements, or detection of fraud, history indicates that the process w i l l 
evolve slowly over time. A n y extension probably w i l l not result from a sudden 
pronouncement of the A I C P A ; instead, any such pronouncement w i l l follow 
rather widespread practice i n the field. Should detection of fraud again become 
a stated audit objective, either as a part of the ordinary examination of financial 
statements or through a demand for special reports asserting the absence of fraud, 
auditing standards must be judged for their appropriateness to the task. 
Auditing Standards 
Current general and field work standards seem to apply equally well to 
audits of financial statements and to audits designed to detect the existence of 
fraud. As mentioned earlier, the requirement for review and evaluation of 
internal control should ferret out all but the most insignificant embezzlement 
or defalcation perpetrated by a lone individual. The search for other types of 
fraud seems to be covered by the third standard of field work which requires 
"sufficient competent evidential matter." That standard goes on to indicate that 
this evidence should be obtained "through inspection, observation, inquiries, and 
confirmations." A l l of the types of fraud that result from situations other than 
"nonsharable problems" are transaction based. Purchases, sales, cash receipts, 
and cash disbursements are recorded and result i n balances that appear i n 
accounts. If the balances are incorrect due to fraud, evidence of that fraud 
should be available. This evidence may not always be conclusive, as sometimes 
seems to be true in the ordinary examination of financial statements. Neverthe­
less, some evidence w i l l exist. 
Because accounting data are transaction based, evidence theory indicates 
that auditors should corroborate client representations by obtaining information 
from the other party to the transaction or a third independent party such as a 
bank. Evidence is gathered by auditors i n the field by applying this theory 
through the use of confirmations (a direct means) and such things as examina­
tion of invoices and cancelled checks (an indirect means). In summary, auditing 
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standards seem broad enough to encompass audits for the purpose of detection 
of fraud. 
In most of the fraud cases that are covered in the literature there are prob­
lems of interpretation of auditing standards, and i n a few cases, apparent viola­
tions of them. A s M r . Catlett suggests, standards must be distinguished from 
procedures and I would suggest that it is procedures used i n applying standards 
that might have to be changed should fraud detection become an objective of 
either a special examination or the ordinary examination of financial statements. 
Audi t ing Procedures 
The changes that should occur in audit procedures are really changes that 
should occur whether or not fraud detection becomes an objective of the ordinary 
examination. T o discover any characteristic of a population of data, sampling 
techniques can be used. Discovery sampling, for example, seems particularly 
appropriate to investigation of potential frauds. Discovery sampling is not par­
ticularly helpful i n situations where fraudulent transactions or behavior constitute 
an extremely minor percent of the transactions or behavior experienced i n an 
organization. However, i f fraud is material, such techniques could be helpful. 
Scientific sampling currently is very helpful i n the ordinary examination of 
financial statements. The characteristics of interest are different, but the purpose 
is identical: to discover characteristics and assess their importance. It is difficult 
to assess the degree to which statistical sampling is utilized by auditors, but it 
seems clear from the literature that it is far more reliable than judgment sampling 
techniques. Should detection of fraud become an objective of the auditor's 
examination, scientific sampling certainly would have to be used i n order to 
assess the risk taken i n attesting to the absence of material fraud. Also, an 
auditor should be interested i n assessing the risk he is now taking i n his opinion 
on financial statements for an ordinary examination where fraud is explicitly 
denied as an objective. 
One additional example of an audit procedure that might change should 
fraud again become an audit objective is confirmation. It is my understanding 
that negative confirmation requests are still quite prevalent i n spite of the fact 
that when an auditor does not receive a reply from a request, he has no basis 
for determining whether the amount to be confirmed is correct or the respondent 
is nonexistent, uninterested, or unresponsive. In an audit of accounts receivable, 
if confirmation requests were sent and the objective were to determine whether 
the accounts receivable were fraudulently stated, I do not believe that many audi­
tors would want to rely on the use of negative confirmations. Instead, positive 
confirmations would be utilized with careful and extensive followup. Again , 
I would suggest that such procedure would be appropriate i n the ordinary 
examination where the objective is not detection of fraud; however, it becomes 
much more important when the objective is detection of fraud. 
Professional A u d i t Service 
Earlier, it was suggested that the use of the term "responsibility" perhaps 
was inappropriate. Instead it was suggested that demands for C P A s ' services 
should be treated as opportunities and privileges to serve society. W h e n such 
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requests are made, they represent recognition by society that C P A s have the 
competence and the integrity to perform the services requested. Competence 
often is brought into arguments against extension of the attest function to other 
areas. In such arguments it is suggested that the competence of C P A s lies i n 
their abilities as accountants and that to attest anything or offer a service that 
is outside of the field that has been known traditionally as accounting would 
be to engage i n services beyond their abilities and that therefore the public 
might lose confidence. This , of course, could happen; however, i n my opinion 
C P A s w i l l not seek out engagements i n which they must offer a service that 
they have not offered previously. Rather, society w i l l ask C P A s to provide the 
new service. This has happened i n many instances over the years to the extent 
that management services departments of C P A firms engage i n salary surveys, 
executive search and other activities that cannot be considered, even remotely, 
as traditional accounting services. Thus far, no consequent loss of public con­
fidence has occurred. 
Although I am not a practitioner, I think there is one change that should 
be made i n the practice of public accounting, should requests for extensions of 
the attest function and other services be made by the public. In almost every 
profession, some allowance is made i n the fee structure for the relative risk 
involved. Delicate surgical operations are more expensive than routine low-risk 
surgical operations. W i t h the possible exception of some securities registrations, 
C P A s apparently have not built into their bil l ing structures any allowance for 
risk that might be present i n a given engagement. Should C P A s be asked to 
attest to the absence or presence of material fraud, it would seem wise to adjust 
bil l ing methods to allow for risks being undertaken. Again , there is a parallel 
to attestation of financial statements. Given current litigation against accountants, 
it would seem appropriate for C P A s to assess risk i n each ordinary engagement 
and adjust the fee according to the estimate of the risk to be undertaken. 
Conclusion 
Services or functions of any profession evolve over time and should be 
seen as opportunities or privileges. A t the same time, professionals should assess 
the value of their services and the risks that may be involved and bi l l clients 
accordingly. Furthermore, historically, audit examinations with some stated 
objective have been undertaken before standards were developed. As indicated 
previously, Brown asserted i n his article that audits occurred prior to the year 
1500 and were carried on for hundreds of years before auditing standards were 
developed. A more recent example is that of attesting to some aspects of fore­
casts. Such services have been performed and are being performed now by 
C P A s without any explicit standards. Therefore, I think it is unreasonable to 
assume that standards should be developed before examinations wi th the stated 
objective of detection of fraud can be undertaken. 
Finally, there is one important suggestion that comes from this paper. M r . 
Catlett made assertions about the nature of fraud which can be substantiated 
through research. If there is client interest i n attestation to the absence or 
existence of material fraud, research should be undertaken i n the area. Almost 
all C P A firms maintain files with experiences catalogued i n many different ways. 
As a first step, it would be interesting to examine the files of C P A firms catalog-
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ing all types of fraud that have been discovered either during the course of an 
examination or afterward. A classification system for this examination might 
include type of fraud, method of concealment, industry, client size, and the 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the fraud. Only after extensive 
research of this type can the profession properly assess the likelihood of discovery 
of fraud and the risk the C P A is taking when he attests to the absence of it. 
Catlett's paper concludes with the following statement: " . . . the account­
ing profession must not permit itself to be destroyed by assuming responsibilities 
or accepting a role that cannot be successfuly fulfilled." I would add to that 
statement that the accounting profession must not permit itself to be destroyed 
by refusing to provide requested services to society. Destruction in this latter 
case w i l l be much slower but nonetheless definite. 
Footnotes 
1. Donald R. Cressey, " W h y Do Trusted Persons Commit Fraud? A Social-Psychological 
Study of Defalcators," The Journal of Accountancy, November 1951, pp. 577-578. 
2. R. Gene Brown, "Changing Audit Objectives and Techniques," The Accounting 
Review, October 1962, pp. 696-703. 
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A Decision Theory View of Auditing 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of Washington, Seattle 
The major objective of the field of applied statistics is to help solve decision 
problems i n the face of uncertainty. This help has traditionally been provided 
by making inferences based on a probability model. These probability models 
are the statistician's models of the uncertainty faced by a real world problem-
solver. The field of auditing has been the beneficiary over the past ten to fifteen 
years of increasing assistance from the field of applied statistics. This paper 
w i l l review these contributions and then consider a new contribution that is a 
logical next step. 
Dealing with Uncertainty 
The auditor is continually making choices i n the face of uncertainty. The 
first statistical recognition of this fact occurred wi th the use of classical statistics 
i n evaluating the results of random sampling. 1 The significance of this approach 
was not that uncertainty was first recognized, but that the risks associated with 
one particular aspect of auditing were made explicit. That is, the classical state­
ment of confidence interval and level (e.g., ± 50 at 95% confidence) specifies 
the risk of sampling error. 2 Thus one element of the uncertainty faced by an 
auditor with which he has always had to treat was now disclosed i n statistical 
terms. Given this beginning contribution, expansion of the potential uses of 
applied statistics to auditing, comparable to other disciplines facing uncertainty, 
should follow. 
In using classical sampling, the contribution of statistics is restricted to the 
evaluation of evidence obtained by random sampling. Incorporation of this 
evidence with other evidence is left to the auditor's judgment. More recently 
a method for combining sample evidence with other auditing evidence has been 
proposed.3 Inferential methods i n Bayesian statistics are based on a posterior 
probability distribution which is a combination of a prior probability distribu­
tion, representing evidence the auditor has evaluated up to the point of sampling, 
and a likelihood function, representing the information i n the sample. By sub­
jectively specifying the results of evidence evaluated up to a point of time as a 
probability function, the auditor has expanded the explicit recognition of the 
uncertainty he faces in carrying out an audit. Again , this uncertainty previously 
existed but was considered only through intuition and judgment. The advantages 
for the auditor that result from being more precise i n considering risk have been 
argued by Roberts.4 
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While classical sampling methods have met with some acceptance by the 
auditing profession, Bayesian sampling methods have not. One major reason for 
this lack of acceptance is the need for a practical method of expressing the prior 
probability distribution. Whi le some research has been carried out, a confidence-
inspiring method still awaits development.5 Another source of resistance to 
Bayesian methods is the "subjective" nature of the prior distribution. The use 
of classical sampling has been "sold" to some members of the auditing profession 
on the basis that it is more objective. Since the result of the audit process is an 
opinion or judgment decision, over-stating applied statistics as a source of 
objectivity can be misleading. Statistical methods discussed i n this paper can 
make the parameters or bases of judgment more explicit. 6 But even i f these 
approaches are carried to their full extent, judgment w i l be required as a critical 
input to the model. The prior probability distribution is an example of an input 
based on judgment. 
Both classical and Bayesian methods discussed above are methods of infer­
ence. The next logical step i n the use of applied statistics is to move from 
inference to action. A n audit action or decision can be addressed by use of 
statistical decision theory. Thi s methodology requires as an input a payoff 
function i n addition to the requirements for inference. This payoff function is a 
specification of the consequences of each possible outcome of the audit to the 
auditor. The use of this method allows the auditor to maximize i n the sense 
that he w i l l make the decision that has the highest expected payoff. 
In addition to the problems discussed above in applying Bayesian methods, 
the use of decision theory also requires an auditor to specify his payoff function. 
For each possible outcome of the audit he must specify the "value" (possibly in 
monetary terms) to h i m . 7 In the auditor's complex environment this specification 
of outcome consequences w i l l be quite difficult. For example, consider that an 
outcome consequence to an auditor w i l l probably represent a combination or 
matching of the form of his opinion and the discovery or lack thereof of a 
material error with the reaction of the firm (fee bargaining, lawsuits, future 
business), the reaction of users (lawsuits), the reactions of the regulators (right 
to practice, criminal prosecution), and the reaction of the rest of the auditor's 
environment (professional regulation, loss of other clients). 
The remainder of this paper w i l l illustrate the application of decision theory 
to a relatively constrained audit decision followed by a discussion of the prob­
lems involved in relaxing the constraints and the related need for research. 
Some discussion of the reasons for the author's bias that such inquiry is needed 
is incorporated i n these comments. 
A Decision Theory Model 
Audi t decision making can be described as a series of choices beginning 
with the acceptance of the client, followed by a series of choices as to type and 
quantity of evidence, and may conclude with the choice of opinion. The evolu­
tion of these choices is likely to be complex. For purposes of this discussion a 
single artificially isolated audit decision w i l l be modeled. 
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Suppose an audit of a single balance, B, such that Σ b i = B. The 
i=1 
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auditor's choice i n this examination is to give either a clean opinion (a 1 ) , or 
require an adjustment (a2), to B. The existence (s 1 ) , or absence (s 2 ) , of a 
"material error" i n B is the criterion which the auditor wishes to employ. This 
specification of possible actions, a i, and states of the balance, si, provides the 
basis for the construction of a payoff table as follows: 
Error S1 N o error S 2 
Clean opinion a1 
Adjustment a2 
In this payoff table the auditor w i l l put the consequences or payoffs to h i m of 
each action-state combination. The objective at this point is to choose payoffs 
that, while arbitrary, have some intuitive appeal. The values i n the following 
table represent dollars ( in thousands). 8 
S1 S 2 
Clean opinion a1 
Adjustment a 2 
- 2 0 7 
3 - 1 
The $7,000 amount i n the no error-clean opinion combination represents the 
fee net of ordinary expenses and is usually the most desired outcome. The no 
error adjustment combination is —$1,000 because it is assumed that the adjust­
ment involves extra audit work for which the client w i l l not pay. The $3,000 
amount i n the error adjustment combination represents extra work that i n part 
is billed and collected from the client. The —$20,000 for the error clean opinion 
combination represents the impact of a settlement with the client (or a third 
party) to not pursue a suit for negligence. 
The auditor plans to sample for evidence regarding the balance but before 
doing so, assesses his prior belief regarding the balance he is examining. Based 
on his knowledge of the client and of the system generating the balance, he 
states that S 1 , a material error, has a .10 chance of existing and S 2 an absence 
of a material error, has a .90 chance of existing. 
A t this point the auditor could decide to not sample and simply make a 
choice based on his prior probability distribution and his payoff function as 
stated in the payoff table. (Such a decision might be correct in decision theory, 
but the auditor must also respond to professional conventions which w i l l require 
at least some testing.) The criterion for choice is to select the action with the 
highest expected value. Using the auditor's prior probability distribution, these 
expected values are as follows: 
E (a 1 ) = E (clean opinion) = .1 ( - 2 0 ) + .9 (7) = 4.3 
E (a 2 ) = E (adjustment) = .1 (3) + .9 ( - 1 ) = - .6 
The decision indicated at this point is a clean opinion. 
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The auditor's next step is to collect additional evidence and modify his 
prior distribution. In obtaining and using sample evidence i n a decision theory 
framework some basic tools have been developed. The first is called the expected 
value of perfect information ( E V P I ) . It indicates the upper l imit on the value 
and thereby the amount that should be spent for additional information. The 
E V P I is computed by summing the values of the best action for each state, Si, 
weighted by its probability of occurring and then deducting the value or payoff 
of the best decision (a clean opinion) under the prior distribution. The expected 
value of the best decision is 3(.1) + 7(.9) = 6.6. Subtracting 4.3 results in an 
E V P I of 2.3. This indicates that no more than $2,300 should be spent on 
sampling. 
Perfect information is seldom available and, for this reason, the expected 
value of sample information ( E V S I ) is a useful number to the decision maker. 
T o compute this value, the decision maker must have or assume some knowledge 
about the population from which he plans to sample. In this case we w i l l 
continue making assumptions that keep the presentation and computations 
simple. 
The computation of E V S I requires the use of Bayes' Model to combine the 
audit decision-maker's prior probability with each possible sample outcome, 
compute the expected values of each possible outcome, and then identify those 
sample outcomes that would indicate a change from the decision indicated by 
the auditor's prior distribution. The E V S I for a particular sample size is the 
sum of the expected values of all actions for all sample outcomes indicating a 
change in decision weighted by the probability of that sample outcome occurring. 
The Appendix summarizes the computations of E V S I for a sample of five from 
the b i making up our balance, B. In this sample we have assumed that only 
two situations could exist i n the balance B. Either a material error exists, defined 
as exactly 20 b i's i n error by their total amount, or there is no material error 
which is defined as exactly 5 bi's i n error. Sampling is defined to be with re­
placement to permit use of binomial tables. The computed E V S I is .443. If the 
cost of taking each sample item is twenty dollars (.02 i n terms of the payoff 
matrix), the expected net gain of sampling ( E N G S ) to the auditor is E V S I less 
the cost of the sample or .443 — 5(.02) = .343. This value should be positive 
for a particular sample to be worthwhile. In this case the sample is worth $343 
to the auditor in terms of his payoff table. 
Given acceptable means of assessing prior beliefs and payoff functions, 
statistical decision theory presents auditors with an interesting and potentially 
desirable alternative. Us ing the expected net gain from sampling as a criterion, 
the auditor could compute the value of alternative sample sizes and choose a 
sample size that is optimal i n terms of his payoff function. The cost of sampling 
can be expected to increase in an approximately linear fashion while the E V S I 
w i l l tend to increase rapidly and then level out. Figure 1 approximates the effect 
of increasing sample size on E N G S . In this figure n * would be the optimal 
sample size. 
After the auditor chooses his sample size, he w i l l take the sample and 
evaluate it. H i s final decision is based on a terminal posterior probability distri­
bution based on actual rather than expected sample results. If i n the above 
example a sample of five were taken with two errors (as described above) 
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located, a specific terminal posterior distribution can be obtained. W h e n this 
posterior is combined with the loss function (table), either a1 or a 2 w i l l have 
a higher payoff indicating the appropriate action for the auditor to take. In 
the example the posterior distribution on the states would be: 
P (S 1 ) = .515 
P (S 2 ) =.485 
as indicated by the Appendix. The expected payoff of the two actions would be: 
a 1 : - 2 0 (.515) + 7 (.485) = -6.905 
a 2 : 3 (.515) + - 1 (.485) = 1.060. 
The indicated action is to require an adjustment to B. 
Extensions and Research 
The simplifications made i n the above illustration can be relaxed to develop 
a model more closely fitting actual audit decisions. Without actually construct­
ing an example, a modification particularly appropriate for audit decisions w i l l 
be proposed i n the following paragraphs. 
In comparing the above example to the auditor's decision environment, the 
first point that might occur to the experienced auditor is " i f only the real world 
were so simple!" Instead of a single decision i n isolation, the auditor i n exam­
ining a set of financial statements must make a series of complex, interrelated 
decisions as to the type and quantity of evidence to collect and evaluate. T o deal 
with this complexity, the profession has relied on good, "intuition based" judg­
ment developed through training and experience. A less charitable observer 
might add that auditors may tend to over-rely on conventional practices to deal 
with this complexity. For example, it has been observed that some practitioners 
do too much cash work. This event might be a result of relying on convention 
rather than good judgment. 
T o deal with the auditor's decision environment, the decision theorist needs 
a structure or sequential model of the auditor's decision or judgment processes. 
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FIGURE 1 
Such a model has not been clearly exposed i n the literature, but S A P N o . 54 
(now Section 320 of Statement on Audi t ing Standards N o . 1) does implicitly seem 
to include the framework of such a model. One possible view of that framework 
is as follows: 
1. The auditor engages i n a process of learning the client's operations, 
operating environment, accounting systems, and personnel. In a deci­
sion theory context he is collecting general evidence so that he can 
claim to be an expert with regard to the client and begin his examina­
tion with non-diffuse or concentrated prior probability distributions 
on each material element i n the financial statements. 
2. For each significant class of transactions the firm is likely to have 
a separate information subsystem providing the basis for one or more 
balances or parts of balances i n the financial statements. For each 
such subsystem, for the system handling miscellaneous transactions, 
and for the system combining the results into financial statements, 
the auditor evaluates the internal control. In a decision theory con­
text the auditor is assessing his belief to this point regarding the 
probability distribution on each accounting subsystem generating and 
not correcting a material error. 
3. Using the prior distribution developed i n (2) above, the auditor w i l l 
plan, both as to type and scope, systems (compliance) tests and out­
put (substantive) tests. In a decision theory context he is engaging 
i n assessing the expected net gain from sampling, E N G S , for both 
(1) different types of tests and (2) different sample sizes (up to and 
including a census). This assessment requires the use of a payoff 
function and is based on the expected results of sampling as the 
above example indicates. 
4. The execution of the plan established in (3) above w i l l in essence 
be a series of Bayesian revisions of the auditor's subjunctive beliefs 
regarding the financial statements based on the actual results of 
sampling. A t each major step in execution the auditor should revise 
his remaining plans based on the results of the preceding evidence. 
Each posterior distribution becomes a prior probability distribution 
for the next evidence collection activity. Note that at the conclusion 
of systems testing for all accounting subsystems, the auditor must 
combine the results of one or more systems to complete his prior 
assessment of balances. For example, the accounts receivable balance 
may be the result of an accounting subsystem for credit sales being 
combined with a cash collection subsystem. The posterior distribu­
tions for both systems should be combined for use as a prior distri­
bution in testing the accounts receivable balance. In addition, the 
interrelationship of financial statement balances would have to be 
considered. The results of tests of sales and cash balances could in­
fluence the posterior distribution on accounts receivable. 
5. Finally, the auditor reports his opinion on the financial statements 
choosing from among those opinions proscribed by his profession. 
In a decision theory context, this would be a final decision based on 
the payoff function and his confidence in the balances as expressed 
i n his terminal posterior distribution on the balances. 
While representing an untested suggestion, the above process clearly indi­
cates that a modeling of this complex series of decisions is a challenging task. 
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In practice the computations and analysis suggested by this process would require 
computer algorithms. 
In addition to the usual advantages of modeling judgment processes to gain 
insights for improvements and further productive research, decision theory seems 
to promise another possibility. 9 The auditor's current environment is litigation 
prone and many cases suggest that trouble for the auditor may have been 
the result of slow response to a changing environment. A n auditor may be 
undesirably slow to change because of the "weight" of professional conventions. 
A decision theory approach to an audit may encourage and help justify change 
in the face of this pressure from conventional practices because it provides a 
means of comparing alternative sources of evidence i n terms of criteria that 
should be convincing. 
Additional benefits that a decision theory approach to auditing may provide 
are in the area of communication. In the application of the current intuition/ 
judgment-based approach to scope and evidence source decisions, it is often 
difficult to articulate clearly the criteria used i n making decisions. If decision 
theory could make these criteria more explicit, it is likely that the on-the-job 
training and supervision of inexperienced assistants could be facilitated. In 
addition, communication between experienced auditors is less likely to be 
garbled if it is based on explicit agreement on risk and payoffs. Another aspect 
of communication relates to the evaluation of our services by society. Whi le 
certainly not a panacea, a decision theory approach may facilitate the documenta­
tion of decisions and criteria that w i l l be more convincing and less "mystic" to 
outsiders (such as attorneys and regulators). 
Concluding Observations 
In concluding an exploratory discussion of an untested source of new tech­
niques, it is appropriate to reinforce the problem areas that must be carefully 
researched before an evaluation of their usefulness can be made. There are at 
least three significant problems. The first is identification of the structure of the 
process discussed above. Second, as noted above, some research on assessing 
prior probability distributions has been published. But before such techniques 
can be considered practical for auditors, considerable additional effort i n devel­
oping appropriate distributions and means of training professionals i n their use 
is needed. T h i r d , the payoff function (table) used above needs considerable 
expansion and testing on auditors before any use of decision theory can be 
seriously considered. Basic texts in decision theory do develop the continuous 
payoff and probability function relationship that could be appropriate for audi­
tors. But they need testing and evaluation i n the auditor's environment. Further, 
the use of monetary values in an auditor's payoff function does not seem reason­
able. 1 0 Because of the extremely large amounts that a decision-state combina­
tion resulting i n a lawsuit might involve and the nonmonetary, or at least 
indirect, effects on reputation, a utility-based payoff function seems more reason­
able. 
In summary, decision theory offers considerable promise. Its basic promise 
that decisions under uncertainty are best made based on a probabilistic collection 
and evaluation of sample evidence structured in terms of economic criteria (the 
expected payoffs) is appealing as a model for the audit process. Whether or not 
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the application of decision theory to auditing w i l l result i n better audit decision­
making, better communication between auditors and their public, and better 
communication between auditors can be answered only through research. The 
outlook is promising. 
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The following tables show the computation of EVSI for a sample of 5 where the sampling 
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Posterior 
1. 0 error, 5 correct 
2. 1 error, 4 correct 
3. 2 error, 3 correct 
4. 3 error, 2 correct 
5. 4 error, 1 correct 























































Sample Expected Change in Value of 
Outcome Action Payoff Decision? Sample Info 
1 a1 
a2 
—20(.045) + 7(.955) = 5.785 
3 (.045) + ( - 1 ) (.955) = - . 8 2 no 0 
2 a1 
a2 
-20(.183) + 7(.817) = 2.059 
3(.183) + (-1)( .817) = —.268 no 0 
3 a1 
a 2 
-20(.515 + 7(.485) = -6 .905 
3(.515) +(-1)(.485) = 1.060 yes 
1.060 - (-6.905) =7.965 
4 a1 
a2 
—20(.838) + 7(.162) = -15.626 
3(.838) + ( - 1 ) (.162) =2.352 
yes 2.352 - (-15.626) = 17.978 
5 a1 
a 2 
- 2 0 ( 1 ) + 7(0) = - 2 0 
3 ( l ) + ( - 1 ) ( 0 ) = 3 
yes 3 — (—20) = 23 
6 a1 
a 2 
- 2 0 ( 1 ) + 7 ( 0 ) = - 2 0 
3(1) + ( - 1 ) ( 0 ) = 3 
yes 3 - (—20) = 2 3 
EVSI = 7.965(.03974) + 17.978(.00611)+ 23 (.00064) + 23(.00003) = .443 
* The likelihood of the sample result is the probability of the sample result occurring given 
that the sample was from state S1, where the error rate is .2 or state S2 where the error rate is 
.05. The probabilities are from a binomial table. 
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Discussant's Response to 
A Decision Theory View of Auditing 
James K. Loebbecke 
Touche Ross & Co. 
Compliments are in order for B i l l Felix on a fine paper. It covers the 
subject well and reflects elements of both tact and wisdom. Tact is evident i n 
that it presents a model which expresses decision criteria i n terms of a payoff 
matrix instead of a loss function. This is a distinction which, I can assure you, 
is particularly appealing to practicing independent public accountants. Wisdom 
is reflected i n that it discusses several of the broader aspects of using a decision 
model in auditing as well as the technical characteristics of the model itself. 
W i t h i n the past two years I have become increasingly involved i n the 
challenging problem of "modeling the audit." It would seem so nice to have 
the complete audit model—the ultimate audit tool. M y research has disclosed 
models which are variously described as probabilistic, stochastic, analytical and 
simulation models.* 
M y intent today is not to debate the technical details of B i l l Felix ' model 
or any of these others. Rather, I would like to consider some questions about 
audit models in general: are they feasible, are they desirable, and how should 
they be implemented? 
Feasibility 
Audi t models are clearly feasible. This statement lies partially i n the defini­
tion of audit models. Consistent with Bill 's paper (which presents a model, not 
the model) the classical statistical inference model now common i n auditing is 
an audit model. Other models are more complex, but none of their authors 
show an absence of conviction about their ultimate feasibility. Further indication 
of feasibility is suggested by successful applications of models i n other fields. 
Examples of such models can be found i n engineering, medicine and other 
sciences. Problems of computation and volumes of data previously deemed 
overwhelming have been successfully solved with computer assistance. This tool 
is causing a significant change i n auditing and is the key to further advanced 
techniques. 
* See the following examples: 
William R. Kinney, Jr., " A Decision Theory Approach to the Sampling Problem in 
Auditing," University of Iowa Working Paper Series No. 74-4, March, 1974. 
John Neter and Seongjae Y u , " A Stochastic Model of the Internal Control System," 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Faculty Working Paper No . 106, April 1973. 
Barry E . Cushing, " A Mathematical Approach to the Analysis and Design of Internal 
Control Systems," The Accounting Review, January 1974, pp. 24-41. 




Accepting their feasibility, we must ask whether audit models, i n the 
broadest sense, are desirable. The answer to this question is yes. Bill 's paper 
presents several advantages to be derived from using risk or decision models 
in auditing: 
• Control of risk through precise definition 
• Expression of decision criteria i n more meaningful terms 
• A vehicle to motivate better response to changes i n the audit environ­
ment 
• A framework for improved communication both between auditors 
and with those affected by auditor results 
I agree with these and would express their sum as a means through which the 
auditor can achieve objectivity; a factor that is of ultimate importance to all 
concerned with the audit process. 
Generally, i n auditing, the first examination for a new client is the most 
objective one. More time is spent on learning activities, more attention is given 
to the objectives of corroboratory activities, and there is a greater sense of aware­
ness and skepticism. In subsequent examinations, however, even the best auditor 
is biased by the preconceptions formed by preceding efforts and findings. If 
we are to provide a high level of audit service on a continuing basis, we must 
use techniques to preserve objectivity. 
However, there are some dangerous elements to consider here as well . First, 
since the decision model is a tool, it is liable to evoke the L a w of Instruments. 
That is, its users may become so enamored with its internal characteristics that 
they either apply it in situations where it is not appropriate, or they fail to use 
it properly i n situations which differ slightly from the norm. 
Second, a characteristic of decision models is that they are designed to 
facilitate a decision, one way or the other, according to the best payoff without 
considering the quality, and thereby the adequacy, of the underlying audit 
evidence. I view auditing decision making as a two-stage process. The low 
order stage involves the decision of accepting or rejecting the particular proposi­
tion at hand using the evidence gathered; but this can be reached only after 
the high order decision is made that the evidence is adequate for that purpose. 
The sum of these pitfalls is serious, but they can be overcome by proper 
model design, by user understanding of the concepts underlying the techniques 
used, and by intelligent application. W e must realize that one of the major 
differences between advanced audit techniques and traditional techniques is a 
shift i n quality control emphasis (and effectiveness) from the reviewer to the 
performer. Also, most advanced techniques deal wi th inference and not certitude. 
For these reasons, a "cookbook" approach must not be taken. 
The final element of desirability is cost. Aud i t models w i l l clearly require 
an investment i n research, development of tools, and training. However, there 
w i l l be resultant savings i n terms of increased efficiency and reduced costs of 
bad decisions. I believe the tradeoff w i l l be favorable. 
Implementation 
Designing a model is one thing; implementing it in practice is another. 
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Implementation of advanced auditing techniques involves two groups: users 
and audit management. The users, who are generally staff auditors, must be 
given conceptual and practical training and tools to facilitate application me­
chanics. F i r m management must be convinced that use of the techniques w i l l 
improve audit quality without unduly increasing audit cost. Neither group can 
be approached with the same "language," nor can they be approached with the 
language used i n developing the technique. 
The language of higher level mathematics is used in model development. 
W h e n model concepts are taught, a sorting out process must occur so that 
overly complex aspects are presented i n terms of ideas rather than mathematical 
terms, and so that any mathematical terms used are within the user's comfort 
level. Application tools, of course, must utilize the proper techniques, but in 
a transparent manner, such as can be provided with computer programs. 
It is likely that model users w i l l be quite receptive. Advanced audit tech­
niques make auditing more enjoyable, and, fairly fresh from school, most users 
are preconditioned to use them. F i r m management may not be so receptive, 
and if approached through use of even a minimal amount of mathematical 
jargon, may reject the idea completely. 
The proper approach, i n my opinion, is to show audit management that 
the advanced audit model or technique is simply a refinement of one or more 
elements of the intuitive model he has been using all along. B i l l Fel ix ' paper 
is completely consistent with this view, as is expressed in his presentation of an 
intuitive model extracted from S A P 54. I performed this same exercise at the 
time the S A P was published as a means of determining how it should be in­
terpreted. The result was a model entided " A n Outline of the Basic Aud i t 
Process" which contains twelve basic steps and involves five basic decision 
processes (see Appendix) . 
Audi t management knows both the importance and the difficulties involved 
i n making these basic decisions properly. Audi t managers realize that their 
behavior is affected by these difficulties in the very direct sense that they "over-
audit" to compensate for the risks that they cannot otherwise deal wi th . If 
audit managers can be presented with techniques that clarify this process they 
w i l l accept them. But clarification means clear to them, not just clear to the 
proposer. 
Appendix 
A n Outline of the Basic A u d i t Process 
Step 1 Determine the nature of the client's business and industry. Primary 
resources are: 
A . Firm's industry expertise 
B. Historical data 
C . Overall organization and procedures 
D . Current financial data 
Step 2 Obtain description of system of internal control. 
Step 3 Make D E C I S I O N I: Is the entity auditable? 
74 
The two parts to this decision are: 
A . Does there appear to be an adequate system to produce evi­
dence to be examined? 
B. Does management appear to be honest and wi l l ing to present 
the necessary evidence? 
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 4. 
If answer to Question A is NO—advise that a disclaimer w i l l be 
rendered. 
If answer to Question B is N O — w i t h d r a w from engagement. 
Step 4 Design preliminary plan of substantive audit procedures for auditing 
financial statements based on: 
A . Nature of industry and company as reflected i n description of 
system. 
B. Practical circumstances relating to t iming and scope. 
Step 5 Make D E C I S I O N II: Does the preliminary plan of substantive audit 
procedures indicate that the auditor is relying on internal control to 
produce accurate year-end financial data? 
(Examples of circumstances when reliance is implied: 
• Substantive tests, e.g., confirmation of receivables, inventory 
observations, etc., are performed prior to year-end. 
• Detailed documentation is examined on a test basis. 
• Inventory observations are not performed at all locations. 
• Only certain units are visited i n a multi-unit company. 
• There is an emphasis on tests of an analytical nature.) 
If the answer is YES—proceed to Step 6. 
If the answer is NO—proceed to Step 9. 
Step 6 Identify the specific controls being relied upon and the degree of com­
pliance assumed by the audit plan. 
Step 7 Perform compliance tests of controls to be relied upon. 
Step 8 Make D E C I S I O N III: Is the actual degree of compliance comparable 
to assumed degree? 
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 9. 
If answer is NO—update description of system of internal control, 
revise preliminary plan of substantive procedures, and then pro­
ceed to Step 9. 
Step 9 Perform planned or revised substantive auditing procedures. 
Step 10 Make D E C I S I O N I V : Do results of substantive procedures corrobo-
rate the auditor's understanding of the system of internal control? 
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 11. 
If answer is NO—update description of system, further revise substan­
tive procedures and perform them, and then proceed to Step 11. 
Step 11 Make D E C I S I O N V : Does the evidence gathered by our procedures 
constitute adequate competent evidential matter in support of an 
opinion? 
If answer is YES—proceed to Step 12. 
If answer is NO—design and perform additional necessary procedures, 
and then proceed to Step 12. 
Step 12 Issue report containing opinion arrived at in Step 11. 
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6 
Setting Standards for Statistical Sampling in Auditing 
John C. Broderick 
Arthur Young & Co. 
Auditors welcome the existence of the ten generally accepted auditing 
standards ( G A A S ) and the Statements on Audi t ing Standards. These auditing 
standards and authoritative interpretations ensure order i n the tasks they perform. 
A m o n g other things, G A A S require that examinations of financial statements be 
performed with due professional care by persons having adequate technical train­
ing, proficiency, and independence of mental attitude; that examinations be 
properly planned and supervised; that examinations include a study and evalua­
tion of internal accounting controls; and that sufficient competent evidential 
matter be obtained to provide a reasonable basis for an opinion on the financial 
statements. Thus, G A A S provide an auditor wi th the framework for selecting 
and applying auditing procedures. 
Importance of Judgment 
The selection of specific procedures is largely a matter of judgment. In any 
particular audit engagement, judgment w i l l be influenced by a number of 
matters; matters such as the nature and the problems of the business whose 
financial statements are being examined, the quality and effectiveness of the 
business' accounting procedures and internal accounting controls, and the ma­
teriality of the various items being considered. A n auditor must also exercise 
judgment i n determining the extent of auditing procedures, in choosing a 
method for selecting items to be examined, and i n evaluating the audit signifi­
cance of matters that come to his attention during the examination. Exercise 
of judgment is at the heart of auditing. 
Statistical Techniques as an Aid to Judgment 
In the early 1960s, auditors began to explore the potential advantages of using 
statistical sampling techniques to aid them i n making audit judgments: i n 
determining the extent of their audit tests, i n selecting their test items, and i n 
quantifying their test results. Since those early explorations, statistical sampling 
as an audit technique has received increasing attention, as evidenced by Statement 
on Audi t ing Procedure N o . 54, which contained two lengthy appendices devoted 
to the use of statistical sampling i n auditing. These appendices now appear i n 
Sections 320A and 320B of Statement on Audi t ing Standards N o . 1. Witness 
also the number of articles on the subject i n The Journal of Accountancy, The 
Accounting Review, and The Internal Auditor. 
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Most auditors agree that statistical sampling can be an effective audit tool. 
Many, however, feel uncomfortable i n making the decisions essential i n applying 
it. Thus, it is only natural that they look to others for help. They seek advice 
as to which sampling methods are most appropriate for various types of audit 
tests. For example, they ask whether they should use the same statistical method 
for tests of compliance with internal controls as they would use for tests of 
financial statement items. They seek advice i n choosing statistical criteria for 
their tests: they want to know what confidence levels they should use 
and what sampling precision their tests should produce. Auditors first looked 
to mathematicians and statisticians for help. W h o else they reasoned would be 
more qualified to give advice on the application of statistical sampling? Often, 
auditors were disappointed wi th the advice they received. Part of the disappoint­
ment resulted from a lack of in-depth understanding of audit objectives by the 
mathematicians and statisticians; part resulted from a lack of understanding of 
the meaning of sampling results by the auditors. I suspect, however, that a more 
significant part of the disappointment resulted from what the auditors believed 
to be overly conservative recommendations by the statistical experts. Auditors 
who followed the criteria suggested by the experts often found that the sample 
sizes needed to meet such criteria were larger than they expected them to be. 
Many auditors believed that the use of statistical sampling i n auditing would 
produce dramatic reductions i n the number of items they would have to examine. 
As a result of their disappointment with the advice from the statistical 
experts, some auditors began to establish their own sampling criteria. A l l too 
often, the bases for these criteria were intuitive ones. As a result, undue weight 
was given to sample size considerations (the "magic numbers") and insufficient 
weight was given to test objectives. 
A Search for Standards 
Many auditors have naturally turned to the accounting profession i n the 
hope that the profession would establish standards. The demands upon the pro­
fession have, i n my opinion, been too narrowly directed. I see, for example, 
little demand for guidance material designed to provide the auditor wi th a good 
understanding of the role of statistical sampling i n auditing. Rather, I sense 
a desire for standards which may be a substitute for judgment i n the decision 
making process. Auditors are asking the profession to specify numerical criteria 
as to what is an acceptable sampling precision and what is an acceptable con­
fidence level for audit tests. T o the extent that these persons want standards 
that specify a single precision value and a single confidence level appropriate 
for al l tests, I am troubled. I don't believe such standards can or should be 
established. The arbitrary choice of the same sampling precision and the same 
confidence level for all tests is inappropriate. In some cases the choice w i l l be 
too conservative, causing wasted audit effort; in other cases the choice w i l l not 
be conservative enough, creating unwanted and unnecessary risk. If, on the 
other hand, standards developed by the profession further auditors' under­
standing of applicable statistical techniques and, as our generally accepted 
auditing standards do, provide a framework within which auditors can apply 
their judgment, I w i l l welcome them. 
78 
Precision and Confidence Level 
I have referred several times to the expressions sampling precision and 
confidence level, and because they often imply different things to different people, 
let me describe to you my understanding of their meaning. 
When I use statistical sampling for an audit test, my purpose is to obtain 
a reasonable estimate of the true condition of a group of items. This may, for 
example, be i n terms of the rate of compliance with a particular element of 
internal control, or it may be i n terms of the value of an account balance. By 
examining a sample of items selected from the group, I expect to be able to 
reach a reliable audit conclusion about the condition of al l the items i n the group. 
Whenever I examine only some of the items i n a group, there are two 
consequences: 
1. I cannot determine the exact condition of all of the items; I can only 
estimate the condition. 
2. I cannot be sure that my estimate is 100 percent reliable. 
I can, however, determine the probability that my estimate is within any 
specified range of the true rate or value. For example, I may be able to con­
clude that there is a 95 percent chance that the actual percentage rate of 
compliance with an element of internal control is within a range of two per­
centage points on either side of the rate of compliance contained i n my 
sample. That is, the true rate may be higher or lower than the sample rate but 
there is a 95 percent chance that it is wi thin the specified range. T o the 95 
percent chance referred to above I w i l l give the name "confidence level"; to the 
range within which I believe the true rate lies, the name "confidence interval"; 
to one-half of that range, the name "sampling precision." If there is a 95 percent 
chance that the specified range contains the true rate there is also a five percent 
chance that the true rate is outside the range. T o this five percent chance I w i l l 
give the name "statistical risk." 
The notions of confidence level and sampling precision are inseparable. 
One can never express the confidence level for an estimate without specifying 
the related sampling precision. Thus, because they are inseparable, any guide­
lines for choosing confidence levels must necessarily include guidelines for 
sampling precision. Recognizing this, let me illustrate how guidelines might 
be developed. 
Developing Guidelines 
Because an auditor's choice of a confidence level and sampling precision 
w i l l influence the size of the sample he must examine, he must be sensitive to 
the increased cost of auditing when high confidence levels or narrow sampling 
precision are used. But a drive for efficiency becomes a fault i f it interferes wi th 
the application of due professional care and inhibits the auditor in his under­
taking to obtain adequate competent evidential matter. The fact is that different 
statistical techniques and different audit situations call for different sample sizes. 
Sample sizes must be sufficiently large to produce meaningful results i n terms 
of test objectives. A n auditor who uses smaller samples than circumstances 
require may as a consequence fail to detect material errors. O n the other hand, 
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he may conclude that error rates are greater than i n fact they are, or that ac­
count balances are misstated when i n fact they are fairly stated. The confidence 
level guidelines shown i n the table below when applied with sampling precision 
guidelines described later should enable the auditor to effectively determine the 
sample size he needs to accomplish his test objective. 
Preliminary Evaluation of Internal Controls 
Range of confidence levels for 
tests of compliance with internal 
controls 
Range of confidence levels for 
tests of account balances if pre­
liminary evaluation of internal 
















* I n certain situations, where the results of all related audit procedures indicate that a high 
degree of reliance may be placed on internal control, it may be appropriate to use a confi-
dence level as low as 80% for tests of account balances. 
The guidelines i n the table recognize that the choice of confidence level for 
an audit test should be related to the degree of reliance the auditor intends to 
place on elements of a client's system of internal control and to the importance 
of the test wi th regard to the fairness of the financial statements. 
Some auditors believe that when their preliminary evaluations indicate that 
the applicable elements of internal control are excellent, their tests of compliance 
with those elements need not be extensive. Consequently, they choose lower 
confidence levels for the tests. Only when the elements of control appear to be 
weak do they choose high confidence levels. 
The guidelines presented i n the table above reflect a different philosophy. 
They assume that i f an auditor's preliminary evaluation indicates that internal 
control elements are excellent he w i l l intend to place a high degree of reliance 
on them. Thus, he wi l l want to have a high degree of assurance that the elements 
to be relied upon have i n fact functioned effectively. T o attain a high degree of 
assurance, he must perform relatively extensive tests of compliance. If the pre­
liminary evaluation indicates that the applicable internal control elements are 
only fair, an auditor w i l l nevertheless tend to place some degree of reliance on 
them. If he decides to do so, he w i l l perform tests of compliance i n order to 
satisfy himself that the intended degree of reliance is justified. Since the extent 
of reliance is to be lower, the tests may be less extensive. W h e n the preliminary 
evaluation indicates that the applicable internal control elements are weak or 
nonexistent, an auditor w i l l be unable to rely on internal controls. Consequently, 
he need not perform tests of compliance. In this situation he w i l l concentrate 
audit effort on tests of account balances and other types of procedure. 
The required extent of tests of account balances w i l l usually vary inversely 
with the degree of reliance the auditor places on internal controls. If an auditor 
has concluded that internal controls are strong and have functioned effectively, 
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he w i l l expect that there w i l l be fewer (and often smaller) errors i n the accounts. 
Thus, he may decide that he can appropriately reduce the extent of his tests of 
account balances. Conversely, i f internal controls are weak, or i f the auditor 
wishes for other reasons to concentrate audit effort on tests of account balances, 
these tests should ordinarily be more extensive than they would be i f he were 
relying more on internal controls. 
Setting Confidence Levels 
The confidence levels I have illustrated are relatively high, compared with 
those recommended by some other auditors. Some consider it appropriate to use 
confidence levels as low as 50 or 60 percent for tests of account balances. They 
justify this by combining two types of risk. They assert that most systems of 
internal accounting control provide some degree of protection against the occur­
rence of material accounting errors. If their evaluation indicates that the elements 
of internal control are excellent, they believe the chance that a material accounting 
error w i l l have occurred is i n itself probably very low. They further believe that, 
based on their evaluation of the elements of internal control, they can assign a 
numerical reliability level to "internal accounting control and other relevant 
factors." In other words, they feel that they can quantify the risk that a material 
accounting error w i l l have occurred. They then maintain that they can combine 
this subjectively determined risk with the "statistical r i sk" used for their tests 
of account balances to determine their overall audit risk. Quantifying the dis­
cussion, an auditor may intuitively believe that the risk that a material error has 
occurred is, say, five percent. In view of this, he should be wi l l ing to accept a 
risk of, say, 40 percent that his tests of accounts balances w i l l be reliable, and 
therefore he should use a 60 percent confidence level. H e should be wi l l ing to 
use the lower confidence level because the combined risk that a material account­
ing error w i l l have occurred and that the error w i l l not be detected by the test 
is the product of the two risks—i.e., five percent times 40 percent or two percent. 
This process may be mathematically correct and the concept of joint risk 
may indeed be a factor to consider. The sticking point is that the first risk 
included i n this equation (that a material accounting error w i l l have occurred 
at all) is a subjectively determined one. This may be a correct determination 
but the auditor cannot be sure it is a correct one. In fact, in any particular situa­
tion, a material accounting error either has occurred or has not occurred (the 
actual risk is either zero or 100 percent). The average or overall risk is not the 
controlling factor. If a material accounting error has i n fact occurred, the risk 
of failing to detect it is the specific risk assumed for the specific test designed to 
detect the specific type of error. 
N o w I do not intend to downplay the importance of controls. Auditors 
should recognize that the better the accounting controls, the smaller the chance 
that material errors w i l l occur. Certainly this should have a bearing on their 
choice of confidence levels and of auditing procedures. Indeed, the condition of 
controls plays a significant part in my illustration of guidelines for confidence 
levels. I believe, however, it is imprudent to rely on a subjectively determined 
numerical evaluation of the effectiveness of internal control to justify assuming 
an unduly high risk in audit tests, especially tests of material account balances. 
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Relationships of Confidence Levels and Precision 
Earlier, I stated that the notions of confidence levels and sampling precision 
are inseparable and that guidelines for choosing confidence levels must necessarily 
include guidelines for sampling precision. T o illustrate the relationship between 
confidence levels and sampling precision, assume that the results of his sampling 
permit an auditor to be 95% confident that the true value of an account balance 
is wi thin a range of $50,000 on either side of the value estimated from his sample. 
If the auditor does not feel the 95 percent confidence level is high enough, he 
can easily reevaluate his sampling results at a higher confidence level, say 99 
percent. If he does this however, he must be wi l l ing to accept a sampling pre­
cision of more than $50,000. Increasing the confidence level for an estimate 
w i l l always widen the sampling precision of the estimate unless additional items 
are selected and examined. 
Statistical risk depends upon both the confidence level and sampling pre­
cision of the estimate. The risk an auditor assumes when he uses statistical 
sampling for a test of financial statement items may be described as: 
1. The risk of concluding that a fairly stated financial statement item 
is misstated and 
2. The risk of concluding that a misstated financial statement item 
is fairly stated. 
A n auditor can control magnitude of these risks by his choice of confidence 
level and sampling precision. T o illustrate this, assume an auditor is using what 
is called estimation sampling; he is attempting to estimate the true value of a 
financial statement item. In evaluating his sampling results, he w i l l generally 
consider the financial statement item being tested to be fairly stated i f the book 
value of the item lies within the confidence interval of his estimate. If the book 
value lies outside the confidence interval he w i l l have reason to believe that the 
book value is misstated. If the financial statement item being tested is i n fact 
correct, what is the chance that its book value w i l l lie within the confidence 
interval of the auditor's estimate; what is the chance that it w i l l be outside the 
confidence interval? The chance is determined by the confidence level. If an 
auditor uses a 90 percent confidence level for his test, there is a 90 percent 
chance that a correct value w i l l lie within the confidence interval and a ten 
percent chance that it w i l l lie outside the confidence interval. Thus, when the 
estimate is made with a 90 percent confidence level there is a ten percent chance 
that the auditor w i l l conclude that the correct value is misstated. The consequence 
of this conclusion w i l l generally be that the auditor w i l l expend additional and 
unnecessary audit effort to satisfy himself that the financial statement item is i n 
fact fairly stated. The consequences could be more significant if he were to 
propose an adjustment to the balance when in fact no adjustment is appropriate. 
Risk of Accepting a Misstated Amount 
The risk of concluding that a misstated financial statement item is fairly 
stated is controlled by the auditor's choice of sampling precision. Sampling 
precision was defined earlier as an amount equal to one-half the confidence 
interval. If the sampling precision of an estimate is extremely wide, not only 
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w i l l a correct value lie within the confidence interval, but a misstated value may 
also lie within the interval. If the misstatement is slight the auditor might not 
be concerned. However, i f the misstatement is large, as, say, the smallest amount 
considered to be material to the financial statements (which I shall refer to as a 
material amount) the auditor must be concerned. H i s sampling plan must be 
designed so as to l imit the risk of accepting a financial statement item that is 
misstated by a material amount. 
Even though a conservative (high) confidence level is chosen for a test, 
the risk of accepting a material misstatement i n a financial statement item w i l l 
be high i f the sampling precision achieved is wide. Some auditor's choose to 
make their estimates with sampling precision equal to a material amount. If 
they do this, there is a 50 percent chance that a book value which is misstated 
by exactly a material amount w i l l lie within the confidence interval of their 
estimate and thus be accepted. This would occur regardless of the confidence 
level used to make the estimate. If, on the other hand, the sampling precision 
achieved is equal to one-half a material amount, the risk that the book value 
w i l l lie within the confidence interval of the estimate is only one-half the statisti­
cal risk, i.e., one-half the difference between the confidence level used and 
100 percent. 
Thus, i f the sampling precision of an estimate is equal to one-half a material 
amount at a 90 percent confidence level, the risk of failing to detect a material 
misstatement in the account would be five percent. O f course, i f the misstatement 
were by more than a material amount, the risk would lessen. 
Low Confidence Levels 
In an earlier illustration I stated that I did not agree with auditors who 
would use a 50 or 60 percent confidence level for their testing of financial state­
ment items. If the sampling precision of their estimates at these low confidence 
levels were extremely narrow however, say, one-third to one-quarter of a material 
amount, I would be less inclined to disagree wi th their choice of confidence 
levels. Sampling results with as narrow a sampling precision as that would 
provide an auditor with good protection against failing to detect a material mis­
statement. However, I must still recognize that the choice of a low confidence 
level means that I increase my chance of rejecting the fairly stated balance even 
though my sampling precision is small. 
Concluding Observations 
The only practical way for an auditor to adequately ensure against the two 
risks described above is to use adequate sample sizes. A n y attempt to minimize 
unduly the size of the sample w i l l result in undue exposure to one or both 
risks. T o illustrate, small samples generally produce estimates having one of the 
following sets of characteristics: 
a. A high confidence level and wide sampling precision. 
b. A low confidence level and narrow sampling precision. 
c. A low confidence level and wide sampling precision. 
A comparison of the relative risks with each of these sampling results may be 
shown as follows: 
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Sampling result 
Risk of accepting 
a material mis­
statement 
Risk of rejecting 
a fairly stated 
balance 
a. H i g h confidence level 
and wide precision high low 
b. L o w confidence level 
and narrow precision low high 
c. L o w confidence level 
and wide precision high high 
Thus, auditors should attempt to design their sampling plans to yield rela­
tively narrow precision at relatively high confidence levels. A n earlier table 
illustrated guidelines for confidence levels, and my discussion above demonstrates 
that a desirable guideline for sampling precision is that it be no greater than 
one-half a material amount. 
In my view, current applications of statistical sampling techniques i n ac­
counting and auditing are limited compared with what we can expect i n the 
future. However, new techniques must be developed; our practice w i l l demand 
them. For example, the sophistication of computerized accounting systems w i l l 
place great demands upon our ability to capture and audit data. A statistical 
sampling capability w i l l be an important key to our success i n auditing such 
systems effectively and efficiently. W e must strive to build that statistical 
sampling capability on a strong foundation. The building blocks of the founda­
tion w i l l be the long-standing, mathematically sound sampling techniques; the 
mortar that binds the blocks must be an understanding of the techniques. In­
tuitive applications of statistical sampling techniques are dangerous; they can 
only weaken the foundation and i n the long run cause it to fall in ruin . 
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Discussant's Response to 
Setting Standards for Statistical Sampling in Auditing 
Lawrence L. Vance 
University of California, Berkeley 
John Broderick has raised interesting and important questions about the 
application of statistical sampling i n auditing. The two areas of most concern 
that he has discussed and which I wish to comment upon are (1) the role and 
method of evaluation of internal control and (2) the matter of setting standards 
in general, with particular reference to the precision band i n estimates. 
Evaluation of Internal Control 
Our use of internal control evaluations may be approached i n at least two 
ways, which I refer to as the three-step and two-step methods. In the three-step 
method, which appears to be M r . Broderick's preference, one first evaluates 
internal control on the basis of descriptive material—organization charts, pro­
cedure manuals, and conversations wi th members of the organization who are 
operating the system. O n this basis, one forms a judgment about the apparent 
quality or effectiveness of the system. The second step i n the three-step method 
is to test the operation of the system with documents and other records that 
disclose directly the working of the system. W e are all aware that the system 
prescribed on paper and reported as functioning by members of the organization 
may in fact be distinctly different from the one that the people involved are 
actually using, and the effectiveness of the system may vary accordingly. The 
third step is to use the results of the first two steps i n determining the "extent 
of the testing" (to use the traditional phrase) or to set confidence and precision 
limits for the sampling designed to appraise the bona fides of the accounts. If 
either the first or second step shows weaknesses in internal control, the confidence 
level is raised and the precision limits narrowed for the tests of bona fides; i f 
both indicate effective control, these levels can be reduced. Note that this three­
fold concept, i f applied under a policy of keeping each step distinct, requires 
separate samples for step two as against step three. 
In the two-step approach to the evaluation and use of internal control in­
formation, step one is the same as in the three-step procedure. However, the 
second step proceeds directly to tests of bona fides, and the extent of these tests, 
or the statistical criteria they are required to meet, are determined by the 
subjective evaluation made i n step one. 
The question that arises when we have to choose between these two concepts 
is this: is it necessary to have an objective—not subjective—estimate of the 
functioning of internal control before we set standards for the test of bona fides? 
In making a clear-cut distinction between the three-step and two-step 
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procedures and in making a similar distinction between arriving at a conclusion 
about internal control i n contrast with testing bona fides, I have been ignoring 
what evidently is the popular practice. This consists of a blending of steps two 
and three of the three-step method. A judgment is made about the effectiveness 
of internal control i n step one, but it is tentative—it is modified as documents 
and other records are examined i f this examination shows that the system is 
working less well than the preliminary judgment indicated. It seems to me that 
this is a reasonable way to proceed, as it eliminates the implied need for separate 
tests of documents for internal control evaluation. 
Testing Statement Amounts 
W e must remember in this connection that we are presumably working with 
some kind of estimation procedure. It is possible to use acceptance sampling 
techniques to decide that internal control is or is not satisfactory, or the records 
have been kept with sufficient absence of errors so that we are wi l l ing to conclude 
that the records are sufficiently accurate. However, most auditors evidently 
prefer to think i n terms of amount of dollar error when examining financial 
statement figures. This requires estimation procedures, and gives rise to the 
combination of confidence level and precision range that Broderick has dis­
cussed. Even i f we restrict our attention to errors without regard to their 
magnitude, most auditors may prefer to estimate the percent of error rather 
than to set a firm accept-reject criterion. This means that there is no restriction 
to a single sample size or a final sample size when examining records for a 
combined check on both internal control and bona fides using estimation sampling. 
The advantage of setting a sample size i n advance on the basis of whatever 
method of evaluation of internal control is selected is that the available informa­
tion can be used to indicate what a likely min imum size is; in other words, 
economy can be maximized. But once we have information directly from the 
subject population itself we can, i n estimation sampling, calculate the indicated 
result, and, if this leaves us wi th too wide a range of precision or too low a 
confidence level, we can then simply increase the sample size to the point 
where we have the desired assurance. Because of this possibility, I doubt the 
need to make a clean separation of tests of internal control and tests of the 
so-called bona fides. 
Standards for Precision and Confidence 
The second major thrust of Jack Broderick's remarks concerns the setting 
of standards for precision and confidence, and he has mentioned both the seeming 
desire for specific standards which some would evidently have the profession as 
a whole establish, and also the problem faced by each auditor i n setting standards 
for his own work. W e are i n agreement on the proposition that specific numerical 
standards should not be set. There are infinite gradations in the quality of in­
ternal control and of materiality relative to dollar totals, and it does not seem 
practical to fix minimums, which are always likely to become maximums. I 
agree that general standards, expressed as objectives to be achieved as they are 
in the standards now established by the profession, are the better k ind of regu­
lation. The auditor has to tailor his confidence and precision to the complex 
facts of each case, and to suggest otherwise would likely do more harm than good. 
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This leaves the matter of confidence and precision levels to be determined 
specifically by each auditor, and we must ask: what general guidelines are avail­
able? We , of course, have the fact that professional statisticians most often use 
95% or 99% or approximations of them for confidence levels. Another way of 
looking at the problem is to ask what percent of the time one is wi l l ing to be 
wrong i n order to economize on sample size. A n d this leads immediately to 
another question: what are the consequences of being wrong? If the error is i n 
accepting improper statements, either no one may ever know the difference or 
it may be discovered and there may be a lawsuit for $1,000,000, or some equally 
impressive figure. 
A practical approach to this decision was formulated for accountants several 
years ago and involves, as it must, the assigning of subjective probabilities, or 
expectations.1 It is also being discussed by Professor Felix i n this symposium. 
I recommend this approach to all auditors. If you are wrong i n believing an 
acceptable set of figures to be materially i n error, you, of course, incur the cost 
of the additional investigation necessary to establish the fact of acceptability. 
This cost must be built into the calculation just referred to as is the cost of 
making the opposite mistake. 
Since confidence level and the precision range within which sampling results 
can be expected to fall are tied together, higher confidence for a particular 
sample means a wider precision and vice versa. T o improve one while holding 
the other constant requires an increase i n sample size. The objective is to arrive 
at a combination that meets our standards with as small a sample as the cir­
cumstances permit. H o w then should we set precision limits? M r . Broderick 
has chosen to define precision i n terms of half the range or "confidence interval"; 
standard statistical practice defines it as the whole range, recognizing that this 
range runs both plus and minus from our estimate of the mean of the population 
given by our sample. H a l f the range is, of course, the maximum amount we 
expect to be off i n our estimate i n one direction or the other. M r . Broderick 
has indicated that some accountants are inclined to set the precision for their 
estimates at plus or minus a material amount. 
I agree with M r . Broderick that this is too high. M y understanding of 
"material" in accounting usage is that it represents an amount that significantly 
changes the interpretation of the figure to which it applies. A precision range 
or confidence interval that runs in either direction from the estimate to the 
extent of a material amount leaves plenty of room for a book value that deviates 
from the proper value by a material amount. Presumably we should set confi­
dence intervals at plus or minus a maximum tolerable error; i.e., by an amount 
that clearly leaves the interpretation of the published figure unaffected. This has 
to be an amount significantly different from a material amount; one can not 
set these amounts side by side. For example, i f we have an inventory stated i n 
the accounts as costing $1,000,000, and i f we consider $100,000 material, we 
might well use plus-or-minus $25,000 as our confidence interval. If our con­
fidence interval was plus-or-minus $100,000, and i f our estimate was precisely 
the true amount of the inventory cost—say $900,000—then obviously the con­
fidence interval would tend to support the overstated book value and very 
likely do us no good. In other words, I share M r . Broderick's concern for the 
tendency to set wide precision limits and high sampling risks as a means of 
justifying very small samples. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, I would like to endorse one more of Broderick's concerns, 
namely, that auditors need to familiarize themselves wi th standard statistical 
theory i n order to apply statistical sampling methods effectively. The A I C P A 
has encouraged this with its publication of self-study materials on statistical 
sampling, but hopefully a thorough grounding w i l l be obtained routinely by 
students majoring i n accounting in college, and its achievement should be the 
responsibility of the educators i n charge of college accounting programs. 
Footnotes 
1. Harold Bierman, Jr., "Probability, Statistical Decision Theory, and Accounting," The 
Accounting Review, July 1962, pp. 400-405. 
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The Sample of One: Indispensable or Indefensible? 
Gregory M. Boni1 
Touche Ross & Co . 
Discussions and controversies among auditors about sample size have long 
been active. I personally experienced them since, at least, when detailed audits 
were becoming universally recognized as unable to serve society's needs for 
information about ever-enlarging enterprises. Today, however, a new relevance 
and urgency arises about the question of sample size. Uncensored answers to 
the question may present a challenge to the entire philosophical underpinning 
of auditing practice. 
The new relevance arises because of two—not entirely unrelated—develop­
ments. The first is the articulation of Systems Theory. The second is the grow­
ing loudness of the cry by Society that the justification for technology has not 
been based upon humanistic values. Demands are growing that creators and 
users of technology be responsible for whether it contributes to or detracts from 
human welfare. Increasing attacks come from Society against values which give 
virtue to technology with assertions that objectivity or freedom overrides re­
sponsibility for human impact. 
Challenge to Auditors 
What is the relevance to auditors of this advancing environment? If the 
profession believes this is an environment i n which it can survive by circum­
scribing itself so that the quality of its work w i l l be judged only by its peers 
then it can continue on its present course. The peers can continue to argue 
about 95% confidence limits, or 50% limits. They can argue about how to 
combine compliance testing with substantive testing. Once they agree with 
each other about all these standards or procedures, all w i l l be solved. Certainty 
w i l l be achieved on how one's work w i l l be judged. The upper hierarchy of 
knowledge w i l l be i n the saddle. 
However, Society's enlarging position makes me believe that users of 
financial information w i l l continue to shout—ever louder: " H e y ! Y o u guys 
aren't talking about anything that affects me! Y o u argue about standards and 
practices of auditing i n areas that by careful definition exclude what I want to 
know. Are the financial statements a fair presentation2 of the information I 
need for my decisions? I don't feel any better i f unfair presentation comes from 
management fraud, collusion, or because generally accepted accounting principles 
bring about that k ind of result." 
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M y view of auditing encounters threatening forces calling now for resolution 
of the mutually exclusive questions of how is "good" auditing to be judged: 
By evaluation by one's peers as to compliance w i t h standards? 
By pragmatism and utility i n the eyes of the users of financial informa­
tion? 
W h y a Sample of One? 
For me, the use of samples of one 3 spearheads a philosophy of auditing 
practice that opposes the prevailing audit-practice philosophy. The prevailing 
philosophy leads to a methodology that predominantly looks to justify its sound­
ness by the use of sample sizes that comply with standards or rules derived 
externally from a specific audit. The sample of one is a tool for discovery—for 
the exercise of creativity by an individual. The externally derived sample size 
is a tool for inspection—for bringing about conformity, for controlling the work 
of others. 
The thesis of this paper is that auditing approached with a methodology 
logical for inspection is not uti l izing the methodology logical for meeting So­
ciety's demands for pragmatism and utility. Use of tools that bring about con­
formity and control of the work of employees is inconsistent wi th "good" 
auditing. Audi t ing involves evaluation of and judgment about interactive sys­
tems, not of mechanistic systems. Therefore, i f the quality of the results is to 
be judged by pragmatism and utility i n the eyes of the user, I perceive that 
auditing must use tools suitable for discovery and creativity. The stakes may 
well be the future role of the profession i n Society. 
The thoughts presented i n this paper are directed to the level of institu­
tionalized concepts that directly affect and strongly influence what auditors 
actually do. The vast auditing literature, like the Bible, undoubtedly contains 
all the imperatives necessary for doing a satisfactory audit. But these impera­
tives do not have the force of the institutional environment for influencing an 
auditor's behavior. Effectiveness of auditing cannot be judged by only looking 
at its prescriptions; auditing must be judged by what human beings do. "Use 
judgment," "Be creative," " A s k good questions," "Obtain adequate substantiat­
ing evidence," are imperatives which, i f they are to be incorporated i n behavior, 
must be institutionalized i n a process which is not overridden and contradicted 
by specific and immediate directions and feedback. This paper is directed to 
this level of institutionalization. 
T h e Mechanistic Approach 
The implied (if not explicit) philosophy of auditing practice, particularly 
as expressed by Statement on Audi t ing Procedure N o . 54, is that auditing is an 
inspection process of " s tupid" objects. Statistical quality control is the most 
advanced use of science for performing the inspection process. The principles 
were developed in contemplation of outputs (work done) which do not have a 
purpose of their own and which do not interact with each other. That is, the 
outputs are independent of each other and cannot adapt themselves to a purpose. 
The characteristics of the first unit produced do not act as a force to change 
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what unit five or any other unit w i l l look like. U n i t five cannot change itself 
because of the way unit one looks. A l l this contemplates behavior of objects 
which are "stupid." 
The inspection process of physical (stupid) objects has characteristics which 
are distinctly different from those possible i n auditing. The inspector looks for 
dimensions or qualities which specifically and unequivocably are intended to 
determine the utility of the product. Its length, weight, color, smoothness, re­
sponse become direct means for determining good or bad product. The nature 
of "errors" need not be discovered, only their existence or non-existence—based 
upon the inspection standards—needs to be observed. 
Under these conditions, laws of probability logically and usefully apply to 
ascertain the existence of "errors" in the universe. Confidence limits relative to 
precision are thoroughly sensible. 
The L i v i n g System 
Audit ing , i n common with other studies or activities related to organizational 
behavior, up to now has been heavily influenced by the methodologies so suc­
cessfully used i n physical sciences and its related technologies. But there is 
growing recognition among management scientists and other social scientists 
that continuation of a posture suitable for the physical sciences may bring about 
extinction of their disciplines. 4 
Accounting information is a representation of a l iv ing system, not of a 
mechanistic one. The accounting process is itself a l iving system. Accordingly, 
the audit process encounters characteristics significantly different from those 
encountered i n the physical inspection process. In auditing, the objects of study 
are not "stupid." Differentiated characteristics of the audit process held in 
common with l iving systems are: 
1) Signals (observable characteristics) emanating from the output (work 
done) during stages of processing a transaction are equivocal. The 
signals do not uncontradictably identify "good" or "bad" character­
istics that affect the utility of information to a user. 
2) The signals emanating at the processing stages do not provide in­
formation that can be demonstrated to be useful for establishing 
empirically the expectation for errors i n the aggregated end results 
of the processing. 
3) The utility to a user of the aggregated end-results of information 
processing is affected by material errors or deviant behavior that 
exist i n highly complex functional modules. These modules are the 
results of interactive, self-adaptive functioning of many intermediate 
processing stages. There are no independent signals that unequivo­
cally identify the existence or non-existence of errors or deviant 
behavior i n these modules. 
I w i l l talk about each of these assertions. 
What is the Error? 
A missing approval on a return sale voucher or a missing receiving slip on 
a payment voucher does not identify errors of interest to the users of accounting 
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information. Unl ike deviations in length, weight or color of physical objects, 
the observed deviations i n the return sale and the payment voucher are not the 
characteristics which affect utility to the user. A credit for a return sale which 
should not have been granted is an error. But the unapproved credit is not 
necessarily an improperly granted credit. Worse yet, approved vouchers may 
include improperly granted credits. Because the processing of outputs is self-
adaptive (not stupid), at different times the approval or disapproval may signify 
different things. 
Whether or not it is efficient to track down unapproved credits in order 
to ascertain "goodness" or "badness" should be clarified by the material pre­
sented later i n this paper. But for now, observe the ambiguity that comes to the 
auditor from ascertaining "goodness" or "badness" at lower levels of processing. 
Assume a finding, after investigation, that an unapproved credit is i n fact 
appropriately and correctly issued. This could be a result of many causes: 
• The credit was correctly prepared i n the first place. 
• The credit was corrected because of the review process even though 
the reviewer did not reflect his approval by initiall ing. 
• The psychological impact of a pending approval motivated the pre­
parer into doing proper work. 
• The force of system interactions beyond the reviewer either brought 
about correction or created the psychological impact that motivated 
the preparer into doing proper work. 
Expectations of Errors 
W i t h all the explanations and meaning that are possible when there are 
unapproved returned sales credits, the significance is slight whether approvals, 
undifferentiated as to significance, are present 99%, 95%, 90%, or 75% of the 
time. A prediction model for forecasting the frequency of future errors cannot 
be expected to be validated empirically when the model is derived from such 
data. 
The interaction of approving return sales credits with other control steps 
can logically be expected to affect error rate. But the signals from other control 
steps are just as ambiguous as those for return sales credits. I cannot imagine 
how complex interactions of ambiguous signals can be used successfully to 
establish, empirically, expectations of errors to be found i n the end-results of 
information processing. 
A serious attempt to deal concretely wi th expectations of future error and, 
therefore, to compute reliance that can be given to internal control is set forth 
i n an article by Barry E . Cushing. 5 This article was very useful to me. A l ­
though not the intention of the author, it identifies specifically the difficulties 
(impossibilities?) of computing the reliance to be given to internal control 
for catching those errors which affect the utility of information to the user. I 
simply want to point out a few things i n this article that I think make my 
position clear. 
First, the article does not deal with an interactive world but arbitrarily 
defines its world so that it has a mechanistic character. " A feedback control may 
provide a useful supplement to a system of preventive controls by monitoring 
the performance of a system. However, discussion of modeling techniques which 
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apply the concept of feedback is beyond the scope of this paper." 6 (This quali­
fying reference to feedback probably does not contemplate all the complex in­
teractions and the teleological behavior which in fact exist beyond direct feed­
back mechanisms.) 
Second, after excluding by definition a very important part of the real world, 
the author expresses the need for parameters among which are the following: 
1) p = the probability that the process is correctly executed prior to 
administering the control procedure 
2) P(e) = the probability that the control step w i l l detect and signal 
an error given that one exists 
3) Ve = the estimated average dollar effect of a single undetected error 
of type i on the balance of the account 
H e asserts about the required parameters: "The basic implementation 
problem . . . is the derivation of estimates of the probability and cost param­
eters . . . Estimates . . . can be developed from (1) records of error frequen­
cies and error correction procedures maintained by clerical personnel who perform 
the control procedures and (2) data collected by internal or external auditors 
. " 7 
H e also states: " . . . estimates for Ce and Ve for the case of embezzlement 
may be meaningless or impossible to estimate from past experience. . . If infor­
mation of this type (experience about embezzlement) is not available, the re­
liability model may be of limited usefulness i n examining control procedures 
which are intended to prevent embezzlement." 8 
Note then the circumscribed world to which the model applies: 
• Excluded from the model are the efforts of interactive systems and 
of embezzlement. (The utility of information to users would not 
exclude these two factors. What is the significance of " V e " computed 
with these limitations?) 
• The called for parameters appropriately relate to real "errors," not 
to the frequency of omissions i n an audit trail. (Real errors that can 
be reliably identified i n the manner envisioned by the author must 
be mechanical, low-level operations wi th virtually no expectancy for 
self-adaptation or for changes from interaction. This excludes sig­
nificant areas of the accounting process that are of great interest 
to the user of information and the auditor. Subsequent discussion 
gives support to this comment.) 
Concerns of Auditing 
Before attempting the important job of identifying the functional modules 
that are of intimate concern to users of financial information, I would first l ike 
to address some concepts about the fundamental concerns of auditing. 
Accounting information constitutes a model. The model represents and, 
therefore, gives information about the status of a business system. This model 
involves accounting principles designed as a means—a language and a logic—for 
describing that which may exist in a business system. Thus a prime auditing 
question is whether that which has been represented as existing in terms of the 
model also exists in fact. A n error, or non-congruence between the representa­
tion and the fact could come from several causes: 
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1) The language or the logic has been misused or misapplied, or is 
inadequate to fairly describe that which is known to exist. 
2) A n existing fact which the model contemplates should be identified 
has been overlooked or erroneously measured. 
3) That which is known to exist i n fact has purposefully not been de­
scribed either by omission or by substitution of a description of a 
non-existent fact. 
Recorded accounting information is the output of a l iv ing system. The 
status (health and condition) of the business system being represented is dis­
closed not only by giving the results from classifying the external and internal 
transactions into which the business has entered, but also by incorporating into 
the model relationships (attributes) that cast light upon the influence of these 
transactions upon future transactions. These attributes include collectability, 
saleability, recoverability, etc. Thus, the presence of certain attributes of assets 
and liabilities are recorded i n addition to the bare transactions. 
Attributes result not only from the nature of the transactions, but perhaps 
more importantly from economic events that occur or exist i n the environment 
and from entrepreneurial decisions. Economic events include loss of market to 
competition (may affect saleability of inventories), new inventions that cause 
obsolescence, troubles i n the business situation of customers, change in market 
prices, etc. Entrepreneurial decisions can obsolete products, plants, etc. or, con­
trariwise, they can keep life aflame i n assets, such as investments made i n 
research. In summary then, accounting information represents the state of a 
business system that results from the interactions of functional modules, as 
displayed i n Figure 1. 
A primary issue concerning the utility of the information is whether or not 
the results of the interactions of the modules shown i n Figure 1 give a fair 
presentation of that which exists in fact. This issue extends much farther than 
whether transactions have been authorized and the mechanics of handling and 
recording are relatively error free. Audi t ing is challenged to face this broad issue 
in being measured as to its pragmatism and utility. 
















Errors i n Complex Functional Modules 
Several times reference has been made to functional modules that are of 
intimate concern to users of financial information. The presentation thus far 
has been directed towards making evident that such modules must involve re­
cording functions at a level that is germane to the primary question of what 
the model represents as existing. Deviant behavior of these modules constitutes 
errors which affect the primary interest of the user of the information. I identify 
the deviant behavior that constitutes errors expressed i n terms of such modules 
as follows: 
1) Errors that relate to the recording of transactions: 
a) Monies received but not so recorded—representing diversion of 
receipts from credit sales, cash sales of merchandise and miscel­
laneous cash receipts 
b) Monies paid for non-business purposes (payments that divert 
monies of the business) 
c) Non-bona fide sales recorded 
d) Non-bona fide assets recorded—assets falsely represented as identi­
fied by count, and assets physically lost or stolen not recorded 
e) Liabilities incurred but not recorded 
f) Transactions classified or clerically processed so as to bring about 
misrepresentation of attributes which exist in fact 
2) Errors i n recording the occurrence or existence of external events, 
entrepreneurial decisions, and internal activities that affect those 
attributes of assets or liabilities which the model contemplates should 
be recognized 
First, a few thoughts that may result just from studying the classification of 
errors presented. 
One, the type of error that can be ascertained from an inspection methodology 
exists only i n the last listed transaction module (If)—a module likely to cause 
the least difficulty. 
Second, the assessment of the significance of errors is not to be accomplished 
by ascertaining the dollar value of errors i n an account balance. The account 
balance approach was contemplated i n the article by Barry Cushing i n his 
parameter V e . 9 O n the contrary, it is proposed that significance of errors (and 
utility to the user) is to be related to the business function being recorded. The 
functions identify and define roles that the user wants served i n the recording 
system; an error is behavior that deviates from expectations of how the role 
is to be served. 
T h i r d , there may be all kinds of unauthorized execution ( in the sense of 
lack of approvals, etc.) i n the selected functions, but these "errors" do not add 
up to, or predict, or have a demonstrable effect upon the errors which concern 
the user. 
Fourth, each of the user-level functional modules comprise many interacting 
functional elements at several hierarchical levels. Recognition of the nature of 
this complexity leads me to look to a discovery methodology rather than an 
inspection methodology. A n illustration of the elements of one of the systems— 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anatomy of the Error-level Functional Module 
Inspection of the Elements to be Controlled, shown on Figure 2, that can 
be found i n a system for receiving monies without diversion, gives specifics on 
which to base some important conclusions: (1) Whether or not monies may be 
expected to be diverted need not be independent upon the existence, or the 
manner of application of one procedural element. (2) The interlocking of the 
elements provides the strongest and most meaningful assurance of whether or 
not there is compliance as to any one element. If one key element exists, a 
whole cluster must exist. (3) The non-existence of a control element, or low 
frequency i n the number of times evidence exists of its application, is not of 
itself indicative of an error where it hurts: diversion or loss of assets. 
There is an entire chain of systems available that can deter diversion of 
receipts that might result from failures i n any one of the categories. Note that 
in Figure 2, the degree of control may be challenged in this sequence: 
1) Are the incoming checks under direct control from the time of 
receipt until deposit? 
2) If the incoming-check control suggests that checks could be diverted 
without a signal, is there any way to get r id of, or initially avoid 
the accountability charge on the books? 
3) If the accountability charges are not eliminated, w i l l there be effort 
to contact the customer? 
This sequence of questions contemplates the manner i n which major control 
elements interact. That there is extensive interaction of lower level elements 
with each other must also be apparent. A t the major-control level the interactions 
extend to the elements comprising collateral activity, and to the nature of events 
and transactions, with the elements for controlling the processing of a transaction. 
Reliance versus Understanding 
Reference by the reader to the function of receiving monies, as an illustra­
tion, w i l l help me convey what I believe the auditor must rely upon i n order 
to formulate a judgment on the existence of deviant behavior—or non-congru­
ence between that which is recorded and that which exists i n fact. 
It appears obvious to me that the auditor cannot simply use an inspection 
process methodology to observe unequivocal error signals that come from this 
module and conclude that an error does or does not exist. It also appears obvious 
to me that the auditor cannot rely upon the system to catch part of the errors 
and upon "substantive" auditing to catch an adequate portion of the remaining 
errors. There is only one error that either is discovered or not discovered: re­
ceipts of monies of a significant amount have been diverted. A realization about 
diversion either exists or does not exist i n the auditor's mind. 
In short, I do not believe that final reliance and, therefore, the confidence 
in a stated precision, comes from the sum of two separate contributions for dis­
covering error. I believe there is only one source for an auditor's final reliance: 
the gut feel of a critical, competent human being who has developed an under-
standing (by combining hypotheses and empiric evidence) of the manner in 
which a functional role is being performed. In other words, the reliance of the 
auditor is belief in his judgment as to the nature of reality. 
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The understanding of the manner in which a functional role is being 
performed comes from asking questions and getting responses. Philosophers of 
science today assert that even i n the most "objective" of sciences, understanding 
involves intuitive leaps. Understanding exists when a critical, competent person 
feels right. A critical person does not feel right unless he has touched base with 
an adequate number of his perceptions of facts, logical deductions, and visions 
of outcomes. H i s process is more simultaneous than sequential. Findings at 
one base don't settle the issues for the next base; bases cast light upon each other 
by being related like the chicken and the egg. The critical person touches base 
with countless perceptions that without conscious control present themselves to 
his mind ; he considers whether or not they are relevant to the outcome he is 
struggling with . H e gets hunches about relevance by combining the things he 
perceives; an answer satisfying to h i m may result. Above all he exercises judg­
ment holistically. 
In short, understanding is a creative act each time it occurs. Leaps occur 
that give new meaning to old facts. N e w relationships are faced, unexpected 
conclusions may be reached, stimulation for new follow-on steps may emerge. 
Decisions that come from reference to predetermined concepts are not creative. 
Perhaps the issue of how to make a decision by judgment is epitomized by the 
question of whether you know what you see, or you see what you know. I 
submit that creative thought is to know what you see. Reference to pre-estab­
lished hierarchies leads to seeing only what you know, or worse yet, seeing what 
someone who isn't present once knew. 
The Sample of One is Indispensable 
If understanding comes from grasping and perceiving relationships among 
data which were initially unrelated; i f achieving understanding is the process 
by which a human being makes a discovery; i f understanding is built upon 
getting meaning from the answers to questions, then the sample of one is in­
dispensable to auditing. The sample of one is the tool for asking those questions 
that can make answers meaningful. Inspection-type sampling of processing steps 
either is not pragmatic or is counterproductive for freeing the creativity needed 
to develop understanding—the creativity needed to discover. 
F r o m time to time, I have reached the same conclusions concerning a sample 
of one starting from different points than i n this article: analysis by examining 
concrete and specific situations gives me particularly satisfying results about the 
pragmatism of such samples. For this article, however, space and time limit 
the presentation to mostly deductive arguments at abstract conceptual levels. T o 
help somewhat i n perceiving concretely the approach that I am advocating, an 
oversimplified illustration is presented. 
Illustration of Auditing for Diverted Receipts 
The functional module related to receipt of monies is utilized to provide an 
illustration solely because the material already provided in Figure 2 makes dis­
cussion of this module more understandable and meaningful. 
In Company X Y Z , the auditor finds a system that provides little direct 
control over checks received but little chance of substituting credits for any 
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diverted checks. H e also finds that there is excellent follow-up by the credit 
department using an aged accounts receivable trial balance furnished by the 
ledger clerk. Thus, his overall view is that, i n spite of lack of direct control over 
checks received, there is little opportunity for diversion of receipts, except that 
the aging furnished by the ledger clerk may not correspond with the data i n the 
ledgers. T w o alternatives may be considered for learning more about the attri­
butes of monies received: either (1) compare the ledger with a recent aging 
furnished to the credit department, or (2) confirm with customers accounts 
with overdue balances. (It should be noted that, i n this example, one test of 
the attributes of aging in the latter part of the period would be sufficient to 
form a judgment. A t any point that the credit department receives valid infor­
mation about accounts, the auditor's findings are that strong contact with the 
customer may be expected. Diverted receipts handled i n this manner should 
not long remain undetected.) The auditor chose to confirm overdue accounts 
shown on the ledger, but since many accounts were with chain stores, confirma­
tion replies received (after specific follow-up efforts) covered only a minor 
portion of these accounts. 
Under these circumstances, the auditor determined that his next questions 
should be asked by performing either one or both of the following steps: 
1) Compare the ledger wi th the most recent aged trial balance used by 
the credit department for follow-up. 
2) Ask customers to confirm the unpaid status of specific past due in­
voices. 
M y experience leads me to believe that the methodology used by our illus­
trative auditor w i l l give h im a better basis than the usual auditor has for forming 
a judgment about receipt of monies. Current audit methodology would probably 
differ from that in the illustration i n several important respects: 
1) Non-replies to confirmation requests would not be followed by 
checking of an aged trial balance actually used by the credit depart­
ment; chances are attempts to confirm specific overdue invoices would 
not be made. (The meaning of the customers' non-responses to the 
usual auditor would be different from that for the illustrative auditor 
of Company X Y Z . ) 
2) Emphasis on confirming overdue accounts receivable would not be 
developed from the review of internal control. 
3) Status of control over processing of checks would not affect the 
number of confirmation requests to any accounts. The issue con­
cerning check processing would be weighed with other controls 
involving receivables to decide i f control is weak, ordinary, strong, 
etc. A t best, this evaluation would be the controlling influence on 
how many confirmations to send but it would not influence to whom 
they should be sent. 
4) If the overdue customers' accounts were in the sample of confirma­
tions requested, non-reply would not stir further action that differs 
from the action taken for non-reply to other customers' accounts. 
If the two audit approaches are to be evaluated in terms of pragmatism 
for discovering diversion of receipts, then if diversion exists, the approach used 
in the illustration must be seen as superior. Information theory defines infor-
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mation as the existence of interrelationships which constitute constraints upon 
behavior; thus information constitutes a reduction i n the uncertainty of be­
havior—random behavior means non-existence of information, i.e. non-existence 
of, knowledge about relationships. More relationships concerning receipt of 
monies w i l l be recognized by our illustrative auditor than by our usual auditor. 
There w i l l be less uncertainty for our illustrative auditor (his gut can feel 
better) than there w i l l be for our usual auditor i f he were to consult his anatomy. 
The problem for our current auditor, expressed i n less formal language 
than by the use of information theory, is that he is not motivated by his meth­
odology nor does he have adequate information with which to think through 
what he has available for judgment about a specific function. H i s methodology 
does not encourage finding interrelationships to give h i m a gut feel; his emphasis 
is on sufficient (as defined by authority) evidence to "verify" individual pieces 
as though they exist independently. So, for non-receipt of replies to confirma­
tion requests, he refers to standards and practices for what to do next. H e asks 
if he can accept examining subsequent payments of the account or if he must 
examine shipping records. H e does not personally attempt to evaluate what 
the steps contribute to a particular situation on a particular audit; rather, he 
asks what he must do in order to comply with authority. 
Sample-of-one Questions Find More Interrelationships 
Broader inferences can be drawn from the illustration by relating the audit 
work done by the illustrative auditor to a conceptual framework. A framework 
for classifying the steps available to an auditor for increasing information (and 
thus reducing uncertainty) follows: 
1) Ascertain interconnections that exist between transactions, events 
and entrepreneurial decisions, and direct processing steps, operating 
procedures, collateral material and recording decisions (the modules 
of Figure 2) . 
2) Ascertain the actual processing work done—this to include what was 
perceived by the worker, his response to what he perceived, the inter­
actions with other work, and responses to that interaction. (Data 
needed to meaningfully determine the nature and quality of work 
done.) 
3) Ascertain the nature of the audit trial and the extent of its existence. 
4) Obtain representations from the sources of existing or potential 
transactions, events, and decisions and compare these representations 
with recordings i n the accounting records. Representations from 
the source of the occurrence must not be taken from the medium or 
channel regularly used for communications to the accounting system. 
5) Obtain representations from sources (both inside and outside the 
Company) other than the accounting records to develop data for 
casting light upon the existence of attributes of recorded informa­
tion. 
6) Develop symptoms by examining recorded representations and utiliz­
ing internal logic to channel inquiries directed to discovery of the 
non-existence of expected interconnections. (Internal logic refers to 
the dualisms which bring about expectations that a pair must exist 
if one thing is represented to exist. Some few examples are: interest 
101 
expense with debt, property taxes and insurance with real property, 
current age of accounts with collectibility and bona fides, twelve 
monthly charges with annually rented property, rise i n sales prices 
with increased dollar amount of sales when there is no increase i n 
physical deliveries.) 
I maintain that opportunity for discovery increases when the mind has 
acquired an increase in data which is amenable to the forming of interrelation­
ships which are specifically related to the objective. (Interrelationships are data 
converted into information.) O n this premise, an increase in pragmatic power 
occurs in each of the classifications of audit steps shown above, i f the steps are 
directed to developing separately information about each of the functional modules 
i n which "errors" are significant to the user. For each such functional module, 
the following table shows how the relationship of each of the six audit-step 
classifications is viewed with respect to its usefulness for understanding the 
functional module, and i n turn, to the usefulness of developing further informa­


















Used i n 
illustrative 
case 
1. Essential Yes Ordinarily 
no 
Yes 
2. Impractical Yes Yes N o 
3. None .... .... N o 




5. Essential Yes Ordinarily 
no 
Yes 








Comments about the audit-step classifications and other items i n this table follow. 
Previous discussion has been directed to explaining why audit-step classifica­
tions 2 and 3 are indicated as having low priority when they are evaluated by 
the test of pragmatism and utility. 
Audit-step classifications 1, 4, 5 and 6 are contemplated to contribute to the 
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final judgment only i n their combination, not separately. For example, the 
non-return of confirmations (audit-step classification 5) in the illustrative case 
is also a symptom (audit-step classification 6) from which meaning emerges 
when related to information developed about interconnections (audit-step classi­
fication 1). But i n turn, more is known about interconnections than can be 
gleaned from audit-step classification 1 standing by itself. The meaning given 
by audit-step classification 1 to results i n the other audit-step classifications, 
creates meaning not previously existing. Thus, there is no separate or additive 
reliance, only an integrated reliance. The final reliance is based on information 
not even partially present i n any one of the classifications separately. 
Questions, incited or driven by symptoms relevant to a particular function, 
can be expected to lead to answers that give more information about each particu­
lar function than questions asked randomly (without being driven by symptoms) 
over all functions combined. Increase i n information may similarly be expected 
to be developed with respect to transactions, events and decisions i f questions 
are driven by symptoms relevant to individual categories underlying that which 
occurred i n the business system. The existence of order (information) within 
each functional module about such things as geographic areas, large transactions, 
productive material versus supplies versus services, bar steel versus hardware, 
large customers, single source-of-supply vendors, etc., increases the opportunity 
for the mind to leap to creative relationships. In statistical theory, ascertaining 
whether one or more "universes" are present, also stratification, is somewhat 
analagous to developing specific understanding i n significant categories. The 
impact of this upon a "sample of one" w i l l be discussed shortly. 
Attention is directed to the tremendous importance of directing audit-step 
classification 2 towards developing representations from the sources about the 
existence of events and entrepreneurial decisions. The utility of accounting infor­
mation often may be more affected by these factors than by transactions. N o n -
directed questioning, or sampling (or even completely examining transactions), 
as a means of following the audit trail does not provide adequate understanding 
of significant events and entrepreneurial decisions. 
Is understanding increased by isolating information to short periods of time 
throughout the year? The view reflected i n the table is that only for audit-step 
classification 4 (representations from the sources about events, etc.) is time 
always significant. For audit-step classifications 1, 5 and 6, the nature of the 
initial inquiries casts light on whether a spread over time is significant. Ord i ­
narily, audit-step classification 5 gives adequate understanding through inquiring 
about cumulative results. A n example of such inquir ing is i n the illustrative 
case. 
How the Sample of One Works 
The assertion has been advanced that the discovery process for auditing is 
satisfactorily concluded when a critical, competent person feels right about inter­
relationships i n his mind. The interrelationships consist of concepts and experi­
ences that are relevant to objectives he has undertaken to accomplish. H e has 
brought the interrelationships to that concluding point by asking questions 
prompted initially by his previously experienced relationships with analagous 
subject matter; his subsequent questions are prompted by the interrelationships 
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experienced after answers to his question are obtained. When he no longer is 
prompted to ask questions, he understands, he feels right, and he can shout 
Eureka! The shout expresses the satisfaction that comes from having successfully 
combined logic wi th an intuitive leap beyond that indicated by the data. 
In my approach, the sample of one denotes a methodology for asking useful 
questions when one is engaged i n the discovery process. For auditing, the 
sample of one embodies two concepts: 
1) Each question is framed so that the answer is required to be i n a 
form that eliminates ambiguity as to whether communication exists 
between questioner and responder. Wherever possible, this calls for 
answers i n the form of an existing example that is responsive to a 
request to "Show me one." 
2) Each question is designed i n keeping wi th the expectation that the 
sample produced w i l l provide information useful for framing a next 
question; expectations do not exist that samples w i l l produce informa­
tion that independently establishes or substantiates reality. 
Since the incidence of questions is largely dependent upon the answer to 
the preceding question, an inherent quality of the sample of one is that the 
pattern of coverage w i l l vary from engagement to engagement, as well as, from 
year to year. Consider that auditing with the objective of discovery is akin to 
hunting. A hunter catches up to his quarry by learning its fixed patterns; i f 
a hunter's patterns are fixed, he can be made into the hunted. 
A sample constituting one example provides optimal increase in information 
(relationships brought to mind) when it is obtained from a highly ordered 
process. The high degree of order removes uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
sample; its message is clear. A second example under these circumstances can 
give no more nformation than the first. 
This concept of the relationship of order to meaning is evident when con­
sidering a blood sample. Only one sample is taken. Its meaning is clear because 
of the high degree of order that prevails i n the blood system. Observe that the 
high degree of order removes uncertainty as to the meaning of the sample, but 
the order i n no way removes uncertainty as to whether the blood w i l l show 
deviant behavior (an error in good functioning). 
The auditor's commonly held intuitive feeling that increased control i n a 
system warrants a smaller sample must be founded upon this sense of needing 
fewer examples for understanding. However, there is no sound basis for the 
extension of the feeling about reduced uncertainty i n understanding so that it 
includes reduced likelihood of error or deviant behavior. In statistical quality 
control deviant behavior is asked to speak for itself—it is not inferred from the 
orderliness of the machine that produces the product. 
If "errors" must be discovered by developing increased information, a 
second sample of blood is not taken. Other interconnections are made. So i n 
auditing, samples of one are logical, but it is not logical to use size samples 
where "strong" control exists. Note that i f a system ordinarily expected to be 
orderly has no order, this too is determinable from a sample of one. If meaning 
is obliterated by uncertainty, then again, more meaningless samples do not 
increase information. For example, a sample of petty cash vouchers found to 
be prepared i n pencil gives all the information obtainable from them—their 
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meaning for control is uncertain. Examination of more vouchers prepared in 
pencil w i l l not reduce the uncertainty. 
The concept embodied i n a sample of one is applicable to all of the audit-
step classifications deemed useful for the process of discovery. This covers 
classifications 1, 4, 5 and 6 previously discussed. What this contemplates for each 
category w i l l be made more concrete. 
For audit-step classification 1, ascertainting interconnections between occur­
rences with processing (including the interconnection between processing steps) 
and collateral material, the sample of one approach contemplated is straight 
forward. Fol lowing the concept that orderliness reduces uncertainty of under­
standing, the questioning is effected by drawing samples. This contemplates 
working along paths that reflect functional relationships, using representative 
categories of occurrences. For example, one payment voucher for each repre­
sentative vendor, or for each representative material, service, etc. is traced 
through all of the elements related to the payment cycle. Hold ing the same 
sample throughout the processing cycle increases the information about the inter­
connections of the processing and of the occurrences. The same payment vouchers 
should be taken through the engineering department, the procurement depart­
ment, the receiving department, etc., etc. 
Answers received at each stage should always be utilized for framing the 
next question. Expectations of the manner of processing i n related stages are 
developed from answers to questions. Answers received should be particularly 
considered for whether the sampled items i n fact represent homogenous cate­
gories. Also note that an ambiguous answer always warrants or requires a 
new sample of one to determine whether the ambiguity is representative of 
what is to be found. 
For audit-step classification 4, obtaining representation of occurrences from 
the source (sometimes including sources outside the company), the questioning 
initially follows the pattern just described. W o r k i n g along functionally related 
paths the auditor looks for samples of representations of what i n fact occurred. 
What's happened this year? D i d prices go up? Has the number of customers 
increased with whom the company dealt? Have new products been developed? 
What has been the obsolescence problem? Have new markets been entered? 
Is the company getting advertising behind new products? Has the support of 
any products been dropped? W i t h i n each department the auditor would want 
to ask about what information is used for decision making, what written infor­
mation there is concerning the matters discussed. 
Representative samples of one, developed at the sources of occurrences, may 
be used to frame questions to the accounting recordings. In most cases it is 
likely that the question can best be asked by comparing an aggregation (either 
regularly available or specifically computed) from the source with an aggrega­
tion of results reflected by the accounting records. The concept previously given 
that identifies a sample of one is embodied i n this form of questioning. It con­
stitutes one question "designed with the expectation that the sample produced 
w i l l provide information useful for framing a next question." The distinguishing 
characteristic of the sample of one is that the work is one step that is part of 
a purposeful process; it is not an inspection step that exists independently of the 
entire audit process. 
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In this same sense random sampling and statistical theory could be utilized 
to develop an estimate of the aggregate effect of occurrences, as represented by 
the source, for asking one question to obtain one sample about the recording 
of these occurrences. 
For audit-step classification 5, obtaining representation from outside sources 
for casting light upon recorded attributes, the concept embodied in a sample 
of one is again present. This audit step is concerned with confirmation i n its 
generic meaning—i.e., "added information." Nonaccounting-department data 
provides a source of confirmation that auditors seldom utilize. 
For the sample of one philosophy to be followed, "substantive" audit steps 
must be converted from being viewed as the upper hierarchy of evidence (hard 
evidence) obtained to prove that an account balance is substantiated, to being 
information gathered for answering a question about the interconnections in 
a function. 
For example, the existing practice wi th respect to customer confirmations 
replies records the dollar proportion of the total customer accounts that have 
been "confirmed." The initial selection of accounts to be confirmed is unrelated 
to a question about a function. The meaning of the replies cannot be and is not 
looked upon i n the light of the interconnections that exist i n those functional 
modules which are significant as to "error" characteristics. 
T o change this approach, the relationship which the customer's confirmation 
reply can have to the functional modules must be identified. These relationships 
are: 
1) Bona fides of the account (the sales recording function) 
2) Unpaid status of the account (the receipts diversion function) 
3) Disputes over charges (the function of recording events that affect 
attributes to be recognized) 
The initial requests for confirmation must be influenced by the next question 
that needs to be asked about these functional modules. A s i n the situation of 
the illustrative case, this both brings about different selections of accounts for 
confirmation and changes the meaning of the replies. 
Where an attribute to be sampled is distributed over a large number of 
homogenous accounts, random sampling is appropriate. (But confidence limits 
are not a dependent variable of "reliance" upon control.) The aggregate result 
w i l l permit asking one question for each attribute being sampled. 
In the same way, confirmation (getting added information) must proceed 
i n connection with each of the "error" functional modules. Particular emphasis 
must be placed upon the functional module relating to attributes; this stimu­
lation may bring about the change in audit methodology that turns out to be 
the most significant. 
Conclusions 
The question H o w much testing is enough? asked so many times over 
the past forty years was the wrong question. W e needed to first ask whether 
auditing is an inspection process or a discovery process. The right question was 
whether the auditing problem is to see what you know, or to know what you see. 
Further, we needed to make clear to ourselves that the resolution of this question 
is to be governed by pragmatism and utility to the user of information. 
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When this fundamental issue is resolved, the methodology to be used for 
sampling readily becomes clear. I believe resolution in terms of pragmatism and 
utility leads readily to the conclusion that auditing calls for methodology appro­
priate for asking questions about the nature of subject matter that does not 
emit unequivocal signals. Audi t ing is a process of discovery, not observation 
of signals. If the resolution were that auditing is an inspection process, the 
sample of one is indefensible; i f auditing is to know what you see, the sample 
of one is indispensable. O u r present methodology implies the pursuit of a phi­
losophy of auditing consistent with seeing what you know. 
The discovery process successfully functions as a mixture of science and 
intuition. Science must contribute guidelines that encourage and assist human 
creativity. I believe that the most important such guideline is that the audit 
effort should be built from, around and related to functional modules 
relevant to error determination. Clear identification by the profession of these 
modules is the first order of business. The conceptual analysis and comprehen­
sion of audit steps available, i n the manner set forth i n this article, also is an 
important guideline to assist creativity. Comprehension of the strengths, weak­
nesses, and nature of the methodology involved i n the use of the sample of one, 
must be i n the tool kit of a discoverer. Certainly not least, the auditor should 
know systems theory and technology and be highly conversant wi th business 
system practices. 
The content of today's auditing standards is the most significant manifesta­
tion of the audit philosophy presently being advocated. W h e n the standards 
assert that the auditing process is driven by symptoms, not by mandatory pro­
cedures, we w i l l know that the auditor as a discoverer—as a creative human 
being—will have been encouraged. 
I believe the most significant change that the sample-of-one philosophy of 
auditing would bring about is the new discoveries of the non-congruence be­
tween the representation and reality of attributes that come from events and 
entrepreneurial decisions. Relating the significance of auditing results to func­
tional modules rather than dollar balances of accounts might even bring insights 
on dealing with the attribute which is an ever-present bogeyman—the going 
concern question. 
Adoption of the advocated sample-of-one philosophy must introduce a 
challenge to the organization and professional staffing of public accounting firms. 
I believe the challenge is: can the responsibility to society, evaluated i n terms of 
pragmatism and utility, be met by organizations designed for mass production 
and staffed with professionals educated and trained to be dependent upon 
direction and control from the top. 
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Discussant's Response to 
The Sample of One: Indispensable or Indefensible? 
Alvin A. Arens 
Michigan State University 
Before examining i n somewhat greater detail the content of M r . Boni's 
stimulating paper, I would like to establish my perceptions of the primary 
differences between the "Sample of One: Indispensable or Indefensible" and 
Howard Stettler's classic original article of which this is an extension, "Some 
Observations on Statistical Sampling i n A u d i t i n g . " 1 M y reason for doing this 
i n no way is to criticize Boni's paper, but rather to demonstrate that the basic 
concepts so well known from Stettler's article are completely different from the 
ones included in this paper. 
The relevant section i n Stettler's article is where he rejects the recommenda­
tion of the A I C P A Committee on Statistical Sampling for use of reliability 
levels of 50 to 95 percent confidence for compliance testing and states instead: 
By contrast, it is my contention that the auditor may properly 
ignore the question of sample reliability when adequate controls over 
internal control are present, reducing reliability practically to zero, so 
that only one of each type of item need be tested. O n the other hand, 
i f internal control is deficient, the auditor's modification of his examina­
tion should not be i n the direction of increasing sample size for his tests 
of transactions to achieve increased reliability for his conclusions about 
compliance with the system of internal control. The sample of one of 
each type of transaction should suffice to indicate that the system such 
as it is, is operative, and a larger sample that would disclose the extent 
of compliance helps very little i n assessment of the fairness or propriety 
of the account balances produced by the system.2 
The point Stettler was making, using the terminology of S A S #1, section 320, 
is that compliance testing is not necessary beyond a walk-through test to help 
understand the system and that the emphasis should be on substantive testing. 
Boni takes a similar but much broader view of the meaning of a sample 
of one. Although he certainly believes i n the concept of a walk-through test, 
his use of the term "a sample of one" is a much broader concept than Stettler's. 
H e gives an example near the end of the paper where a sample of confirmations 
of accounts receivable is used to test for aging and other attributes of interest. 
Since the items included i n the sample are dealing with one question, the test 
is referred to as a part of a sample of one. Similarly, he also talks about com­
pliance tests wi th a random sample and statistical theory being used to estimate 
the aggregate effect of certain occurrences. 
Whi le Stettler restricted his use of a sample of one to a sample of one or 
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two items, Boni's sample of one pertains to both compliance testing and sub­
stantive testing, and it can include sample sizes of more than one. This use 
of a sample of one, as stated by Boni i n his paper i n footnote 3, is an extension 
of Stettler's concept. It also makes it a considerably different concept. 
Boni's Integrated Approach to Auditing 
Instead of a paper discussing the concept of a sample of one i n the sense 
used by Stettler, my perceptions are that the paper deals with the notion that 
the individual parts of the audit should be carefully integrated with the overall 
objectives of the audit rather than treating each part independently. The basic 
concept Boni deals with involves asking intelligent questions i n all aspects of 
the audit and interrelating relevant parts of the audit by understanding the 
client's system and following up on inquiries and the responses to the inquiries. 
In this context, many excellent and useful comments are made throughout the 
paper. 
Since there are parts of the paper with which I am i n agreement and other 
parts where I disagree, I have chosen to l imit my comments to M r . Boni's 
paper rather than digress into writ ing a separate paper on the subject. It is 
always tempting for a discussant to depart from the assigned topic and write 
a completely new paper on a related subject. In this case, I prefer to avoid that 
temptation. 
Areas in Which We Are in Agreement 
Although it is not feasible to state all of the areas where Boni and I agree 
i n his paper, the following areas of agreement should suffice to demonstrate that 
I support most of his basic ideas. The areas where we agree are not listed in 
any order of importance and are not meant to be mutually exclusive. Since 
these areas where we agree are discussed more extensively i n his paper, there is 
little need for extensive elaboration here. 
1. Auditors should be concerned about transactions wi th outsiders, 
external economic conditions, and entrepreneurial decisions that 
affect the financial statements. More emphasis should probably be 
placed on external economic conditions and entrepreneurial deci­
sions both i n auditing research and i n practice. 
2. The auditor must understand and evaluate the client's system i n the 
broad sense of the use of systems. This includes the accounting 
system, personnel, interrelationships between people, the overall 
organization, the marketing organization to the extent it is relevant 
to the audit, etc. 
3. The development of the audit tests should be based on an under­
standing of the client's system and should emphasize efficient tests 
to locate errors that are expected to exist. 
4. The auditor should not simply comply with auditing standards in 
a rote manner independently of the unique circumstances of the 
audit. A mechanical approach to auditing is unlikely to result i n 
a well-performed audit. 
5. Intelligent questions should be asked throughout the audit and 
they should be the basis for further questions. When auditors do 
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not have inquiring minds, there is increased likelihood of over­
looking errors. 
6. Questions asked i n a systematic manner about the system are more 
useful than random questions. The questions should be framed 
i n a logical fashion that aims toward a complete understanding of 
the client's system. 
7. The sample results of every sample should be carefully analyzed 
to determine the impact of the errors on the system. 
8. Substantive test results should be carefully analyzed to evaluate 
their impact on the client's system. The tendency to evaluate sub­
stantive errors only i n terms of their impact on the financial state­
ments should be avoided. It is important to determine and under­
stand the system weakness that permitted the error. 
9. Once the auditor understands the client's system, he should not 
expand his sample to get a greater understanding of the system. 
The tendency of automatically increasing the sample size whenever 
errors are found should be strongly resisted. Naturally, there are 
instances where it is appropriate to increase the sample beyond the 
original initial sample. 
10. Errors and exceptions of all types must be directed at determining 
their impact on financial information. F r o m an audit point of 
view, only errors in the financial statements directly affect the audi­
tor's opinion. A l l errors should ultimately be evaluated i n terms 
of the effect on the statements. 
11. Creative discovery of problems is highly desirable. It is necessary 
to be constantly on the alert for the unusual, to ask relevant ques­
tions and obtain satisfactory answers, to develop meaningful and 
relevant audit programs that meet specific objectives and to avoid 
being mechanistic i n performing audit responsibilities. 
One area of the paper where I believe a particularly useful contribution is 
made by the author is in his extensive discussion of errors i n the functional 
modules. H e demonstrates clearly that errors discovered in most auditing situa­
tions are highly complex and must be analyzed carefully to determine their 
cause and their implication on the audit. As a part of this discussion of errors, 
the comprehensive table that was developed for "The Elements of a System 
for the Receipt of Monies from Credit Sales" is especially useful. It demon­
strates clearly the difficulty of evaluating systems of internal control and modi­
fying audit programs for weaknesses i n the system. A n extension of the table 
to include other areas of interest to the audit would be a meaningful contribution. 
There are also several areas in the paper where M r . Boni and I hold different 
views. It is these areas where the remainder of the critique w i l l be directed. 
Comparison of the Worst Aspects of Exist ing 
Practice to a Theoretical Approach 
In several parts of Boni's paper criticisms are made of existing auditing 
methods that to me reflect weaknesses i n the day-to-day performance of the 
audit function, rather than shortcomings of existing auditing concepts. It is 
almost certain that any practicing auditor who frequently performs the review 
function w i l l find that there are many audits i n which there are weaknesses in 
the application of good audit theory. 
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It does not seem to be justifiable to compare the conceptual and somewhat 
esoteric approach advocated by Boni to the worst aspects of the practice of public 
accounting that are encountered i n the review of working papers or discussions 
wi th practitioners. It is likely that if the approach recommended by the author 
were adopted i n practice, there would be equally significant shortcomings 
encountered as a result of the pressures of time budgets and as problems arise 
i n applying theory to practice. 
Three examples from Boni's article of his criticism of existing auditing 
philosophy should be sufficient to demonstrate the point that his criticisms are 
of existing auditing practice rather than the current body of theory. 
1. Statistical sampling in auditing is referred to as a mechanical process. 
Statistical sampling in auditing should be exactly the opposite of a mech­
anistic approach. T o the extent that it is mechanistic, it is a reflection of the 
poor practice of public accounting rather than poor theory. There are several 
aspects of statistical sampling that tend to make it non-mechanistic, when 
properly applied. These include requirements of formally specifying the ob­
jectives of the test, definition of the population about which the auditor plans 
to generalize, definition of an error, and perhaps most importantly, an intensive 
follow-up of al l errors discovered i n the statistical test. It seems to me that 
careful tests of the client's system using statistical methods are completely 
consistent with an imaginative, integrated approach to auditing. 
2. There is reference to the fact that auditors do not relate things to each other, 
but rather follow a mechanistic approach. 
There is extensive professional literature to demonstrate that auditors should 
interrelate different parts of the audit into an overall conclusion rather than 
follow a mechanistic approach to auditing. For example, virtually everyone i n 
auditing agrees that tests of sales transactions should be related to confirmations, 
cash receipts tests, and other aspects of the audit. Nevertheless, i n practice there 
may be a tendency to fail to integrate sales transactions tests, confirmations, and 
sales cut-off tests as much as is probably desirable. Again, this is more a reflec­
tion of weak practice than of the existing body of available auditing concepts. 
The extensive illustration that Boni offers of the elements of a system for 
the receipt of monies from credit sales is an excellent contribution to the com­
plex interaction of different elements of the system, but i f practitioners were 
to follow this approach on a day-to-day basis, it is likely that there would be 
many instances of deficient or improper application. These aberrations would 
not be a basis for concluding that Boni's proposals are not appropriate or relevant. 
It would be unfair to criticize his approach to audit program development on 
the basis that some, or even many, practitioners were applying his concept 
improperly. 
3. It is implied that auditors do not evaluate external conditions and manage-
ment decisions as a part of the audit process. 
W h e n auditors do not evaluate external economic conditions and the deci-
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sions made by management while they audit, there is a significant deficiency i n 
their audit performance. It is essential that auditors consider such things as the 
product selling price i n the subsequent period as a part of inventory valuation, 
and general economic conditions i n evaluating the allowance for doubtful ac­
counts. Similarly, auditors must determine whether management decisions i n 
such areas as charge-off of bad debts, inventory obsolescence write downs, and 
capitalization of fixed assets are i n accordance wi th generally accepted accounting 
principles and are consistent with the preceding period. Although there is a 
need for additional research i n more appropriate methods of evaluating external 
conditions and management decisions i n the audit process, both of these are 
currently necessary as a part of good auditing. 
In summary of this section, I believe that M r . Boni has compared some 
of the worst aspects of existing practice to his theoretic approach. As might be 
expected, whenever practice is compared to a concept or theory, the existing 
practice comes out a very poor second. In my opinion, a good portion of M r . 
Boni's criticism of auditing i n this paper is a criticism of what sometimes occurs 
in practice, and most auditors would be similarly critical. 
Relevance of Compliance Testing i n Aud i t ing 
A major area where M r . Boni and I apparently are i n substantial disagree­
ment is the relevance of compliance testing as a part of the entire audit process. 
This comes up indirectly i n several places, but is specifically stated i n the early 
part of the paper when he asserts that " T h e signals emanating at the processing 
stages do not provide information that can be demonstrated to be useful for 
establishing empirically the expectation for errors i n the aggregated end results 
of the processing." 
Depending upon how expectation of errors is interpreted, this statement 
implies to me that compliance testing is not useful for prediction of monetary 
errors i n the financial statements. This is a very strong statement and incon­
sistent wi th my interpretation of most existing professional literature. In order 
to better understand the nature of our disagreement, a brief summary is given 
of my interpretation of Section 320 of SAS #1. 
1. The initial review of internal controls is performed to determine 
the controls the client believes to be i n effect. This is done through 
flowcharting, internal control questionnaires, walk-through tests, 
and discussions with the client. 
2. The extent to which the auditor is wi l l ing to rely upon the existing 
controls to reduce his substantive audit tests is determined by the 
auditor under the assumption that the apparently existing controls 
are actually operating effectively. W h e n the existing controls reduce 
the auditor's expectations of monetary errors i n the financial state­
ments, the auditor should normally perform compliance tests and 
then reduce the substantive tests accordingly if the compliance tests 
indicate an effectively operating system. The compliance tests should 
not be performed if the expected cost of the compliance tests exceeds 
the reduction of cost of substantive tests resulting from relying upon 
the client's system. This could result from relatively ineffective con­
trols or a high cost of the particular compliance tests. 
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3. The auditor must perform compliance procedures to test the controls 
that w i l l be relied upon to reduce the substantive tests. Naturally, 
these tests must be done intelligently and with great care. In many 
instances, the tests w i l l be done jointly wi th substantive tests, again 
under the still unproven assumption that the compliance tests w i l l 
establish that the client's controls are likely to effectively reduce the 
likelihood of errors. 
4. If the compliance tests yield good results, the auditor can rely upon 
the client's system to reduce the substantive tests as originally 
planned. If the actual tests indicate the client's control system is not 
operating effectively, he cannot rely upon the system to reduce the 
substantive tests. A careful evaluation of the nature of the com­
pliance errors and why they exist must be made at this point even 
though the system cannot be relied upon to reduce the substantive 
tests. 
There are at least four implicit assumptions underlying the philosophy of 
using compliance testing as a means of reducing substantive tests. These are 
as follows: 
1. It is possible to relate particular controls i n a system to a final dollar 
balance aggregate. For example, specific controls over recording sales 
must i n some way be related to the final dollar balance i n the sales 
and possibly accounts receivable. 
2. The existence or non-existence of a particular set of controls in a 
particular environment significantly affects the likelihood of dollar 
errors i n the related financial account(s). 
3. The degree of compliance with the control system significantly affects 
the likelihood of dollar errors i n the related financial account(s). 
4. W h e n compliance deviations exist, a predictable effect on the dollar 
errors on the related financial account(s) is possible. 
It is apparent that M r . Boni rejects one or more of these basic assumptions 
i n concluding that the errors detected i n testing the processing stages do not aid 
the auditor i n establishing the expectation of dollar errors in the final dollar 
balances. The only ultimate test of the validity of the above assumptions is i n an 
extensive empirical test of them by relating actual errors discovered i n different 
client systems to the existence or non-existence of particular controls and to the 
extent of compliance with the controls by the client's employees. Since this 
has not been done formally i n any reported research results, there can be no 
absolute assurance that any of the four assumptions are valid. 
If the assumptions are invalid, organizations that set up sophisticated sys­
tems have been wasting resources i n setting them up. In addition, it would 
imply that auditors who have been evaluating and testing controls have also 
been inefficient i n their approach to auditing. Since companies continue to spend 
considerable resources to set up complex systems of control and to utilize ex­
tensive compliance procedures to assure system effectiveness, it seems likely 
that the controls serve a useful purpose. It is unlikely that most clients would 
waste money on ineffective controls. Furthermore, auditors do have considerable 
experience in evaluating the effect of clients' internal controls on final financial 
aggregates. Since auditors continue to test clients' systems by compliance tests, 
that is some evidence, but certainly not conclusive evidence, that compliance tests 
are useful. 
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Although there is no irreputable empirical evidence to support either M r . 
Boni's position or mine, I conclude deductively that different client control 
systems and the extent to which these controls are operative have an effect on 
the likelihood of errors. Furthermore, when auditors carefully evaluate the 
client's system and test the system i n a prudent and reasonable manner, I be­
lieve the results of the tests are also useful in determining the necessary sub­
stantive tests. 
Other Areas of Disagreement 
There are several other minor areas where M r . Boni and I do not agree. 
This final section w i l l briefly discuss three of these. 
First, is M r . Boni's statement that "the use of tools that bring about con­
formity and control of work is inconsistent with good auditing." I disagree 
strongly with this statement. Although I concur that rote mechanistic work is 
undesirable, it does not follow that the use of tools such as statistical sampling 
should or w i l l result i n mechanistic auditing. Specifically, it seems to me that 
statistical sampling can, and usually does when properly applied, provide a 
higher quality of audit performance. For example, the use of random sampling 
and the measurement of sampling error i n statistical applications provide great 
potential benefit without reducing the auditor's judgment. 
Second is the author's criticism of the combining of compliance testing and 
substantive testing into an overall level of reliance as suggested i n Appendix B 
of Section 320 i n SAS #1. The combination of evidence into a final overall 
conclusion is always done either implicitly or explicitly on every audit. The 
author's method of combining evidence from interrelated activities subjectively 
by asking questions and seeking answers is highly complex and difficult to do. 
I do not see any great difference between his approach and the somewhat more 
formal and objective approach stated i n S A S #1. Aga in , I agree wholeheartedly 
that combining different tests should not be done mechanistically or rotely, but 
more sophisticated methods of combining evidence should be recommended. 
The article presented in this symposium by B i l l Felix on the use of decision 
theory in auditing is a far more sophisticated and potentially useful method 
of combining different tests than the methods recommended i n S A S #1. 
Finally, I disagree with Boni's notion of the desirability or acceptability of 
a "gut feel" or "intuitive leaps." It seems to me that attempts at logical con­
clusions based upon actual evidence should be encouraged and emphasized in 
the professional literature. In recent years where there has been considerable 
pressure from legal liability it is essential that audit evidence be as defensible 
as possible. "Intuitive leaps" and "gut feel" hardly seem adequate legal defenses. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Greg Boni's article is long and sometimes difficult to interpret and compre­
hend, but many of his ideas are imaginative, stimulating and certainly worth­
while to think about by anyone interested i n auditing. In a paper with so many 
existing auditing conventions rejected, there are almost certainly some parts of 
the paper with which virtually every thoughtful reader w i l l disagree. A t the 
same time, many of his feelings and philosophies about auditing w i l l appeal to 
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anyone who understands auditing. Yet, the most important contribution in the 
paper is that it does provide a vehicle for stimulating thoughtful discussions 
about the objectives of audit evidence accumulation and alternative ways of 
satisfying those objectives. 
Footnotes 
1. The Journal of Accountancy, April 1966. 
2. Ibid., p. 58. 
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The Case for Continuation of Mandatory Independent Audits 
For Publicly Held Companies 
John C. Burton 
Securities and Exchange Commission* 
When I was asked to speak on this topic I w i l l have to admit that I did 
not initially view it as a hot one. Nevertheless, it did seem desirable to look 
once again at the somewhat strange phenomenon called an audit by an inde­
pendent public accountant to see whether or not the conventional wisdom which 
asserts its necessity is justified. 
H o w M u c h Independence? 
The first question to be considered is whether or not, in fact, we want 
totally independent audits. Here I think the answer is probably no. Independence 
does not necessarily lead to assurance, and absolute independence, which would 
require elimination of all dependence on communication with clients, would 
be bad news indeed. The ultimate independent audit would be where the 
auditor arrives on the scene, is handed the financial statements and the books, 
and talks wi th no one within the company. I think we could agree that such 
an audit would very likely be a rather bad one since an audit depends on candid 
communication between auditor and client i n order for the auditor to develop 
the necessary thorough knowledge of the company and its business which he 
must combine with a knowledge of the accounting measurement model. 
What we do want, therefore, instead of absolute independence is a dis­
passionate unbiased professional review of financial statements. In addition, 
we expect auditors to be proficient in the measurement and communication of 
financial information, and to assist their clients as necessary to insure adequate 
reporting to the public. 
Parties at Interest 
As indicated above, an audit is a rather strange creature and not at all the 
way i n which it is perceived by most outsiders. In an overwhelming majority 
of cases, the audit is essentially a cooperative effort because the interests of 
management, the auditor, and the public coincide. In these engagements the 
*The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility 
for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those 
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's 
colleagues on the staff of the Commission. 
117 
auditor has as his principal responsibility a review of the adequacy of financial 
information systems of the firms with emphasis on the needs of the outside 
investor. In this review, the auditor should also be aware of the information 
needs of management and, as necessary, make appropriate recommendations to 
improve management's control of operations. The auditor's role then is twofold 
—attestation and consultation. The auditor uses his professional skills and ab­
sence of bias to bear public witness to the reliability of financial information 
included i n an annual report to shareholders and to work with management 
to improve the usefulness of the financial information system for both external 
and internal reporting purposes. 
It is worth noting that in a cooperative audit engagement even a bad audit 
does not have a very high social cost because when the financial statements 
prepared by the client do present fairly the results of operations, an audit de­
ficiency w i l l not result in misleading data being given to the public. It may be 
that total stockholder information falls a bit short of what it could be and that 
the audit fee is largely wasted, but these are minor compared to the potentially 
major costs that way arise if deficient audits coexist with managements who 
are trying to obscure the reality of their operation. 
Whi le an audit is normally a cooperative effort, perhaps 5% of the time 
adversary conditions arise. These are situations i n which the interests of man­
agement and the public are diverse, where there are benefits to management 
from a process of reporting other than the full and fair results of operations. 
These are the tough audits, where the auditor more than earns his fee and has 
trouble collecting it. In these circumstances the auditor has the principal role 
of arbitration between the interests of management and the public, and i n such 
cases he must always remember that he serves the public first. H e must avoid 
the situation in which the public perceives it has been cheated as a consequence 
of deficient financial reporting because abuses of this sort carry a very high cost. 
Economic Considerations 
After considering the nature of the audit, we must next test its economic 
utility. In this connection the cost of audits of public companies in the United 
States is not difficult to measure. It has been estimated to be between $750 
mil l ion and a billion dollars per annum. This is not a small figure and the 
question that must be answered is whether the value to society justifies the cost. 
The benefits from audit services, however, are harder to quantify. A s a 
starting point there are the benefits of improved financial information systems 
which result from the auditor's review and suggestions. For most companies 
the auditor also contributes to improved external financial reporting procedures 
and results; presumably he improves the communication process between man­
agement and investors. Finally, the auditor contributes significantly to the 
avoidance of abuse and, as previously indicated, the cost of abuse is very high. 
This service helps keep the company out of trouble, protects the board of 
directors, and builds the confidence of investors. 
Confidence is a key to good markets. Analysts and other investors must be 
confident that the numbers on which they base their investment decisions are 
realistic within the framework of the accounting model or they w i l l be reduced 
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to a feeling of being a part of a random process without knowing what is being 
done to them. 
In the final analysis, the weighing of costs and benefits must represent a 
subjective judgment. The number of independent audits was growing prior to 
the Securities Acts and it can therefore be inferred that, at least for many 
companies, a hard-nosed market judgment justified the cost of an audit. I 
believe this case is stronger today than it was at that time, but since there is no 
definitive evidence or answer, one must have Faith—as I do. 
Should There be Change? 
If we agree that the principle of audits is a worthwhile one, we should 
explore next the question of whether or not things should be done differently. 
A number of suggestions have been made that perhaps there is a better alterna­
tive to the current approach of having independent accountants perform the 
audit function. Some have suggested that this should be a role for Government. 
Although i n my current position I have developed a respect for the role of 
Government i n the market place, I am not convinced this is the right answer. 
Government audits might be cheaper. I believe, however, that they would not 
be as creative, nor would they be as effective i n avoiding abuses. A Government 
audit almost by its very nature is an adversary audit and the record of adversary 
audits in catching abuses is not very good. Such an audit discourages coopera­
tion, which is still the key to most audits. Whi le the auditors of the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Defense Contract Audi t Agency, and the General Account­
ing Office achieve many successes, their overall record also shows the major 
difficulties which arise when the auditee is steadfastly trying to avoid working 
with the auditor. I believe, therefore, that Congress was wise i n rejecting the 
idea of Government audits of companies offering their securities in the public 
market place. 
Another possibility is to create an audit function within the corporation. 
The Audi t Committee of the Board of Directors or some other internal source 
might supervise an internally performed function. I think, however, that it is 
apparent that not only would such auditors tend to lack breadth of expertise 
which comes to independent public accountants through experience with many 
companies, but this approach would also be defective i n those cases where man­
agement had reason for advocacy—at the bottom 5% of the cases where the 
auditor is most tested. This leaves us then with independent accountants, who 
I think can justify the faith which has been placed i n them. 
If we mutually agree that things should not be done differently, we should 
then consider the question of who should select the auditor. There have been 
numerous suggestions that if an outside party such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange were to select auditors they 
would not be so dependent upon the economic market place, and would be able 
to be more independent and less subject to the pressures of management. Once 
again, however, we can get to the question of whether the cost i n terms of lack 
of cooperation i n such audits would be greater than the benefits created by the 
lack of relationship. I am not persuaded that the benefits of such a system 
outweigh the very substantial problems that coexist with it. 
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Final ly, there are questions raised as to who should pay for audits. Many 
of those suggesting that auditors be appointed by outside agencies also suggest 
some pooling of resources to pay audit fees. They suggest a N e w York Stock 
Exchange fee or some other device by which a pool of funds w i l l be generated. 
Whi le this again has some appeal, since the economic relationship between the 
auditor and his clients is one of the principal problems of outward appearance 
that exists, I am doubtful that it would be an improvement. The discipline of 
the market place is still beneficial i n the audit world, and an auditor who did 
not have a responsibility to his client to do a good job i n economic terms might 
well tend to over-audit. W e should not encourage a steady increase i n pro­
cedures simply because money is available. W h i l e there are problems with the 
current fee arrangements, I think that they represent as good a solution as any 
that have currently been proposed. 
Increasing Auditors' Rights 
If we are to continue to operate within the current broad framework then 
we must determine what changes might be made to improve the quality of audit 
work and avoid perceived problems. In the first place, a number of things can 
be done to increase auditors' rights. Whi le I would hesitate to suggest tenure, it 
would seem that a longer period of appointment might be beneficial. It is well 
known that during the first year of an audit, auditors generally absorb some 
significant nonrecurring costs. If the auditor could be assured of three, four 
or five years of audit relationships some economic pressures that might otherwise 
exist could be avoided. 
Secondly, auditors should be given the right to attend meetings of the 
board of directors and stockholders of corporations. Corporate policy is set at 
directors' meetings and if the auditor is to be fully apprised of what is going 
on and if his services are to be most productively used, his attendance at such 
meetings would be beneficial. Stockholders' meetings are generally attended by 
auditors today and the availability of the auditor to answer stockholders' ques­
tions, as well as to make a statement i f necessary, seems desirable. 
T h i r d , there should be increasing pressure for mandatory audit committees 
comprised of board members to whom the auditor w i l l have a direct channel 
of communication. This is not only a protection to the board but also an im­
portant right for the auditor since he is able to deal with members of the board 
on a continuing institutionalized basis. 
Fourth, it might be desirable to permit the auditor to communicate directly 
to the shareholders whenever he feels it is necessary for h i m to do so. Whi le 
such communications would be infrequent, it seems an appropriate lightning 
rod and device by which auditors could encourage greater corporate disclosure 
when they felt it was necessary. Such a right might be implemented by a change 
i n the SEC's proxy rules to require management to make a section i n the proxy 
statement available to the auditor to enable h i m to make any statement to the 
stockholders which he feels necessary under the circumstances. 
Finally, the auditor should have certain rights i n regard to the disclosure 
of his dismissal. Our 8-K requirements currently represent a significant step 
forward in this regard, but it may be that they should be extended to require 
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disclosure i n a proxy statement or annual report any time an auditor is changed. 
In addition, it might be that some public notice of auditor change should be 
required of any corporation beyond the simple 8-K requirement to report the 
hir ing of a new auditor. 
Some Accompanying Added Obligations 
If auditors are to have more rights as I recommend, they should also recog­
nize additional obligations. In this regard I believe that there is a need for 
increased use of the attest function. Auditors should be prepared, for example, 
to attest i n some fashion to a company's internal control system and perhaps to 
forecasts or projections. 
In addition, the concept of auditor of public record needs development. 
Under this concept, the auditor has a continuing responsibility to review all 
public communications to investors and shareholders on a timely basis—not 
with the objective of performing an audit on interim and other data but to 
provide assurance that audited financial results are not being misused in press 
releases and annual reports and to be certain that accounting and measurement 
problems have been adequately aired prior to the publication of interim reports 
and other announcements. It is apparent that substantial work must be done i n 
the development of standards in this area but the concept seems to be one which 
is growing i n acceptance. 
Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary Change 
In the final analysis then, this re-examination of the role of the auditor has 
not created a cry for revolutionary change. Rather, I believe that evolution of 
the auditor's role is essential and that the opportunities are very great for in­
creased social service and function by the public accounting profession. Such 
increased opportunities should result both i n increased revenues and increased 
responsibilities. As we see the tremendous growth i n accounting enrollments 
i n schools of business today, we can perhaps take pleasure in the fact that stu­
dents are voting with their careers for a broader accounting function. If the 
profession avoids the paralysis which fear of liability can bring it and is prepared 
to see its role evolve, then both the public and the profession w i l l be well served. 
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